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Abstract 
 
An important feature of Chinese industrial relations is the changing role of collective labour 
since the early 2000s. The authorities in Beijing have introduced substantial new legislation 
and policies aimed at strengthening the contractual basis of employment and encouraging the 
extension of trade union membership and collective bargaining. Meanwhile, unofficial strikes 
in non-state sectors have become increasingly severe in terms of their intensity 
and complexity. The Chinese trade unions, which in law protect workers’ rights, have 
encountered challenges from the increasing demands of these strikes. This thesis looks at how 
the Chinese trade unions have responded to pressures from rank-and-file workers in the 
private sector. 
 
The thesis starts with a review of the development of Chinese labour law relating to dispute 
resolution and trade unions in the transition from a command economy to a partial capitalist 
market economy. A literature review of the role of trade unions in industrial conflict indicates 
the limitations of recent research arising from looking at workplace disputes from the outside. 
The thesis then presents original case studies of six foreign-owned enterprises, including one 
joint-venture enterprise. It describes and analyses the process of dispute resolution 
or avoidance at these workplaces during the strike wave of 2010. The cases drew on a range 
of interviews and participant observations, and examined the ways in which the trade 
unions had been practically involved in managing strikes. 
 
The thesis suggests that strikes continue to be autonomously organised by workers, while 
trade unions generally pursue a role limited to resolving the dispute. The cases illustrate how 
union guidance in dispute resolution encourages concessions to workers’ demands by foreign 
employers. The operational forms and the effects of this union dominated approach are varied, 
reflecting the specific industrial relations context at different locations. 
 
The research suggests that this reactive union approach is likely to be unstable and 
conditional. In the reforms that have followed strike action, the status of trade unions is being 
enhanced as a result of a simultaneous strengthening of their links with both workers and the 
government authorities. There are mixed implications for the likelihood that the trade unions 
will become more responsive in character. The thesis provides insights on the potential and 
constraints of state-approved trade unions in channeling workers’ discontents into formal 
decision-making processes. 
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Chapter One – Introduction – Labour Relations in China 
 
1.1 Labour Relations and Labour Disputes under Marketisation  
 
1.11 The Emergence of Marketised Labour Relations 
 
Since the late 1970s, central government in China has embarked upon transforming 
socialist labour relations into marketised labour relations. The Third Plenum of the 
Central Committee of the Eleventh National Party Congress reset China’s economic 
path from a state socialist economy to capitalism, of which labour reforms were an 
integral part.1 The transformation from the administrative-command system to market 
relations included abandoning employment protections of ‘cradle-to-grave’, releasing 
the labour force in the free labour market based on a labour contract system, as well 
as applying the marketised institutions to determine the labour wage levels while 
empowering enterprises’ comprehensive managerial authority. The new type of 
employment was featured by marketisation. 
 
The reform of ‘Zhengqi Fenkai’ (a separation between politics and enterprise 
management) in management of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Collective-
Owned Enterprises (COEs) separated the right of ownership from the right of 
management. Boards of directors, shareholders and supervisors formed the 
governance structure, with the ‘purpose to achieve economic efficiency and profit 
maximization for the investor’. Under these superior committees, managers were 
committed to their responsibilities in the production agenda, the definition of work 
obligations, determination of wage levels, as well as recruitment and selection and 
other managerial functions. The 1995 Labour Law legalised this new type of market-
located employment relations, by implementing the labour contract system. The 
market institutions were permitted to be the principal forces behind wage 
determination. It set the direction of the wage reform: the market determines, the 
enterprises mediate, the government monitors.2 Workers, in principle, were to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chang, K. (2013), ‘The Collective Transformation of Labor Relations and the Improvement 
of the Government’s Labor Policy’, in Social Sciences in China, 2013(6), pp. 91 – 108. In 
Chinese. 
2 Zhang, Y. N. and Chen, L. Y. (2005), 2005 Report on Situation of Chinese Enterprise 
Labour Relations, Beijing: Enterprise Management Press. In Chinese. 
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rewarded for performance or productivity, and the level of their wage was also linked 
to the economic efficiency of the enterprise. Layoffs were defined as the legitimate 
rights of state enterprise management.3 Furthermore, employment insurance, as one of 
the crucial parts of the pay package, was to be socially administered.4 Management 
and labour became independent groups in pursuit of differentiated interests.  
 
The reforms also introduced different types of enterprises in terms of ownership, apart 
from the SOE and COE, which used to be dominant in production and the economy 
underwent privatisation. Private Owned Enterprises (POEs), including Demotic 
Private Enterprises (DPE), Joint-Venture Enterprises (JVE), and Foreign-Invested 
Enterprises (FIE),5 which used to be constrained because of their exploitative nature, 
now have become the major forms of economic organisation in China. Two groups 
who sold their labour power to the companies mainly constituted the labour force. 
One was the workers in the SOEs transferred from the ‘masters of the enterprise’ to 
‘employed employees’ in the new marketised labour relations. The other one was the 
migrant workers who temporarily migrated from the countryside to urban areas to be 
employed in the POEs.6 The latter were directly employed in enterprises with a 
capitalist mode of production.7  
 
1.12 Labour Management under Cost-Cutting Strategies  
 
Marketisation led to changes of marketised employment in the state-owned sectors 
and in the privately owned sectors, which has been accompanied by the enhanced 
authority and influence of managers. The labour management in both SOEs and POEs 
was characterised by the low labour cost strategy. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Chen, F. (1995), Economic Transition and Political Legitimacy in Post-Mao China: 
Ideology and Reform, p. 180, New York: State University of New York Press. 
4 Lo, V. I. (1999), Law and Industrial Relations: China and Japan after World War II, 
London: Kluwer Law International. 
5 Sometimes, the POE refers to domestic owned enterprises only. 
6 Because of the residential registration (hukou) system, they can hardly be employed in the 
SOEs. The residential registration system separates residents in rural and urban areas, in 
terms of their formal identity, based on which the resources of welfare, education, 
employment, etc. are allocated. 
7 Chang, K. (2013), ‘The Collective Transformation of Labor Relations and the Improvement 
of the Government’s Labor Policy’, in Social Sciences in China, 2013(6), pp. 91-108. In 
Chinese. 
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In SOEs the practice of ‘life-time employment’ was to be replaced by ‘massive 
layoffs, widespread unemployment, forced early retirements and frequent failure to 
provide promised wage, pension and health-care benefits’.8  And for those who 
remained, their labour relations with the enterprise, and their wage levels, were to be 
set by the ‘enterprise profitability or a combined indicator of economic returns’ which 
‘vary by region and reflect local economic conditions’. In general, there are two 
components of wage structure, the ‘fixed’ and the ‘variable’. The former consists of 
the basic wage, seniority wage, insurance (medical, unemployment and pensions), and 
a housing fund, while the latter mainly depends upon the individual productivity and 
enterprise profitability.9  
 
The wage level in SOEs is generally higher than the pay for comparable work in the 
private sector.10 It is estimated that the average wage in sectors such as Electricity, 
Gas and Water, in which the SOE employees account for more than half of the labour 
force, is twice or triple that of other sectors. 11 But there is also a dramatic disparity of 
the wage between the senior managers and middle or lower level workers, sometimes, 
by 20 times to 30 times.12  
 
The substantial privatisation of SOEs and COEs in the late 1990s had negative 
consequences for hundreds of thousands of workers and their families. For those who 
still maintained their positions in enterprises that were often on the verge of collapse, 
they faced (or were threatened by) receiving barely adequate compensation or wages 
from their enterprises.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Gile, J., Park, A. and Cai, F. (2006), ‘How has Economic Restructuring Affected China’s 
Urban Workers?’, p. 61, in The China Quarterly, (2006), 185(1), pp. 61-95. 
9 Yueh, L. Y. (2004), ‘Wage Reform in China During the 1990s’, p. 152-153, in Asian 
Economic Journal, (2004), 18(2), pp. 149-65. 
10 Cai, F., Wang, D. W., Zhang, C. W. and Xie, J. H. (2000), ‘Chinese Economic Increase: the 
Labour Force, the Human Capital and the Employment Structure’, in Wang, X. L. and Fan, H. 
(eds.) Sustainability of Chinese Economic Development, Beijing: Economic Science Press. In 
Chinese. 
11 National Statistics Bureau (2008), 2008 Annual Report on the Statistics on Population and 
employment in China, Beijing: China Statistics Press. In Chinese. 
12 Tian, S. Q. (2008), ‘Chapter 6: the Situation of Wage and Working Hour’, in Chang, k. 
(ed.), Report on labour relations in China: characteristics and tendencies of labour relations 
in contemporary China, Beijing: Chinese Labour and Social Security Press. In Chinese. 
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After the commencement of the economic reform, the private owned firms and then 
the joint venture firms had been welcomed and encouraged. The pay system in these 
private firms varies in different sectors and individual enterprises. Enjoying 
considerable autonomy in management, the wage standards, forms of wage payment, 
bonuses and level of subsidies are decided by the labour market rate and the 
employers’ discretion.13 There emerged severe violation by managers of workers’ 
statutory rights by wage reductions or unpaid wage arrears. It is estimated that 43% of 
private firms provided a wage below the minimum wage.14 Rights infringements were 
also common in mandatory overtime, physical abuse, occupational diseases, and 
industrial accidents.  
 
Since the first FIEs were founded in Shenzhen in 1979, regions such as Pearl River 
Delta, Yangze River Delta and some coastal cities have been open to labour-intensive 
export-oriented industries.15 These regions have attracted substantial investments from 
the West and nearby Asian areas such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc.16 Working 
conditions in FIEs are generally more satisfactory than in domestic enterprises. Yet 
research suggests that with the primary aim of obtaining comparative advantage by 
exploiting lower-cost manufacturing, the transfer of advanced human resource 
management practices from their home countries are sometimes viewed by the 
managers as ‘unnecessary’, and the actual practices often based on short-term cost-
benefit analysis.17 
 
1.2 Labour Disputes and the 2010 Strike Wave  
 
1.21 Changes in Labour Disputes  
 
Exposure to open market forces has encouraged labour unrest. The underlying market 
mechanism of wage levels, excess labour supply, ill-formed labour market institutions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial Relations in China, p. 25, Chelterham: 
Edward Elgar. 
14 Zhang, Y. N. and Chen, L. Y. (2005), 2005 Report on Situation of Chinese Enterprise 
Labour Relations, Beijing: Enterprise Management Press. In Chinese. 
15 Wang, K. (2008), ‘A Changing Arena of Industrial Relations in China –what is happening 
after 1978’, p. 197, in Employment Relations, 30, 2, pp. 190-216. 
16 Taylor, B. (2001), ‘The Management of Labour in Japanese Manufacturing Plants in 
China’, in The Journal of Human Resource Management, 12(4), pp. 601-620. 
17 Taylor, B. (2001), ‘The Management of Labour in Japanese Manufacturing Plants in China’ 
p. 614, in The Journal of Human Resource Management, 12(4), pp. 601-620. 
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and unfettered managerial forces, were the primary reasons triggering labour 
disputes.18 The first part draws on official statistics, it describes the extent and 
complexity of disputes. The second part turns to collective actions with the focus on 
strikes. It argues that there emerged dramatic changes in the nature of the disputes. 
Despite the lack of official statistics on strikes provided by government or other 
authoritative institutions in China, scholars have devised alternative estimates of 
collective disputes. They particularly draw on individual case studies.  
 
Changes in general disputes 
 
Before mapping the contours, it is necessary to clarify the identification of disputes in 
the field of labour in China. Labour disputes are normally classifiable by the number 
of people involved in disputes that are either individual disputes or collective disputes; 
or by the nature of the dispute in terms of rights disputes and interest disputes; or by 
the procedural form in which the disputants take - in the reactive channel of grievance 
settlements and in the proactive forms of collective bargaining and collective 
actions.19 The last category of disputes shall also be regarded in terms of the solution 
to the disputes. These classifications are interconnected. For instance, individual 
labour dispute procedures are mostly concerned with statutory or contractual rights, 
through the relevant individual grievance process. 20  Collective bargaining and 
collective action are typical forms of adjustment machinery over disputes of interests 
that are ‘non-adjudicable, [and] may or may not be arbitrable’,21 on the grounds that 
the collective bargaining and collective action reflect the power relationship in the 
decision-making process, which can hardly be achieved by individuals acting alone.22 
Strikes are the normal form of collective action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the Joint Venture, it is universal that the labour management is charged by the local 
managers.  
19 Michelle, K. (1999), ‘New Forms of Work Organization and Their Impact on the Grievance 
Procedure’, in Eaton, A. and Keefe, J. (eds.), Employment Dispute Resolution and Work 
Rights in the Changing Workplace, Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association. 
20 Michelle, K. (1999), ‘New Forms of Work Organization and Their Impact on the Grievance 
Procedure’, in Eaton, A. and Keefe, J. (eds.), Employment Dispute Resolution and Work 
Rights in the Changing Workplace, Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association. 
21 Spielmans, J. V. (1939), ‘Labor Disputes on Rights and on Interests’, p. 299, in American 
Economic Review, 29(2), (Jun., 1939), pp. 299-312. 
22 Hyman, R. (1975), Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction, p. 194, Basingstoke: 
MacMillan; also see Flanders, A. (1968), ‘What are Trade Unions for?’,  in Management and 
Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations, (1975), Faber and Faber: London.  
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The main forms of collective action in China are various, including strikes, stoppages, 
go-slows, petitions, processions, demonstrations, sit-ins, road blockades, picketing, 
and surrounding government building.23 In the Chinese judicial terminology, strikes or 
collective actions are not included in the frame of reference as the sort of collective 
disputes to be entered in official statistics. Those collective disputes recorded and 
published by the statistical bureaux are basically disputes of rights.24 The narratives of 
the statistical facts in this section do not separate strikes from collective disputes in 
general. The collective disputes in the main case studies in this research however 
specifically cover the form of a strike in which workers abandoned their work. The 
terminologies in this research in terms of collective disputes, collective actions, and 
strikes are interchangeable unless otherwise indicated.  
 
Official statistics reveal that the development of disputes was associated with 
economic demands arising from the marketisation of labour relations. Data noted the 
changed foci of labour disputes between the 1980s and 1990s reform periods. At the 
beginning of the reforms, disputes focused on narrowly defined ‘contract issues’, 
concerned with contract implementation or dismissal; whereas from the 1990s, 
appeals relating to ‘economic issues’, such as labour remuneration or social insurance, 
became the primary concerns of the labour disputes.25 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial Relations in China, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham; Shen, J. (2007), Labour Disputes and Their Resolution in China, Chandos 
Publishing: Oxford; Qiao, J. (2009), ‘Chapter 16: Investigation and Analysis on the Situation 
of Trade Union Officials in Enterprises –Investigating 1811 Trade Union Presidents by 
Questionnaires’, in Chang, K. (eds.), Characteristics and Tendencies of Labor Relations in 
Contemporary China, Chinese Labour and Social Security Press: Beijing. In Chinese. 
24 The collective labour disputes are defined as, according to the Regulation on Handling 
Labour Disputes in Enterprises’ (1993-6-11), ‘three and more than three workers who are 
involved in the labour disputes, with the joint request, should recommend the representatives 
to attend the negotiation and arbitration activities’, and the latest provisions in the Law of 
Labour Disputes Conciliation and Arbitration and the Labour Contract (2008-5-1) increased 
that number from three to ten. Relevant provisions on collective bargaining provided the 
regulatory framework of dispute of interests, yet these regulations excluded the strike. The 
legal framework of the strike will be discussed in Section 4 Chapter Three.  
25 Zhang, Y. M. (2003), ‘Labour Movements in the time of Reform in China’, in Twenty-First 
Century, (Apr 2003) No.76, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/issue/articles/076_0210017.pdf  
(accessed 14/01/22). In Chinese; Chan C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: 
Strikes and the changing labour regime in global factories, p.30, London: Routledge. 
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The Public Report of the Development of Labour and Social Security demonstrates 
the consistently rising number of collective labour disputes. From 1991 to 2008, the 
number of collective labour disputes increased from 1.5 thousand to 22 thousand.26 In 
1996, the figure of involved workers in SOEs was only 21% with a caseload 
percentage of 35%; while in FIEs, the proportion of labour disputes accounted for 
around 21%, whereas the number of workers involved in FIE disputes accounted for 
52% of the total.27 In 1998, at the start of SOE privatising, collective labour disputes 
rose by 65% while the number of people involved rose by 89% (see Figure 1).28 In 
2004, despite the high yearly increase rate (also see Figure 1), the average number of 
workers involved per case fell dramatically from 47 to 25,29 which may be partially 
attributed to the ending of SOE reform. 
 
Figure 1.  Collective Labour Disputes Registered for Arbitration, 1994-2008 
 
Source: China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various years 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Figures are drawn from Public Report on the Development of Labour and Social Security 
2006-2008 provided by MOL and National Statistics Bureau, online, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/t20090519_402559984.htm (accessed 10/5/2 – 
invalid access). In Chinese.  
27 Zhang, Y. M. (2003), ‘Labour Movements in the time of Reform in China’, in Twenty-First 
Century, (Apr. 2003) No.76, http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/issue/articles/076_0210017.pdf  
(Accessed 14/1/22). In Chinese. 
28 Figures are drawn from Public Report on the Development of Labour and Social Security 
2006-2008 provided by Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and National 
Statistics Bureau. http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/qttjgb/qgqttjgb/t20090519_402559984.htm 
(accessed 10/5/2 – invalid access). In Chinese. 
29 China Labour Website, Data analysis on national labour dispute resolution in 2004, online, 
http://www.labournet.com.cn/ldzy/ckzl/t15.asp (accessed on 14/8/9). In Chinese. 
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These collective labour disputes showed by the official data were characterised by 
‘disputes of rights’, where the workers’ legal or contractual rights were infringed by 
the management. By observing these labour disputes, Lee concluded that the major 
types of workplace grievances are: ‘(1) unpaid wages, illegal wage deductions, or 
substandard wage rates; (2) disciplinary violence and violations of dignity; and (3) 
industrial injuries and lack of injury compensation’.30 Disaggregation of protests by 
region roughly echoes the categories between SOE and POE. ‘Rustbelt’ regions, such 
as the Northeast, Central Coast, upper Changjiang and North-central are the foci of 
SOE workers disputes.31 The highly globalised zones of the ‘sunbelt’ regions located 
in the Southeast have a high incidence of action by migrant workers.32  
 
Changes in strikes  
 
From 2004 onwards, except the year 2008,33 collective labour disputes in the official 
statistics declined dramatically while the unofficial records captured the change of 
workers’ collective action in both number and pattern. Most of these strikes were 
provoked by managers’ breaking the law or by harsh management as disputes of right, 
while a number had gone beyond the statutory provisions as disputes of interest (see 
Figure 2).34 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Lee, C. K. (2007), Against the Law: Labour Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, p. 
165, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
31 Hurst, W. (2009), ‘Chapter Five’ in The Chinese Worker After Socialism. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
32 Blecher, M. (2009), ‘Globlization, Structural Reform and Labour Politics in China’, in 
Global Labour Journal, 1(1), pp. 92-111; also see Lee, C. K. (2007), Against the Law: 
Labour Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt, pp. 165, Berkeley: University of California 
Press.  
33 In 2008 the implementation of the Labour Contract Law and the Law on Labour Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration expanded both the caseloads of overall labour disputes and 
collective labour disputes. Within a year, there was a surge of labour disputes from 500,000 to 
693,000 while the number of workers involved in these disputes doubled from 650,000 to 1.2 
million. 
34 The proportions were drawn from a study on 553 cases of collective action between 2000 
and 2010. See China Labour Bulletin, 2012. A Decade of Change: The Workers’ Movement in 
China 2000-2010, online, http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/files/2000-
2010_Chinese_workers_movement_research_report.pdf (accessed 14/08/13) 
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Figure 2.  Changes in protests between right dispute and interest dispute: 2000-2010 
 
The percentages of right disputes are in dark grey, of interest disputes are in light grey 
Source: China Labour Bulletin, 2012:17. 
 
Investigations reveal, tracing back to the early stage of the reform, the gradual 
appearance of strikes over interests disputes. Out of 155 workers’ collective actions in 
1992, 10% came from FIEs, of which the number of workers accounted for less than 
2%.35 Strike incidents in subsequent years were frequently in FIEs and domestic 
private enterprises along the Southeast coast. The number went up from 244 in 1993, 
to 668 in 1994 and reached its peak of 1,041 in 1995, then fell to 1,016 in 1996.36 In 
Guangdong, spontaneous walkouts and strikes in foreign-owned enterprises have been 
widely reported in the press.37 These strikes frequently occurred in the primarily 
export-oriented industrial zones, such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, etc. 
 
A strike wave in 1992-1994 was observed along the Southeast coast.38 Although very 
much the minority, these cases nevertheless implied the workers’ relatively advanced 
rights consciousness, and their capability to act strategically. In these cases, strikes 
and sit-ins were the main forms of protest. A strike in Canon Company in Zhuhai was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This sort of enterprises normally includes Sino-foreign joint ventures, cooperative 
businesses, and exclusively foreign-owned enterprises. 
36 Chen, F. (2003), ‘Industrial Restructuring and Workers’ Resistance in China’, in Modern 
China, 29(2) (Apr. 2003) pp. 237-263. 
37 Lee, C. K. (1998), ‘The Labour Politics of Market Socialism: Collective Inaction and Class 
Experiences among State Workers Guangzhou’, p.5, in Modern China, 24(1) (Jan. 1998), pp. 
3-33. 
38 Leung, W. Y. (1988), Smashing the Iron Rice Pot: Workers and Unions in China’s Market 
Socialism, Hongkong: Asia Monitor Resource Center. 
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initiated with demands for a 30% wage increase and accommodation provision. Their 
demands were regarded by the local authority as ‘unreasonable’. In San Mei (a 
Japanese owned company) in the same city, workers protested against their wage as 
‘insufficient to compensate for the inflation rate.’ In the latter case, workers appealed 
to the local trade union to organise the workplace union, and they elected their own 
bargaining representative in negotiations with the manager. In Zhuhai, another strike 
occurred in a Chinese toy factory, where workers ‘circulated hand-written pamphlets 
outside the factory, persuading others not to work and displayed a Dazibao (Big 
Character Poster) (of the demands)…(which was) also posted outside the factory…’ 
In one case in Shenzhen, strikers organised a continuing trade union organization. 39   
 
Since the middle 2000s, as the disputes in POEs became more dominant, collective 
action in the form of strikes was apparent in the growing areas in coastal cities. 
Statistics on collective action outside the official sphere suggest these protests 
developed dramatically in POEs (see Figure 3).40  
 
Figure 3.  Workers’ Collective Action: distribution by type of enterprise, 2000-2010 
 
The percentages of SOEs are in dark grey, of POEs are in light grey 
Source: China Labour Bulletin, 2012:16. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 All the cases were drawn from Chan’s book (2010), page 24 to 37, see Chan, C. K. C. 
(2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour regime in global 
factories, London: Routledge.  
40 The proportions were drawn from a study on 553 cases of collective action between 2000 
and 2010. See China Labour Bulletin, 2012. A Decade of Change: The Workers’ Movement in 
China 2000-2010, online, http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/files/2000-
2010_Chinese_workers_movement_research_report.pdf (accessed 14/08/13). In Chinese. 
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These findings imply that waves of strikes have occurred frequently in places where 
the wages and working conditions are generally higher than in other types of 
enterprises.41 A number of features of these cases can be identified. First, workers’ 
demands became more radical and aggressive. Two cases showed the difference 
between strikers’ demands in 2004 and in 2007. The former requested the full 
implementation of basic labour rights and remedies for employers’ harsh management, 
while the latter ‘asked for a decent wage in addition to a proper working and living 
environment.’42 Again, in-depth interviews on strikes after 2008 revealed that workers’ 
demands have transferred from the implementation of their statutory rights to a ‘moral’ 
minimum as well as access to negotiation with managers as well as being treated with 
respect. 43  Furthermore, demands for the establishment of more sustainable 
mechanisms of ‘voice at the workplace’ became more common. They requested the 
reform of the current remuneration system to be more reasonable, notably seeking 
linking of pay with the profits the company gained in many cases44; establishment of 
collective mechanisms in wage determination, namely collective bargaining;45 and 
setting up or restructuring more representative workplace trade unions. 
 
Secondly, strikes have become strategically sophisticated over time. One sociologist 
described the workers’ developing strategies in strikes: ‘…in 1993 to 1994, strikers 
confined themselves to the factory complex, whereas in 2004 and 2007 they began 
walking out to the highway to attract public attention and state intervention. In the 
2004 case, the workers transferred the struggle experience to a new factory in another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 China Labour Bulletin, (2011), The Workers’ Movement in China 2009-2011, p. 10, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/unity_is_strength_web.pdf 
(accessed 14/08/09) 
42 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), ‘Class Struggle in China: Case Studies of Migrant Workers Strikes 
in the Pearl River Delta’, p. 73, in South African Review of Sociology, 41(3), pp. 61-80. 
43 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 
31, paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 
2nd-5th July 2012. 
44 It is remarked that, one of the main reasons leading to the high frequency of strikes in auto 
companies is the disproportional gap between the high profit and low wage. See China 
Labour Bulletin, (2011), The Workers’ Movement in China 2009-2011, p. 10, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/unity_is_strength_web.pdf 
(accessed 14/08/09) 
45 China Labour Bulletin, (2009) The Workers’ Movement in China 2007-2008, p. 20, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/workers_movement_07-
08_print_final.pdf (accessed 14/08/13) 
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city, whereas in 2007 workers in two factories owned by the same company 
coordinated with one another to stage a joint strike.’46 The comparison among three 
cases suggested that, compared with two cases during the early reform (in 1993 and in 
1994), the one in 2004 ‘marked workers’ advanced… organising capacity, struggle 
strategy and the duration and scale of the strike.’47 Two other cases in 2007 and 2010 
similarly presented workers’ demands for higher wages and working conditions than 
were provided for by legal provisions.48 Since the mid-2000s, the strategy of workers’ 
protests has moved from street demonstrations to collective actions within enterprises. 
This was ‘a gradual move away from targeting the state to confronting employers 
directly, with the aim of forcing them to negotiate.’49 
 
Subsequent research suggested this change has continued. In a case in Zhuzhou in 
2011, which was led by white-collar office workers, strikers went beyond the 
workplace struggle and reached out to the Zhuzhou Municipal Federation of Trade 
Unions. The author described the strikers’ action of making a list of workers’ 
demands and organising workers’ representative as ‘(holding) Western-style 
negotiations’.50 Several cases reported by China Labour Bulletin suggested that to 
boost their bargaining leverage, some labour NGOs and even one Law Firm were 
involved in the strike, typically in the final stage of negotiations.  
 
1.22 Summary of the 2010 Strike Wave 
 
The nationwide strike wave in the summer of 2010 was an effective clear 
demonstration of the development of collective disputes since the middle 2000s. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Chan, C. K C. (2010), ‘Class Struggle in China: Case Studies of Migrant Workers Strikes in 
the Pearl River Delta’, p. 73 – 74, in South African Review of Sociology, 41(3), pp. 61-80. 
47 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour 
regime in global factories, p. 41-42, London: Routledge. 
48 Pringle, T. (2011), Trade Unions in China: The challenge of labour unrest, p. 109, London: 
Routledge. 
49 Pringle, T. (2011), Trade Unions in China: The challenge of labour unrest, p. 107, London: 
Routledge. 
50 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 
29, paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 
2nd-5th July 2012. 
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2010 strikes shared common features with a number of strikes in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s, with regard to the demands, strategy, and outcomes.51  
 
(1) Workers’ demands were basically economic and in essence were disputes of 
interests, including ‘more money, better working condition and more respect in 
treatment.’52 In many cases the cause of the strike was the disproportionate gap 
between the high profits and low wages. (2) The forms of strikes were peaceful and 
strategic. The location of the protests had moved from street demonstrations to strikes 
within enterprises. As one observed, it was ‘a gradual move away from targeting the 
state to confronting employers directly, with the aim of forcing them to negotiate.’53 
Irrational behaviour such as damaging machinery seldom took place. (3) These strikes 
were spontaneously organised by workers without the involvement of workplace trade 
unions. Occurrence of the strikes was encouraged by accidental circumstances. 
Strikers formed temporary leadership, and disbanded afterwards. In some cases, 
mobilisation was achieved by intra-workplace divisions within the company.54 There 
was little sign of alliance strikes across factory or region, but a strike in one enterprise 
might lead to the extension of strikes in particular regions and industries.55  
 
The 2010 strike tides surged from January. The Suzhou Industrial Zone in the Yellow 
River Delta Area suffered the first wave of strikes in 2010, involving tens of 
thousands of workers. In the months before May, every few weeks there were strike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Discussions on the new trends of workers’ protests can be found in Pringle, T. (2011), 
Trade Unions in China: The challenge of labour unrest, London: Routledge; Elfstrom, M. 
and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 22, 31, paper 
for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 2nd-5th July 
2012; Chan, C. K. C. (2010), ‘Class Struggle in China: Case Studies of Migrant Workers 
Strikes in the Pearl River Delta’, in South African Review of Sociology, 41(3), pp. 61-80; 
Chan, C. K. C. and Hui, E. S. L. (2012), ‘The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade 
Union Reform in China: Case of the Honda Workers’ Strike’, in Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 54(5), pp. 653-668. 
52 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 
22, 31, paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, 
Philadelphia, 2nd-5th July 2012. 
53 Pringle, T. (2011), Trade Unions in China: The challenge of labour unrest, p. 107, London: 
Routledge. 
54 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 
12, paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 
2nd-5th July 2012. 
55 Chang, K. (2013), ‘The Collective Transformation of Labor Relations and the Improvement 
of the Government’s Labor Policy’, in Social Sciences in China, 2013(6), pp. 91 – 108. In 
Chinese. 
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reports in different provinces. The strike wave was initially concentrated in the auto 
industries in the Pearl River Delta, and then spread to other industries such as 
electronic, textiles, chemical, metal and plastic, and to Northern regions and inland 
cities.  
 
New features of strikes accompanied the changing policies of the authorities in some 
regions. 56  It has been held that, by being more economically oriented, more 
strategically peaceful, and more focused renders these strikes comparatively 
acceptable in the eyes of the authorities.57 This mirrors the interactions between 
labour and the state at the broad/macro level, which may be concluded as two inter-
related background features of the 2010 strikes: the new generation of migrant 
workers, and the innovations in legislation. 
 
1.23 New Generation of Migrant Workers and their Characteristics 
 
The main labour force behind the protests was migrant workers. Among them, the 
‘new generation of migrant workers’ occupied a substantial proportion.58 This section 
describes some of the characteristics of these workers, to provide a better 
understanding of Chinese collective labour relations. Information provided is based 
on a number of national organisations and academic research groups.59 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Chang, K. (2013), ‘The Collective Transformation of Labor Relations and the Improvement 
of the Government’s Labor Policy’, in Social Sciences in China, 2013(6), pp. 91 – 108. In 
Chinese. 
57 Wang, R. J. (2014), ‘Government Regulatory Strategy and Logic of Behaviours in Strike 
Resolution’, PhD Thesis, Renmin University. In Chinese. 
58 This term was officially used in the ACFTU report, where the ‘new generation of workers’ 
refers to those ‘who were above 16 years old and born in and after 1980s.’ See ACFTU, ‘The 
Research Report on Issues of “The New Generation of Workers”’, 2010, online, 
http://www.youngmigrants.org/ew/uploadfile/20100718143155316.pdf (accessed 14/08/09). 
In Chinese. 
59 National Bureau of Statistics, Number, Structure and Feature of New Generation of 
Migrant Workers, 2011, http://www.stats.gov.cn/ztjc/ztfx/fxbg/201103/t20110310_16148.html 
(accessed 14/10/25); ACFTU, ‘The Research Report on Issues of “The New Generation of 
Workers”’, 2010, http://www.youngmigrants.org/ew/uploadfile/20100718143155316.pdf 
(accessed 14/10/25); Shenzhen Federation of Trade Union, Report on the Living Conditions 
of New Generation of Migrant Workers in Shenzhen, 2010 
http://news.163.com/10/0715/11/6BKO81BK000146BC_3.html (accessed 14/10/25); Renmin 
University, Feeling the Life –2012 Report on Chinese Migrant workers, 2012 
http://www.gzhong.cn/yanjiu/zhuanti/survive/survive_01.html; Tsinghua University, Report 
on the ‘Short-Term Employment’ of Migrant Workers’ employment tendency, 2012, 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/617e2c34b90d6c85ec3ac670.html (accessed 14/10/25). All in 
Chinese. 
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The phrase ‘New (Second) Generation of Migrant Workers’ (xinshengdai 
nongmingong) was first defined in a national survey conducted by the Chinese 
National Statistics Bureau in early 2010. The new generation of migrant workers were 
those  ‘born in and after the 1980s, who seek work outside the countryside areas in 
which they are born.’ By contrast, the ‘Previous Generation of Migrant Workers’ 
refers to those born before the 1980s.  
 
The number of the new workers was around 85 million, accounting for 58% of all 
migrant workers. In Guangdong, the figure had surged to approximately 75%. A few 
studies refer to the second generation of migrant workers as ‘new workers’ 
(xingongren), because they are only weakly connected with the rural sector. 90% of 
them are not familiar with the countryside and are inexperienced in agriculture. It is a 
relatively young group, with an average age of 20.6. And among them, the average 
age of those born in 1990s was 17.2. 
 
The circumstances of employment relations of the new generation of migrant workers 
are generally inferior. More than half of the new workers had not signed a labour 
contract with their employer. As regards their employment conditions, the average 
number of working days was 26 per month, while they worked 9 hours per day. 
Though this work intensity is close to that of other generations, their income tended to 
be much lower, due to their relatively low employment seniority, which means they 
work in relatively junior positions in the workplace. 65% of them were paid less than 
1500 RMB, and their average monthly income was merely 1328 RMB; compared 
with 1543 RMB for the older generation. In addition, young workers tend to be 
confined in low pay sectors, because of their inadequate education and training.  They 
experience poor social welfare in urban areas. Typically, together with poor working 
conditions, the coverage of social insurance is low. This is attributed to their 
background in rural households, against which social policy tends to be biased.  
 
Despite the limited amelioration of their working conditions in recent years, 
compared with the older generations, some improvements have come from changes in 
personal circumstances. Though still without the professional training provided by 
companies and despite their rural location, research has shown that their educational 
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level has improved significantly. According to a national survey, average years of 
education increased from 8.8 to 9.8. The proportions of those at secondary technical 
school (zhongzhuan), and junior college (dazhuan) and above levels rose from 2.1% 
to 9.0% and from 1.4% to 6.4%, respectively. It is worth noting that, apart from 
various vocational training, the proportion receiving training in labour law rose to 38 
per cent. It can be predicted that the influence wielded by the Labour Contract Law on 
workers’ ever-improving awareness of their rights and interests should be far-
reaching. Furthermore, in the era of greatly improved information and communication, 
internet has been widely utilised by these new workers. Research by Renmin 
University of China, suggests that 96% of the new generation spent many hours on 
the Internet.  
 
Coupled with this improvement in education, their expectations have become more 
sophisticated. A survey conducted by Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions reached 
the conclusion that workers had reasonable expectations of their income. For instance, 
they considered a ‘likely monthly income’ to be 2678 RMB, only 842 higher than the 
actual number, whilst 46% of them thought that their ‘likely monthly income’ might 
be less than 2000 RMB. Moreover, the ‘ideal income’ was 4200, very close to the 
average level of the income in Shenzhen.  
 
Other changes also influence young workers’ expectations of their working and living 
conditions. A host of surveys have indicated, for one thing, that young people are 
concerned more about further personal development, rather than job security, by 
comparison with their older counterparts; for another, urban living had become their 
preferred choice in their aspirations for a bright future. 
 
1.24 The Effects of Legalisation  
 
The formalisation of labour relations, starting from the legislation on individual 
labour rights, helped to improve workers’ confidence in defending their rights. While 
bringing in marketisation, the state has gradually formalised labour relations. The 
state actively legislated to protect workers, by stipulating workers’ individual rights 
on such issues as contracts, wages, working conditions, pensions, as well as by 
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providing individual grievance procedures.60 The 1995 Labour Law and the relevant 
labour codes played a crucial role in the rise of labour disputes cases. Owing to the 
ineffective implementation of labour laws, the central and local government also 
made great efforts in remedying deficiencies in enforcement by a variety of means, 
such as the ‘co-ordinated multi-agency’ of the 2004-2007 Wages Campaign.61  
 
Severe problems of social inequality highlighted the need to improve workers’ 
livelihood. The reorientation of the government development model after the mid-
2000s further moved to balance social and economic development. In 2008, the 
national government introduced three major pieces of legislation, the Labour Contract 
Law, the Labour Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, and the Employment 
Promotion Law. These three laws provided a more stringent legal framework for the 
protection of workers’ basic rights. The 2007 Labour Contract Law is a significant 
reform of labour rights protection in China.62 Firstly it drew tremendous attention 
even before its enactment. In the process of the legislation, it was one of the first 
cases in China of drafting a law by drafting at the same time as requesting public 
opinion. The first draft received 19 thousand expressions of public opinion while the 
second received 55 thousand. There were spirited debates among labour scholars over 
the objectives of the law, and over some of its principles and key provisions such as 
labour dispatch (also known as agency employment), fixed-term contracting rules, etc. 
 
With labour contracting, rather than strengthening the negotiation process, the law 
focused on the formalisation of the introduction and use of the written labour contract, 
with the purpose of ‘stabilizing employment relations’, and ‘raising compliance with 
working conditions standards.’63 The law was regarded as ‘significant’, not only by 
comparing previous statutory positions in the Chinese labour legal framework, but 
also ‘bring(ing) China closer to regulatory development in many jurisdictions in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Chen, F. (2007), ‘Individual rights and collective rights: Labor’s predicament in China’, in 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 40(1), pp. 59-79. 
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Routledge. 
63 Cooney, S., Biddulph, S. and Zhu, Y. (2013) Law and Fair Work in China, p. 90-92, 
London: Routledge. 
	   18	  
Europe, East Asia and Australasia’.64 Last but not least, on-going reforms of labour 
contracts related to the collective sphere were initiated by the ACFTU. Right after the 
enactment of the Labour Contract Law, the ACFTU issued two ‘opinions’ related to 
expanding the contracting system and improving the process of collective 
consultation particularly in respect of wages.65 
 
Although these regulatory interventions in labour relations mainly concern workers’ 
individual rights, the formalisation of labour relations, starting with the legislation on 
individual labour rights, helped to improve workers’ confidence in defending their 
rights. The most visible change is that there was a doubling of the number of 
arbitrated individual labour disputes from 2007 to 2008, which is an obvious 
manifestation of workers’ rapidly elevated awareness of the opportunity to preserve 
their rights by the means of law. They may also raise workers’ awareness of their 
general rights and interests, based on the formalisation of labour contracting at 
workplaces. There were signs of the commencement of collective labour relations, in 
that ‘when both urban workers and rural migrant workers experienced complete 
marketisation of their employment status, their consciousness of collective labour 
relations began to evolve and strengthen.’66 
 
The central government, in making and implementing the legislation, send a message 
to workers and society, as well as to local governments and enterprises, about the 
state’s determination to improve workers’ livelihood. Partially because of milder 
restrictions on society and especially the media, the first time that some mainstream 
Chinese websites, such as sina.com, sohu.com, used the term ‘strike’, instead of the 
‘work-stoppage’ or ‘slow-down’ which were previously used by these official 
websites, was in reporting the summer 2010 strike wave. Some reports of the strikes 
conducted in-depth investigations which illustrate this. The majority of these reports 
pointed out how fundamentally labour conflicts were provoked by the imbalance of 
power between workers and employers. 	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1.3 Research Questions, Analytical Framework and Structure 
 
1.31 The Research Questions 
 
An important feature of Chinese industrial relations is the changing role of collective 
labour since the early 2000s. The authorities in Beijing have introduced substantial 
new legislation and policies aimed at strengthening the contractual basis of 
employment and encouraging the extension of trade union membership and collective 
bargaining. Meanwhile, unofficial strikes in non-state sectors have become 
increasingly severe in terms of their intensity and complexity. The Chinese trade 
unions, which in law protect workers’ rights, have encountered challenges from the 
increasing demands of these strikes. 
 
As an integral part of institutionalised collective labour relations, trade unions have 
become conspicuous in terms of their role in strikes. The purpose of this research is to 
cast light on how Chinese trade unions in practice deal with strikes in foreign invested 
enterprises. Accepting that there were changes in the relationships between the state 
and the workers in 2010 strike waves, as presented in the previous sections, will there 
be new behavior on the part of the trade unions, and in which ways? It attempts to 
identify the trade union’s role, and how this was shaped by the reciprocal actions and 
influences among the relevant actors in the settlement. Central questions surrounding 
this research are:  
1) What is the institution for the unions to resolve strikes?  
2) How far they can or cannot resolve the disputes? 
3) What are the conditions contributing to their behaviour?  
 
1.32 The Structure of Chapters 
 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. After this introduction chapter, Chapter 2 
presents the relevant theories and literatures. By identifying the different assumptions, 
based on the different labour relations systems established in most industrial countries, 
as opposed to in China, two relevant theories of ‘Classic Dualism’ and ‘state 
corporatism’ are identified as the foundation of trade unionism in China. The chapter 
also explores the literatures on wildcat strikes in the West and in China. It argues that 
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there have been few in-depth studies on the topic in China, and research particularly 
lacks insights from the inside at the grass-roots level that might be based on case 
studies. 
 
Chapter 3 elaborates the evolution of Classic Dualism, looking for the particular 
consequences with regard to the dynamics of the nature, structure, functions and 
approaches in the transition to markets. These aspects have significant implications 
for the union’s function in strikes. The chapter also provides an account of the 
development of the law and of regional regulations relating to dispute resolution, 
which is the institutional basis of the union’s dispute resolution function. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the research methods that this thesis adopts for case studies and 
participant observation. In this chapter, the narrative of my ethnographic enquiry 
provides the background for an understanding of the broader labour relations system. 
It is followed by a brief summary of the 17 cases used in the fieldwork. The conduct 
of the six main cases, with interviews with the key figures, is then introduced. One 
appendix of the list of the 17 cases conducted in the fieldwork is placed at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
Analyses of the case studies are framed within the Chinese labour relations system of 
‘three parties, four actors’. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the analysis, drawing on the 
facts relating to the conduct of individual strikes, will concentrate on the workplace 
and regional trade unions as a whole, and examine their interplay with the other three 
actors: the government, the management and the workers. Six case studies of strikes, 
where the trade unions are involved at different layers in the dispute resolution 
process are to be presented. 
 
In Chapter 7, a section of discussion (7.1) summarises the union’s role in strikes from 
the case studies and the impact of strikes on the workplace labour relations in the 
cases, with reference to recent trade union reforms. A section of conclusion (7.2), 
based on the main arguments in previous chapters, explores the potential and 
constraints of the representative functions of current trade unionism in China. 
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Chapter Two - A Changing Industrial Relations System: 
Theory and Literature Review 
 
The Pluralist analysis is essentially benign in that it sees as broadly satisfactory the 
present pattern of opportunities for mobilizing power, influence, and justice enjoyed 
by the various interests and pressure groups. British society offers, it is believed, full 
and fair freedom for any legitimate body of opinion to organize, disseminate its views, 
press its interests, and try to persuade others, including relevant decision makers. 
Alan Fox 1985: 21 
 
Under the ‘socialist market economy’, the trade union was not supposed to represent 
the interests of the employees in relation to the employer, but was still supposed to 
represent the interests of the entire ‘labour collective’, the enterprise as a 
whole …[which was] in principle non-adversarial… 
Simon Clarke 2005: 9 
 
The labour relations framework based on a power relationship in the West is clearly 
differentiated from the framework on which the Chinese labour relations and trade 
unions operate. This section provides a theoretical account to identify the relevant 
factors contributing to union activities in China.  
 
2.1 Trade Union in the West 
 
2.11 The Starting Theories – Unitary, Pluralist and Marxist  
 
The three theories, unitary, pluralist and Marxist, provide different views of relations 
between the state, the firm and the trade union. They deal with two main questions: 
firstly whether there exist different interests between labour and capital; secondly, if 
the answer to the first one is yes, then whether the conflict arising from their different 
pursuit can be resolved. A crude simplification would be that while the unitarist alone 
says ‘no’ to the first question, and the Marxist alone says ‘no’ to the second question, 
then the pluralist answers both questions ‘yes’. 
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Unitary approach 
 
The unitary approach to the management of labour assumes that there is a unity of 
interest between workers and employers; while employers pursue profit maximisation, 
workers may seek to achieve a compatible end of fulfillment and intrinsic rewards.67 It 
adopts typically managerialist perspectives by focusing on organisational 
effectiveness and economic efficiency,68 and stressing the absolute authority of the 
management.69 It supports perspectives such as ‘the organization as a unitary structure 
with but one source of authority, leadership, and loyalty.’70  
 
It is commonplace that the unitarist perspective is the basis of managerial doctrines 
that endow the unitary power to the manager in enterprises. It employs internal 
management approaches, while precluding or minimising the influence of the trade 
union and government regulation.71 Its main goals are ‘increas(ing) flexibility and cost 
competitiveness while maintaining their non-union status.’72 The unitary approaches 
were typical of employers in the nineteenth century before trade unions developed. 
Nowadays this approach largely exists ‘in the context of paternalistic family concern, 
or a plant that is geographically isolated, or a company whose policy combines non-
unionism with the payment of wages well above the rates prevalent in the locality’.73  
 
Apart from managerial legitimation, the unitary ideology also has implications for the 
state, exemplified by ‘laissez faire’ policies, where the ‘sphere of production is 
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conceived of as harmonious, unitary reality which is self-maintaining’.74 Interferences 
by either the state or the trade unions are, by implication, unnecessary and disturbing.  
 
Pluralist approach 
 
The pluralist perspective holds that there exist a variety of groups with their own 
interests and beliefs.75 Pluralists believe in the divergent interests of social groups, and 
of these generating conflicts. Pluralists do not only study the tensions among actors at 
workplaces, but also seek to shed light on the institutional resolution of the sources of 
tension between labour and capital. They seek for resolutions within the current 
capitalist production framework. The pluralist framework encompasses: the 
institutions of collective bargaining between trade union and management at the 
workplace level; a tripartite framework that includes the state, employers’ 
organisations and trade unions in the decision-making process; and a state with a 
neutral role in maintaining well-functioning institutions.  
 
Pluralists in the US and the UK, from their distinctively different contexts, illustrate 
these accounts. Rejecting previous studies of industrial relations which had been the 
‘subset of several fields of study’, the US economist John Dunlop defined his ‘system’ 
as an analytical framework with the specific intent of integrating the study of 
industrial relations.76 The industrial relations system comprises three different sets of 
actors or participants, the workers and the trade union, the employers and the 
employer association and the government. Actors act in a shared set of contexts 
including market, technology, society, economy and politics. The centre of the 
industrial relations system is the ‘web of rules’ that is both the regulatory framework 
in which parties interact and operate, and the outcome of negotiations and bargaining 
among the parties.77  	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The British pluralists from the Oxford School were differentiated from Dunlopians in 
terms of the self-perceived value-free framework of the latter.78 The Oxford School 
adopts a normative stance, whose accounts in some respects allied with the Marxist. 
Clegg commented on arguments in Alan Fox’s Beyond Contract, that the imbalance 
of the employment power relationship was the premise of the principal pluralist 
means of collective bargaining. But if it could partially correct the outcomes, it could 
not fundamentally alter this imbalance. Similarly, his practitioner colleague Flanders 
contended that collective bargaining mechanisms, for all their benefits, fail in 
changing the inferior position of the union to capital.79 
 
This emphasises the inherent bias of power that favours the employer against the 
individual worker. They emphasise the managerial prerogative associated with the 
employer’s authority in an unequal economic system. The trade unions act as pressure 
groups to balance at least partially the unequal power between the ‘dominant group’ 
(the management) and the ‘other’ (workers). Hence, the body of rules is required to 
allow freedom to function to these pressure groups, such as rights of association and 
free speech.80 Pluralists regard collective bargaining as a ‘rule-making process’, a 
workers’ share of the management. 81  Underpinning the analysis is the idea of 
empowering workers 82  by ‘orient(ing) workplace behaviour towards a broader 
structure of social power relations’.83 Therefore, for British pluralists, the system of 
industrial relations is trade union centred job regulation. 	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Marxist approach 
 
The Marxist approach asserts that industrial societies are indicative of material 
inequality and unbalanced power, which generate continuous possibilities for conflict 
of interest. The Marxist theory goes beyond the current capitalist production 
framework. Because workers’ working conditions are determined on a fundamentally 
unequal basis, the Marxists deny the chance of overcoming the inequality by any form 
of collaboration with the employers.84 
 
The disadvantages of the Marxist approach in providing a basic paradigm of industrial 
relations stems from the nature of the relations between employer and employee that 
it implies. This is as an essentially economic relation rooted in overt conflict. It 
neglects the fact that, in practice, a high degree of co-operation is achieved within this 
unequal relationship. This is of necessity, because the subject of industrial relations is 
highly pragmatic. This leads to the main-stream of contemporary academics seeing 
the issue as essentially a political issue. In developed societies where there are trade 
unions, their survival to a large extent depends upon their co-operating with 
employers. And particularly when employees are making demands with 
demonstrations of resistance against the managerial authority, there is also the 
possibility for the employers to consider employee’s interests. 85  Trade union 
philosophies of the twentieth century which rejected co-operation in favour of 
uncompromising confrontation proved to be unsuccessful. A consequence in the 
twenty-first century is the marginalisation of radical ideologies. 
 
2.12 Power-relations in Dispute Resolution 
 
In Western countries, the pluralist perspective has been the mainstream underpinning 
the regulatory frameworks of labour dispute resolution. The Oxford School’s concern 
with the imbalance of industrial relations in a capitalist society has much common 
ground with the Marxist approach in their central concern with power relations and 
egalitarian values; that both philosophies recognise the importance of the imbalance 	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of property rights between employer and employee, heavily weighted towards the 
employer.  
 
A necessary pre-condition is workers’ united leverage as a collective force vis-à-vis 
that of employers. Employment relations are essentially an economic relationship, 
whereby ‘the content and interpretation of the contract depends heavily upon the 
power relationship between the employer and the employees’ trade union 
organisation’.86 Without the collective leverage, workers cannot effectively ‘exercise 
voice in the firm’.87 The source of labour disputes is not only the basic conflict 
stemming from the distinct interests between the capital and workers; there is also 
‘organisational hierarchy’ in the capitalist mode of production.88  
 
Union centred mechanisms are commonplace in resolving the disputes. In unionised 
establishments, trade unions guarantee workers’ rights in labour disputes through 
collective bargaining, works councils and union grievance procedures. The trade 
union also provides latent support to the individual cases, by regulating terms and 
conditions, and supporting arbitration machinery in collective agreements. 89 
Grievance procedures even for unorganised workers typically involve committees 
appointed by management, supervisor-centered teams and a grievance process where 
workers are provided with an appeal mechanism.  
 
The strike is regarded as a sign of union power, symbolic of workers’ power, and a 
means to ‘strengthen trade union’s institutional position’.90 A limitation on industrial 
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action will jeopardise the union’s bargaining power.91 In the ILO conventions, though 
in the absence of ‘any explicit, declarative statement’, the right to strike bestows the 
right to freedom of association.92 And in major Western countries, the right to strike is 
‘an integral part of the society’s way of daily functioning’.93 It is ‘central to collective 
bargaining’,94 Laws on strikes provide an indirect but influential legal framework for 
collective bargaining. The rights are institutionalised to be closely linked to rights for 
engagement in collective bargaining.95  
 
In Britain, unauthorised strikes are made up of unofficial strikes – those without 
formal union’s involvement – and unconstitutional strikes – those in the breach of the 
agreed procedure.96 Unauthorised strikes comprised a substantial proportion of all 
strikes in the third quarter of the twentieth century. Research on the high tide of 
strikes in the West in the 1960s – 1970s suggested that strikes were typically short, 
small and fragmented,97 which was partially resulted by disordered payment systems 
such as those based on piecework and informal bargaining characterised by ‘custom 
and practice’. 98 Shop stewards were the active actors in leading these strikes to force 
the managers to make concessions. It reflected a move from industry-wide bargaining, 
to domestic bargaining. These strikes were regarded at the workplace to be ‘effective’ 
in defending the workers’ interests. The boundaries of the formal institutions had been 
changed as a result of evolving shop steward organisation. Initially intended to be 
possibly a member of the works committee and with a function as ‘dues collectors for 	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the unions’, the function and activity of shop stewards significantly broadened,99 with 
a gradual inclusion of shop stewards into the formal structure, as the management 
gave them fuller recognition and support. 
 
The shop stewards were however confronted by severe crisis after 1980, 
accompanying the increasing pressure of the market. Facing the intensifying of 
product market competition, managers in the UK generally tightened their 
management through more strategic management methods in pay. At the same time, 
recognition of workplace union representatives and the range of issues negotiated in 
collective bargaining were constrained. To survive, the previously confrontational 
shop stewards became increasingly cooperative in character. 
 
2.13 Changing Power Relationships in Western Societies 
 
The decline of union power in the west is the prominent phenomenon since the last 
quarter of the twenty-century. In the twentieth century trade unions became a widely 
accepted basis of challenge to unitary approaches. Rising competitive pressures in the 
West however have caused the decline of trade unions and collective bargaining. 
Because they face a diminished challenge from trade unions, and thus less need to 
make concessions to the intrinsically different interests of workers, employers became 
more able to act on unitarist assumptions. As a result, academic analysis has swung 
away from an awareness of the utility of pluralist approaches that analyse the intrinsic 
power relationship between employers and organized labour, towards personnel 
management and Human Resources Management (abbreviated as HRM) approaches. 
These HRM approaches tended to ignore bargaining behaviour and power 
relationships, so that trade unions were removed from the central focus.100  
 
The underlying driving force is the competitive pressures under globalisation, of 
which the growth of international trade is a fundamental component. Comparative 
advantage in the low cost developing world brought about the relocation of 
production from the West as a central strategy of capital. Moreover, the ‘global 	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capitalism’ portrayed by the new-Marxist School indicated the unchanged logic of the 
accumulation of global capitalism accompanied the dramatically changed location and 
forms.101 As a consequence, the power of capital in reshaping power relationships 
within a global scope was epitomised by struggling for decent income, health and 
safety at work, and control over the labour process.102 The logic of ‘efficiency first’ 
brought about by globalisation is reinforced by the state-dominated process of 
economic development in developing countries.  
 
2.2 Chinese Trade Union in the Transition 
 
2.21 Contradictions in Labour Relations from Unitary to Pluralist 
 
China’s reforms are leading to an industrial society with the emergence of pluralist 
interests among the state, employers and workers. The planned economy in China 
before its economic reform in the 1980s adopted an overall unitary framework of 
employment. Different from the unitary theory in Western labour relations, the ruling 
actor in China was not the management, but the state. The Chinese unitary labour 
relations presented and assumed a unity of interests not only between the employer 
and the employees, but also between the enterprises and the state.103 In the transition, 
the legacy of this unitary relationship that was formed in the socialist period is 
maintained in the emerging relationship between the one-party state and the pluralist 
society in capitalist China.  
 
The prominent feature in Chinese contemporary labour relations is the relations 
among the state, the trade union, the worker and the management. Different from the 
classic labour relations framework of the interaction between the three parties,104 the 
Chinese labour relations framework is constituted by ‘four actors’, and presented in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour 
regime in global factories, p. 177, London: Routledge.  
102 Hyman, R. (2008), ‘Author’s Remark: to the Chinese readers’, in Industrial Relations: A 
Marxist Introduction, trans. Hei Q. M. (2008), Beijing: China Labour and Social Security 
Press. In Chinese; also see Chan, C. K. C. (2008), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes 
and the Changing Labour Regime in Global Factories, p. 13, PhD Thesis, Warwick 
University. 
103 Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial Relations in China, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
104 Dunlop, J. T. (1993), Industrial Relations Systems (Revised edition), Boston: Harvard 
Business School. 
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‘three party – four actor’ structure of labour relations (See Figure 4).105 In this 
framework, the party of ‘labour’ was divided into the trade union and the workers, in 
a collective sense. The workers’ individual rights are institutionalised into the system, 
protected by the legal frameworks. But their own organisations and collective actions 
are not incorporated into the system owing to the absence of protection of 
independent organizational rights. The workers’ formal organisations are represented 
by the ACFTU and its affiliated branches, of the latter, however, the pursuit, functions 
and approach are institutionally differentiated from the workers’ collectivism. In 
strikes, compared with their western counterparts which are confronted by the 
management, and sometimes the government, the Chinese trade unions are located in 
a ‘quadripartite’ relations among the workers, the government, and the 
management.106  
 
Figure 4 Actors’ structure in general labour relations in China 
 
 
A ‘Three Party – Four Actor Structure’ of Labour Relations System.107 
 
Hence, when both China and the West developed pluralist perspectives, which are 
based on the acknowledgement of the different pursuits of the multiple interest groups 
and the quest for compromise mechanisms between these groups, the communist 
trade unions in China became the foci in the regulatory framework of labour relations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 This framework was firstly depicted in Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial 
Relations in China, p. 25, Chelterham: Edward Elgar; and then in Chen, F. (2010), ‘Trade 
Unions and the Quadripartite Interactions in Strike Settlement in China’, in The China 
Quarterly 201 March 2010, pp. 104-124. 
106 Chen, F. (2010), ‘Trade Unions and the Quadripartite Interactions in Strike Settlement in 
China’, in The China Quarterly 201 March 2010, pp. 104-124 
107 Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial Relations in China, p. 25, Chelterham: 
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which remains attached to the idea of the non-adversarial nature of relations between 
labour and capital. This analytical framework of ‘three party – four actor’ is to be 
applied in this research to analyse the quadripartite interactions in strike settlements. 
 
2.22 The State-union Relations – a Discussion of Corporatism 
 
State-society relations under marketisation 
 
The development of a market economy, the weakening of ideological values, and the 
retreat of the state demonstrates a growing separation between society and the state.108 
 
The early work by Yang investigated ‘economic corporate groups’. Yang observed 
the intensification of internal tensions between the workers and the leadership within 
enterprises. One important insight from Yang’s findings was that the ‘dual character 
and tension embodied in the socialist factory work unit’ was the root cause of the 
conflict at the workplace, because there was ‘a structural opposition between the 
corporate group and the state.’109 Yang predicted ‘the first step toward a broader role 
for civil society is being taken in the economic sphere.’110 White investigated the 
relationship between private economic agents and the state in Xiaoshan in Zhejiang 
Province. These organisations were largely influenced, and at times dominated, by the 
state. They served as the intermediator, by playing a dualist role of representing both 
their members and the state. In these cases, elements of civil society can be found in 
these organisations.111 A more recent study by Watson written in 2008 maintained that 
the emerging associations during the current reform era would lead to a civil society 	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in China: The Consequence of Reform, San Franciso: Oxford; Shambaugh, D. (1993) (eds.), 
American Studies of Contemporary China, Washingtoo, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center 
Press; and Brook, T. & Frolic, B. M. (1997) (eds.), Civil Society in China, New York: M. E. 
Sharp. And see journals with special issues, such as Modern China, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
Symposium: ‘Public Sphere’/ ‘Civil Society’ in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese 
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Republic China. (Jun. 1997), Journal of Contemporary Asian Development, special Issue: 
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109 Yang, M. H. (1989), ‘Between State and Society: The Construction of Corporateness in a 
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1989), pp. 31-60. 
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Chinese Socialist Factory’, pp. 60, in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 22 (Jul. 
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in China. He held that the civil society in China was ‘transitional’, and ought to be 
debated in the context of a ‘transitional state’. Yet he predicted a potential civil 
society, cultivated by increasing acceptance of habits, practices, values in 
associational life.112 Walder’s findings in urban industrial establishments revealed the 
workers’ emerging pursuit of interests that were distinctive from those of the state, 
providing similar evidence tending toward a civil society.113 Unger and Chan noted a 
change of some small local organisations ‘obtain(ing) a measure of autonomy.’114 
Work by Pearson in 1996 explored the private entrepreneurs and foreign managers in 
enterprises. Pearson concluded that the nature of Chinese state-society relations was a 
hybrid pattern combining both socialist corporatism and clientelism.115 She explicitly 
rejected the terminology of a civil society model in describing Chinese state-society 
relations.116  
 
Acknowledging the existence of conditions for the emergence of a civil society, 
scholars challenged the civil society interpretation in China, revising the term of civil 
society as ‘semi-civil society’ and ‘state-led civil society’.117 Empirical studies find 
the prominent characteristic of the civic associations is their dependence on the state-
government. Foster found it was difficult for some government-created business 
associations to develop effective mediatory functions between the state and their 
members. They were largely constrained by the government’s hierarchical control, 
due to the state’s political concerns. Anxious about the state’s unwillingness to co-
operate, these associations worked cautiously within the rather limited sphere that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Watson (2008) cited by Unger, J. (2008), ‘Introduction: Chinese Associations, Civil 
Society, and State Corporatism: Disputed Terrain’, in Unger, J. (ed.), Associations and the 
Chinese State: Contested Space, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
113 Walder, A. G. (1992), ‘Urban Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s’, in 
Rosenbaum, A. L. (eds.), State and Society in China: The Consequence of Reform, San 
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114 Unger, J. (2008), ‘Introduction: Chinese Associations, Civil Society, and State 
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116 Pearson, M. M. (1997), China’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of 
Economic Reform, pp. 23-32. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
117 These two terminologies stemmed from He, B. G. (1997) and Frolic, B. M. (1997) 
separately, and both cited by Liu, A. (2009), ‘Civil Society? Corporatism?’, in Law, History 
and Philosophy, 2009(5). In Chinese. 
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they felt was legitimised by the state. 118  Clarke and Lee probed the tripartite 
consultation system in China, finding that neither the trade union nor the enterprise 
associations were independent from government. 119  Yep identified two reasons 
contributing to the associations’ failure in fulfilling dualist functions, namely the lack 
of effective communication with both the government and the workers, and the lack 
of internal solidarity that lies behind the members’ perception of their interests.  
 
Divergent state regulatory approaches 
 
Civic associations are confined within the state’s regulatory frameworks. Studies 
suggest there is enormous diversity within the state regulatory framework of civic 
associations. Kang and Han categorised the government’s control over civic 
associations, by focusing on the different attitudes and strategies toward different 
types of associations.120 They argued that government adopted different strategies in 
regulating associations by taking into consideration first the associations’ potential 
capability of challenging the government, and second the government’s need for the 
public service that the associations could provide. Howell, after examining 
developments in the institutional changes in regulating civil organisations, came to a 
similar conclusion that civil organisations characterised by the provision of social 
welfare were more favoured by the state’s regulatory framework than those 
characterized by rights promotion or political protests.121 
 
Studies revealed that professional associations, especially in the economic field, had 
enjoyed encouragement by the government. Howell stated the selective state strategy 
has become more supportive and laissez faire in regulating its relations with the 
commercial societies, facilitating the development of trade associations such as the 
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business associations and chambers of commerce. 122  These principles were 
‘cultivating, developing and establishing’ self-negotiating and self-disciplinary 
institutions. Sun argued the aim was to facilitate the reform of governmental 
institutions, to transform government functions, and encourage the development of 
industrial institutions.123 Two empirical research studies by Lin and Oi focused on the 
township and village enterprises in rural areas. Their studies depicted government-led 
collusion at local level, between the government, the enterprises and other 
institutions.124 In Lin and Oi’s works and the previously mentioned Pearson’s work, a 
common finding was the unitary interest between the enterprises and local 
government, as a unique factor in motivating actors to reach commitment and 
compromise.  
 
Trade union as a state corporatist organisation 
 
China’s current regulatory framework on civic associations is characterised by overall 
restrictions and is politically tightly constrained; while it is selective with regard to 
those regulations that have been relaxed and to the policies aimed at encouraging 
economic growth and social stability. State-union relations have been embedded in a 
form of state corporatism, where the official trade union has been treated as a ‘quasi-
governmental organisation’,125 ‘highly bureaucratised association’,126 or ‘a de facto 
government institution’.127 
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The seminal work in discussing the state – trade union – workers relations was 
‘Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao China’ by 
Chan, where the state-corporatist approach was for the first time applied to Chinese 
trade unions. Taking reference from Pravda and Ruble, Chan stated that, in the 
transitional socialist state, the trade union is located in the corporatist edifice 
dominated by the party-state. In her later book chapter, she concluded there was a 
possible trend of Chinese trade unions from state corporatism to societal 
corporatism.128 In another work from Unger and Chan, they argued that China’s major 
associations were typically in the form of state-corporatism.129 
 
The heuristic contribution of Chan’s argument points to the need for probing the 
nature of Chinese trade unions as a state corporatist organisation. Schmitter (1974) 
defined corporatism as, 
 
…[A] system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized 
into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of 
leaders and articulation of demands and support.130  
 
And he distinguished two subtypes of the corporatist representation, societal 
corporatism and state corporatism. Distinguishing features between the two were the 
‘autonomous and penetrative’ nature of societal corporatism and the ‘dependent and 
penetrated’ nature of state corporatism.131   
 
For practical purposes, scholars found societal corporatism was best located on a 
pluralist continuum; while state corporatism presented a ‘starkly different order of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Chan, A. (2008), ‘Chapter Three China’s Trade Unions in Corporatist Transition’, p. 85, in 
Unger, J. (ed.) Associations and the Chinese State: Contested Space, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
129 Unger, J. (2008), ‘Introduction: Chinese Associations, Civil Society, and State 
Corporatism: Disputed Terrain’, p. 8, in Unger, J. (ed.) Associations and the Chinese State: 
Contested Space”, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe. 
130 Schmitter, P. C. (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, p. 93, in The Review of 
Politics, 36:1, (Jan., 1974), pp. 85-131. 
131 Schmitter, P. C. (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, p. 102-3, in The Review of 
Politics, 36: 1, (Jan., 1974), pp. 85-131. 
	   36	  
incorporation’. 132 In short, societal corporatism is a certain type of pluralism, while 
state corporatism is another thing altogether. As Schmitter stated, though structurally 
similar, these two subtypes ‘are revealed as the products of very different political, 
social and economic processes, as the vehicles for very different power and influence 
relations and as the purveyors of very different policy consequences.’ 133 
 
The definitions provided by Crouch are better for understanding the nature of 
corporatism. Crouch’s theory shed light on the dualist aspect of interest representation 
with both the state and the members. This was incorporated by Schmitter in his more 
explicit statements on the organisation’s dualist-function, reflecting ‘both interest 
articulation…and responsibility for delegated enforcement of government policy.’134 
The major interest groups in society are the constituent parts of corporatism, they are 
granted right representation in national decision-making, and some degree of 
functional autonomy, while having the duty of maintaining internal order within the 
organisations to ensure the social discipline in the need of the nation-state as a 
whole.135 By referring to the intermediary’s membership discipline and representation, 
Crouch distinguished different forms in corporatism (authoritarian corporatism and 
liberal or bargained corporatism) and pluralism (pluralism/bargaining and 
contestation) by a continuum of organisations exercising functions of ‘no 
representation’ at one end, to ‘prosecuting the demands of members without 
compromise’ at the other.136 Drawing from Crouch’s continuum two insights can be 
drawn. Firstly, for any pattern of corporatism, the dualist function is the indispensable 
element of corporatist intermediaries in every particular setting. In a nutshell, the 
protection function is a fundamental component of the legitimacy of the intermediary, 
although the actual effectiveness of these functions may vary. Secondly, the weight of 
the functions undertaken by the intermediary alters along the continuum and is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Martin, R. M. (1983), ‘Pluralism and the New Corporatism’, p. 102, in Political Studies 
(1983), XXXI, pp. 86-102. 
133 Schmitter, P. C. (1974), ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’, p. 104-5, in The Review of 
Politics, 36: 1, (Jan., 1974), pp. 85-131. 
134 Cawson (1978) cited by Crouch, C. (1983), ‘Pluralism and the New Corporatism: A 
Rejoinder’, p. 453, in Political Studies, 31: 3, (Sep., 1983), pp. 452-460. 
135 Panitch, L. (1979), ‘The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies’, in 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, Beverly Hill: 
Sage. 
136 Cawson (1978) cited by Crouch, C. (1983), ‘Pluralism and the New Corporatism: A 
Rejoinder’, p. 457, in Political Studies, 31: 3, (Sep. 1983), pp. 452-460. 
	   37	  
determinant factor in assessing the nature of the pattern. This means that the 
distribution of the weight of the functions serves to distinguish the particular pattern 
of corporatism from other patterns. 
 
2.23 The Classic Dualist Model 
 
Western theories of trade unions 
 
In the West, the trade union is ‘a continuous association of wage-earners for the 
purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment’.137 The 
Webbs concluded, in an inductive approach, that Western trade unions, in maintaining 
and improving their members’ interests, rely on two approaches, namely the Device 
of Common Rule, and the Device of Restriction of Numbers.138 The device of the 
Common Rule of setting the minimum level of the working conditions that is 
applicable to all its members has been the core principle in contemporary trade 
unionism.139  
 
The Webbs also defined three main methods used by trade unions to attain the 
regulation of the common rule, the Method of Mutual Insurance, the Method of 
Collective Bargaining, and the Method of Legal Enactment. In the essay Trade 
Unions and Politics, Flanders elaborated two similar conceptions of the industrial 
method and the political method, as the two principal methods. The idea of the 
political method is similar to that in Industrial Democracy, both referring to unions’ 
participation in legislation, the formation of political machinery and in some cases 
working through the Labour Party. The tripartite negotiation involving government 
participation can also be classified in this category. Union’s political action can 
provide the union with the means of access to decision-making by providing legal 
assurance of the union’s status, especially its industrial role of collective bargaining 
with management.140 	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Trade unions in the general sense elaborated above should be separated from the 
communist unions owing to their different function. In the Leninist ‘transmission belt’ 
conception, the trade union is a two-way channel between the state and the masses. 
This conception explicitly reflects its difference in function from the western 
counterparts. The comparisons between the Western and the Communist trade unions 
deserve caution with regard to the fundamental components.  
 
Firstly the western unions exist as the representative of particular interest groups in a 
society of divergent interests. But in China, the labour relations between the workers 
and managers at the workplace have been inherited from the socialism of the 
command economy, ‘on the assumption that socialist interest consensus already 
exists’. This assumption of unitary interests in labour relations was the basis for the 
introduction of trade unionism in contrast with a pluralist regulatory framework of 
labour relations from the West. Secondly, when the unions in capitalist countries 
operate as interface between the managers and workers, the state is a minor actor in 
this relationship; their communist counterparts, as inferred from their dualist nature, 
have to mainly deal with the relations between the state and the workers. And this 
dualist-function was underpinned by the state corporatist approaches. Thirdly, 
although some functions of the two sorts of trade unions have the same names, they 
may be the same in name only. The ultimate goal of the western idea of a union 
differs from the unitarist views in the communist states; whereas the western unions 
seek to maximise their members’ interests by whatever means, the communist unions 
have to attempt to create a balance between their dualist roles while prioritising the 
state’s interests. As globalisation imposes more pressures on workers and their 
organisations in the developing states, the state-led trade union in China is certain to 
be further restrained in its representative function, with the associated negative 
economic implications. 
 
Bearing this in mind, a comparison between the capitalist and communist unions is of 
necessity for two main reasons. Firstly, despite the fact that the mobilisation role for 
the sake of the state in practice outweighs the protector role for the sake of their 
members, the latter is an integral part of the communist union’s dualist functions. It is 
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of significance in comparing the protection and welfare functions of the communist 
union and of the capitalist unions. Secondly, bias in the dualist function is commonly 
intertwined with the external and internal factors of the communist trade unions. 
Variations in the dualist functioning of unionism are introduced by differences in 
enterprise, sector, and state. The evident strains of the dualist functions reflect the 
changes in the macro economic and political environments in which the trade unions 
operate the functions.141 
 
‘Classic Dualist’ trade unions in China  
 
As the first person who conceptualised the communist trade union as a ‘transmission 
belt’ between the state and the workers, Lenin saw the need for a union to defend 
workers’ interests by maintaining the two functions: the mobilisation of labour and 
the protection of member’s rights. Coming under the Stalin’s dominance, the function 
of the trade unions had ‘an almost wholly production and labor mobilization 
orientation’. This new orthodoxy, named as ‘Classic Dualism’, was contextualised in 
the state socialism of the command economy, ‘on the assumption that socialist interest 
consensus already exists’. The party-union relationship is one of total organisational 
domination rather than the party’s political leadership over the union. 142  
 
The book Trade Unions in Communist States, edited by Pravda and Ruble, provides 
an outstanding contribution to the understanding of communist trade unions. It 
examines the role of trade unions in eight communist states. The Introduction Chapter 
conceptualises the Leninist model of trade unionism as classic dualism with analysis 
of the union’s organisational structure, relations with the party, the management, the 
workers, and policies as well as of the barriers to performing the dualist function. And 
it argues that there are political and economic barriers preventing these trade unions 
making a fundamental departure from this model, given the absence of the ‘general 
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systemic crises’ such as the radical upheaval in Hungary in 1956 and in Poland in 
1956 and 1980-1981.143 
 
An earlier study by Harper examined the Chinese trade union’s three crises - in 1951, 
in 1957 and in the Cultural Revolution. Harper contended their function as a 
transmission belt places the union officials in the same dilemma, because when they 
try to support the workers, the party may seek to halt the union’s transmission belt 
operation between the party and workers, as happened in the three crises.144 Similarly, 
Zhang reviewed five severe conflicts between the union and the state, concluding that 
‘at these crucial points, the trade union is consciously inclined to represent the 
workers.’145 In Chan’s arguments, the party state granted the ACFTU a certain degree 
of power after the economic reform to protect workers’ rights from being violated by 
the party-state itself. The trade union can play an important ‘revolutionary’ role 
against the state in the state corporatist model.146 Jiang witnessed the tensions between 
the union and the party during the process of trade union reforms in the fifteen years 
since the implementation of the economic reform. 147 Focusing on the economic 
aspects, he argued that the pressure from the workers and the union’s own self-
interest is the motivation for the union to confront the authoritarian political structure. 
But Jiang also admitted the unlikelihood of fundamental reform of the trade union in 
the near future unless industrial disputes increase or the leadership of the party-state 
splits. 
 
These researches have probed into the interactions between the trade union and the 
Party, the strain in the union’s dualist functions, the dynamic external environments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (1986), ‘Communist Trade Unions: Varieties of Dualism’, p. 
10, in Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (eds.), (1986), Trade Union in Communist States, London: 
Allen & Unwin Press. 
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and the union’s potential to confront the party. Other scholars stressed the constrained 
factors of the party’s supreme authority in the ‘Classic Dualist’ model. They drew 
particular attention to the union’s structural constraints. 
 
Clarke analysed contradictions of dualist functioning unions in the post-socialist 
transition. He argued that trade unions in both Russia and China had retained their 
traditional dualist functions in the transformed industrial relations, owing to the 
‘severe structural constraints to which they are subject’.148 He outlined the key 
principles of trade unionism in a socialist market economy. The trade unions are still 
supposed to represent the interests of the enterprise as a whole, under the assumption 
of ‘non-adversarial industrial relations’. The emerging pluralist interests in these 
societies place the unions in a dilemma. To secure their status and role, the unions 
have to be effective in representing the members, but if they do this, they will risk 
undermining their underlying legitimacy from the administration.  
 
Some scholars have a sceptical attitude towards the adaptation of Classic Dualism to 
the Chinese trade unions. They contend the constraints are decisively influential on 
the trade union’s autonomy, rendering its passivity of acting as a government 
instrument. Interestingly, such an argument is advocated by a number of union 
academics and officials.149 
  
‘Is the ACFTU a Union’ is the title of the article by Taylor and Li, in which the 
answer is the ACFTU does not have the essence of a trade union. From three tests of 
unionism, standardised by Western norms, they argue that, firstly its constitutional 
role is defined as both to protect workers and to protect the national interest. But 
when the national interest involves the development of capitalism and the promotion 
of employer interests, the Chinese trade union normally does not hesitate to give up 
its worker protection role. Secondly, the trade union can hardly be seen as a 
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representative of workers because there is no effective electoral system for union 
office holders. Thirdly, workers lack independence in unionisation, because the fact 
that the Chinese trade union is the only legal union that is permitted, denies any 
legitimacy in claiming independence. Unions are organised as part of the state 
structure, while their judicial, executive and administrative functions are monopolized 
by the party.150 In similar tones, Xu and Wu disapproved of the use of Classic 
Dualism in that the Chinese union was not a workers’ organisation in essence. The 
leverage of the union confronting the state in union-party crises does not arise from 
associational power stemming from workers.151  
 
You reviewed the reform programmes of the trade union since its establishment. He 
argued that the union had no intention either to touch its fundamental relations with 
the Party, or to face its internal democratisation. Instead it would attempt to reinforce 
its organisational capability in dealing with complex labour relations. The West 
mistakenly viewed an emphasis on the union’s representative function, that stems 
from the Party’s initiations and demands, as the trade union’s own. This exaggerated 
the different interests between the trade union and the Party.152 Scholars found that the 
recent union reforms are characterised by ‘high politisation’, ‘more activity out of the 
enterprise’ and ‘socialisation’.153 
 
Chen articulated that the union has been embedded into the layers of government, 
while its bureaucracy’s power and its operation are critically reliant upon their formal 
government status. The union’s protection functions are consequently constrained 
because ‘their governmental status prevents them from operating through the 	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mobilising of grassroots or exerting their influence by empowering their grassroots 
branches.’154 In the further study that analyses different patterns of the union’s role, 
Chen points out that the main explanation for it manifesting diversity is the 
incompatibility between its ‘double institutional identities’. He sets apart the 
mediating role played by the union in collective action from two other roles, a 
mitigating role – the union’s representation in legal contention - and a more intrusive 
role – the union’s pre-empting of independent organising.155  
 
Three indications of Chinese union’s distinctiveness can be drawn from the academic 
literature. Firstly, relations between the union and the party-state are of prime 
importance in analysing different aspects of the trade union. Secondly, the trade 
unions are ideologically and institutionally intricately intertwined with state-
government bureaucracies. Thirdly, the transformation of industrial relations will 
contribute to fundamental changes of Chinese unions. Scholars study the ‘Classic 
Dualist’ trade union in China from different perspectives and approaches. 
Disagreements reveal different perspectives and emphases on contemporary Chinese 
trade unions. Most Chinese scholars stressed the factual evidence of the conspicuous 
influence of the party-state over the trade union, while most western colleagues, 
though acknowledging the party’s supreme authority, emphasise particularly the 
union’s potential to confront the party.  
 
2.3 Trade Union in Strikes in China 
 
In the British literature, unauthorised strikes are made up of unofficial strikes and 
unconstitutional strikes.156 Usually ‘wildcat strikes’ refers to unofficial strikes, but 
empirical studies suggest in reality ‘almost all unconstitutional strikes are 
unofficial’,157 as unions are unlikely to sanction a strike in breach of the agreed 
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procedure where they themselves are an agent.158 Hence, unconstitutional strikes can 
also be described as ‘wildcat strikes’ under most circumstances. Gouldner, the US 
industrial sociologist, further differentiated these wildcat strikes into ‘genuine wildcat’ 
and ‘pseudo-wildcat’. In the case where the formerly dominant union officials had 
lost power relative to unofficial union organisers, it was ‘the genuine wildcat’. In the 
case where unions used covert influence in sanctioning and leading the strike, he 
described it as ‘the pseudo-wildcat’.159 Strikes in opposition to the official union, for 
example against some policies accepted by official leaders, are not typical of 
unauthorised strikes in general.160 There was usually official backing from formal 
trade unions for unofficial actions, either during the strike or afterwards.161  
 
As a post-socialist organisation, the Chinese trade union is required to give priority to 
maintaining industrial peace. The comparisons of post-socialist trade unions found the 
lesser extent of the Chinese union’s involvement in spontaneous organised labour. 
The reasons included adverse political and legal factors in China,162 as well as the 
difference in organisational, material and symbolic resources in a broader historical 
and institutional context.163 
 
In practice, the organisers typically bypass the trade unions.164 The Chinese trade 
union is not granted the right to strike.165 Its role in the strike is prescribed as a 
mediator. The underlying motivation for the union to act in a strike is to defuse the 	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conflict.166 Some research suggests that the aim of mediating is to ‘channel unrest into 
constitutional, judicial and/or bureaucratic forms of dispute resolution’.167 In other 
cases, the enterprise union ‘tipped management off about the strike and encouraged 
workers to resume production.’168 On occasion, they ‘co-operate with enterprises, fire 
the leaders, make “black lists”, and prevent the leaders from getting new jobs’.169 
Most cases have been characterized by the no visible role for the union at all.170  
 
The discussions on the union’s specific role in strikes has not been the subject of 
substantial debates, yet they frequently emerged as a by-product of the increasing 
academic attention to the labour disputes, as some scholars argued that the trade 
unions are doomed to come under pressure from the rank-and-file when someday the 
current arrangement is not adequate to resolve worker’s grievance anymore.171 Studies 
witnessed the increasing ‘need for a “collective” instrument’ in labour disputes172, in 
some regions, prompted a sharper response by the trade union in strikes. Pringle 
provides two cases in 2007 and in 2010, in both of which strikers demanded wages 
and improved working conditions higher than the statutory provisions. He found that, 
in both cases, unions presented a ‘more rigorous response’ to workers’ demands. In 
one case, the union’s action, as a mediator in the strike resolution, became particularly 	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positive.173 In another dispute, the outcome enhanced procedural dimensions that 
would strengthen, in the long run, worker voice at the company.174 Elfastrom and 
Kuruvilla noted in one case where the trade union supported the workers. And when it 
felt that it was in a disadvantageous position, it called for external help from the 
district union. An interesting question concerning the union’s role in the strike that 
was raised by Estlund and Gurgel is how the workplace unions can gain the trust of 
workers in persuading them to go back to work.175 But they did not give the answer.  
 
Among the first to probe into case studies, Chen gave an institutional account of the 
analysis of the settlement of strikes in the 2005 strike wave in the Dalian 
Development Zone. 176 He argued the government dominated the dispute resolution, 
with the trade union playing a mediating role. More insightfully, he identified the 
interactions among the state, the trade union, the workers, and the management at an 
institutionally and socially ‘quadripartite’ basis.  
 
More attention has been given to unions’ broader reforms in which the changes are 
more significant. These findings indicate that the details of these reforms are more 
complicated as well as controversial than would appear on the surface, and scholars 
hold critical views towards them. Some query how fundamental these changes are.  
 
Meng finds that the unions involved in the disputes, together with the government and 
the management, intend to absorb workers’ spontaneous collective actions into the 
instituted bargaining institution. This system is a union-promoted while government-
controlled institution, which aims to whittle down workers collective awareness.177 	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Other scholars investigate collective bargaining where local government and the 
union is actively promoted after the strike.178 One of them concludes that these 
reforms of collective bargaining, though in a more robust form, cannot ‘give workers 
a stronger mechanism to advance their interests’. Due to a lack of fundamental change 
to the union, the enterprise unions are unable to promote change, while the success of 
industry and regional level bargaining continues to depend on the initiative and 
support of the local authority, with which the local union works closely.179 In other 
words, in the new mechanism, the formal union’s legality has been maintained or 
even enhanced by the authorities, and workers’ collective awareness has thus been 
constrained or eliminated. A third study concerns union democratic elections in the 
post-strike phrase. In this case, workers collective action successfully brings about the 
authority’s promise of democratic union elections in their companies. But the 
emerging mechanism was, however, manipulated by the authorities. As a result, 
workers collective power cannot be effectively transformed into the institutional 
power. According to the author, this is a government strategy which ‘pull(s) back 
(workers) to the original uneven playing field.180 
 
There is a lack of in-depth investigation in most of these studies. This can be partially 
attributed to the near impossibility of access to the necessary materials, especially 
primary materials, in China. It calls for an in-depth study of union functions and 
activities. Given this, a contribution of this thesis is to provide a study from the inside 
of the union institution, from workplace to national level. 
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Chapter Three – The Dualist Functioning of the Union 
under Marketisation 
 
In the Leninist ‘transmission belt’ conception, the trade union is a two-way channel 
between the state and the workers. In this conception, the dualist role of the union is 
to ‘protect the workers from their state, and to get them to protect our state.’181 This 
doctrine of classic dualism of the trade unionism has ruled Chinese trade unionism. It 
should be noted that the term ‘Chinese trade unions’ in this thesis refers to the 
ACFTU and its affiliated branches at all levels, because the ACFTU is the only 
legally permitted organisation of workers’ representation in China.182 
 
3.1 ‘Classic Dualism’ of Chinese Trade Unions 
 
3.11 Pre-1980s 
 
The 1920s, the time of the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (abbreviated 
as CCP), witnessed an upsurge of Chinese popular anti-foreign empire sentiment. 
Adhering to the Marxist class doctrine, the CCP played a crucial role in a range of 
major labour movement actions. Along with an increasing influence on workers and 
their organisations, the 1925 Second Labour Congress claimed the CCP’s leadership 
of the Chinese labour movement.183 A national trade union – the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was founded. 184  During that time, political and 
revolutionary views against imperialism, against the Japanese invader, and later 
against the Nationalist Party were embedded in the CCP-led trade union movement. 
In 1927, the CCP, along with the major organisations of trade unionism, were 
suppressed by the Nationalist Party presided over by Chiang Kai-shek, and forced into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Lenin, V. I. (1920), ‘The trade unions, the present situation’, Speech delivered at a joint 
meeting of communist delegates to the Eight Congress of Soviets, Communist Members of the 
All-Russia Central Council of Trade Unions and Communist Members of the Moscow City 
Council of Trade Union, 30th December 1920. 
182 Articles 3 and 4, Trade Union Law (1950). 
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exile in rural areas. The ensuing years till the end of the revolution of the CCP in 
1949 witnessed the preliminary formation of ‘Classic Dualism’ in union practices. 
 
In urban areas, trade unionism was strictly controlled by the Nationalist Party, and 
thus had been inactivated. In rural areas, which then became the communist-held base 
areas, the trade unions mainly worked in public-owned enterprises where activity was 
aimed at providing and assisting the military effectiveness and service. In these 
factors, the trade unions were obliged to mobilise and educate workers to increase 
production and quality, as well as reduce production cost. Those possessing concerns 
with the workers’ welfare were condemned as ‘deeply economist’ by the leader of the 
Central Workers’ Movement Committee, and were commanded to ‘co-operate with 
the factory heads, boost production of the factors in a bottom-up way.’ Under close 
supervision from the central committee, it was reported that in a year, the ‘economist’ 
problem was ‘basically overcome’.185 
 
With the establishment of the new state in 1949, the CCP decided to follow the Soviet 
model of trade union organisation, and it became a part of the state socialist bloc.186 In 
national union meetings prior to October 1949, the principal aim of trade unionism 
was assigned as to ‘increase production to make the economy prosper’.187 The 
principal purpose of trade unionism was ‘considering both public and private interests 
and benefiting both labour and capital.’ The 1950 trade union legislation stipulated 
that the union would have a double function of mobilisation of production and the 
construction of the new state as well as the protection of workers. These principles 
and laws established the foundation of the Chinese trade union’s dualist function.  
 
In the 1950 Trade Union Law, it assigned unions with 1) rights of representing 
workers in order to sign collective contracts, 2) responsibility for implementing 
policies which would support and steady the socialist regime and 3) motivate workers 
in production.188 It was known as the ‘three-in-one function’ principle, dependent on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
186 Wilson, J. L. (1986), ‘The People’s Republic of China’, p. 219-220, in Pravda, A. and 
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which, the trade union should take production as the central task; and at the same time 
be responsible for workers’ livelihood and education. 189  Non-adversarial labour 
relations were implemented in a way that social and welfare provision was through 
the ‘work unit (gongzuo danwei) system’. In practice, the work of the union was 
dependent on and supervised by the administration of enterprises and the local 
government,190 while its main task was to subordinate the members’ aspirations to the 
building of a radiant future of the economy.191 
 
After the political disturbances from the mid-1960s when the trade union ‘did not 
even exist as an institution’ until the late 1970s,192 the transformation of socialist 
labour relations into marketised labour relations commenced from the late 1970s. In 
the following decade, accompanying the more relaxed political atmosphere,193 the 
trade union embarked on its preliminary scheme of democratisation, announced in 
‘Tentative Plans of Trade Union Reform’ in the ACFTU Congress Meeting in 1988. 
Reforms in this period, though for the most part at the theoretical level, witnessed the 
union’s attempts at getting more autonomy from the Party and democratising its 
internal relations with its members. The primary aim of this reform was remedying 
the union’s dualist functioning, adjusting the relations with the Party and workers, as 
well as enhancing the trade union’s representative capability, for the needs both of the 
trade union and the Party.194  
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The failure of the 1989 social movement ended the trade union’s short-lived reform. 
The trade union was placed under the Party’s stricter control immediately after the 
incident in June 1989. In the ‘Notification of Reinforcing and Improving the Party’s 
leadership of the Trade Union, Communist Youth League, and Women’s Federation’ 
(1989) (short for 1989 Notification), promulgated by the central government after the 
Tiananmen Protests, it requested the union to closely keep pace with the Party, 
politically, ideologically and practically. In responding, in the ACFTU’s 11th 
Executive Committee Meeting in 1989, the President of the ACFTU stressed that the 
maintenance of workers’ stability was the trade unions’ main task. In its 11th 
Presidency Conference in April 1990, it re-emphasised that its political task was to 
ensure that ‘the foundation of the union’s work is closely connecting with the masses’, 
‘the trade union shall closely connect with the masses, be devoted to work for the 
workers, and optimally organise and unite the workers in the trade union.’195 After the 
Tiananmen Incident, the union saw getting closer to central policy-makers as the 
expansion of its influence, yet at the price of the union’s acceptance of the Party’s 
control.196 
 
3.12 Since the 1990s 
 
The second Trade Union Law and the first Union Constitution, both issued in 1992, 
stipulated that ‘the trade unions represent the overall interests of the people, and at the 
same time represent the legal rights and interests of employees’.197 In the law, the 
trade union had four basic functions, which were protection, participation, 
constitution, and education. ‘Protection’ referred to the union safeguarding members’ 
interests; ‘participation’ referred to the union participating in the management of 
SOE/COE; ‘construction’ referred to the union mobilising in production; and 
‘education’ referred to union propagandising political and ideological thinking among 
workers.  
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In the 2001 revised trade union law, the four functions were replaced by the emphasis 
on the union’s protection role. The law reflected that the state had the intention to 
adjust the role of trade unions to be more adaptable to the market economy by 
removing the typical functions of a socialist regime and reinforcing the trade union’s 
protection function. Article 6 stated ‘Protecting workers’ legal rights and interests is 
the basic function of the trade union’. But the same article maintains ‘Classic Dualism’ 
by further stating ‘The trade union protects the overall interest of all people of the 
nation; while it represents and protects the legal rights and interests of workers.’  
 
3.13 Concluding Remarks 
 
The basic function of the Chinese trade union has been developed within the rigid 
one-party regulatory framework since its establishment. The history of trade unionism 
up to the reforming period witnessed the distinctive trajectory of formation of Classic 
Dualism. In the War, because the development of the union had been contingent on 
the political struggles either between the two Chinese parties, or against the warlords 
and Japanese, the unions had little chance to nurture their capacity in economic fights. 
Their function of production, cultivated in the rural revolutionary based areas during 
the war-time, was inherited in the planned economy period. During the socialist time, 
the trade unions further developed their capability and experience of mobilising 
production, distributing welfare, and organising well-being, while their ability in the 
economic struggle again encountered developmental disorder. The screeching halt of 
the comparatively radical 1980s political atmosphere left the trade union two 
influential aftermaths: the stagnancy of structural democratisation, and the 
maintenance of the union’s dualist functions. The structural re-arrangements were 
designed in a way to constrain the union’s affiliation to the Party, which created a 
regulatory framework which was handier for the state to use to reform and enact 
regulations on the trade union. In the increasing economic liberalisation, the trade 
union’s status was increased within the established restricted regulatory frameworks. 
As reflected by the revised trade union laws, which set forth the development of the 
trade union in marketization, this involved remaining in a dualist functioning 
framework but in a manner that was more favourable to the workers. 
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3.2 The Organisational Structure 
 
3.21 Overall Arrangements 
 
The ‘Classic Dualism’ of the trade union is supposed to be achieved by the structural 
constraints to which the trade unions are subject. The production principle and the 
principle of democratic centralism are two fundamental tenets. The production 
principle refers to the absence of discrimination between people in production, no 
matter they are workers or the managers, that all shall be organised into the union. 
Democratic centralisation is the union’s organisational dogma, consistent with 
‘democratic discussion in the formulation of policies… (and) central control and 
discipline in execution’.198 
 
The Chinese trade unions abide by the combined organisational leaderships of 
territorial union and industrial unions. The national organisation, the ACFTU, 
formally leads both the territorial trade unions and the industrial trade unions. The 
industrial trade unions adopted a representative/delegatory model whereby the 
delegations from lower industrial unions should be recommended to upper union 
officials. At present, ten industrial trade unions exist at the national level. The rest 
come under the direct authority of the local union, but in practice the upper industrial 
unions play a minor role.199 The industrial unions were required to be set up by local 
(regional) union.200 The reality became the largely underdeveloped status of the 
industrial unions. For example, in Shanxi Province, where coal mining is its major 
industry, of its nine industrial unions, there is no such thing as a coal mining industrial 
union. Consequently, although the local union officials are subject to the intertwined 
hierarchies of industrial union and superior regional union, the industrial union’s role 
has been invisible. 
 
The territorial union, also known as the difang (local or regional) trade union, is the 
main form of Chinese union organisation, which adopts a vertically downward 
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arrangement of ‘centralism’.201 The territorial unions are regionally based, ranging 
from province or city, to county/district, then to township or street federation union 
(see Figure 5). Directives and communications flow vertically downward between 
upper and lower territorial trade unions. The lower union is requested to ‘obey, 
consult and report’, while the upper union is requested to ‘oversee, listen, research 
and resolve the problem’.202 The territorial unions are normally established by upper 
unions and Party organisations at the same level. In terms of the union establishment, 
it adopts a superior’s approval system, which is inherited from the 1950s. At that time, 
as a formal part of the state apparatus, the trade union was only required to be 
registered with the superior authority, while it need not get government approval. 203 
This regulates the monolithic nature (yiyuanhua) of the Chinese trade unions. 
  
Figure 5 Organisational Configuration of the ACFTU and its Affiliations 
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3.22 Arrangements at National and Regional Levels 
 
The Party-state’s leadership over the trade union after 1989 was reasserted by the 
ideological constraints, and also by the structural re-arrangement of unions’ 
increasingly tightened subordination to the Party. The 1989 Notification on the 
Party’s leadership of major mass organisations required that the trade unions at all 
levels should follow, firstly the leadership of the party committee at the same level, 
and then the higher organisation. In practice, the party committee exercises authority 
over the management and the treatment of trade union officials. In addition, the key 
union positions have increasingly come directly within the Party by the concurrent 
appointment of the high profile union officials. The 1989 Notification also enhanced 
the union’s political status by providing that trade union officials should be allocated 
higher party status than the status of their corresponding colleagues in government or 
management bodies. In 2009, among the 9972 union presidents and vice presidents, 
11% were members of the corresponding Party’s Standing Committee, 18% of the 
People’s Congress, 10% of the Political Consultation Standing Committee, 9% were 
vice chairman of People’s Congress.204 The union structural arrangement, in terms of 
highly centralised power within the union bureaucracy and subordination to the 
Communist Party at all levels, serves to ensure that union decisions comply with party 
policy.205 The union’s substantial political status thus enables it to exert leverage over 
government officials at appropriate levels. But being structured bureaucratically, the 
lower the union organ is located, the less political status it acquires, and the more 
reliant that they are on complying with government. 
 
At levels above individual enterprises the trade unions are endowed with rights to 
participate in government policy-making. The lack of sanction authority renders the 
trade union naturally dependent on the government. The law prescribed that the union 
co-operate with the government in policy making and implementation,206 while the 
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government ‘shall listen to the union’s opinions in legislating provisions concerning 
workers’ interests.’207 Although, in principle, the socialist unions are not tied to the 
government, their mutual relations are normally intimate for two main reasons. Firstly 
the trade unions are left with little leverage to exert sanctions on unruly behaviour or 
obstacles. The trade union law formulates they shall appeal to the government or the 
court for help.208 Secondly, given the closeness between the Party and the government, 
the unions’ incorporation into the Party ‘ensures that all government measures have a 
party imprimatur that makes them binding upon the unions.’209  
 
3.23 Arrangement at Workplace Level 
 
In ‘Democratic Centralisation’, the democratisation notionally exists in relations 
between the union committee and its members at the grass-roots level. According to 
the law, in the union’s internal governance, the union committee has accountability to 
the union member congress constituted by the elected member delegates: firstly, the 
members sitting in the committee shall be elected by the workers or union member 
congress; secondly the committee shall report to and is monitored by the congress; 
thirdly the committee shall ‘democratically discuss the formulation of policies’ over 
major issues with the delegates.210 It is worth noting that the 2001 Trade Union 
Constitution had initially endowed the members or congress members with the right 
to withdraw or retract the workers’ representative or the committee members.211  
 
But these democratic principles are not grounded in reality. The grassroots unions at 
the workplace level are largely integrated into the managerial hierarchy. In SOEs 
inherited from socialist labour relations, the trade union is subject to the party 
organisation, while the latter is a part of the managerial bureaucracy. And the 
compensation and benefits (daiyu) of full-time union officials are designed to be 
equal to those of the vice chairman of the party-administration.212 In the private sector, 
the trade unions possess more autonomy from the management. But this was 
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undermined by a number of factors. Firstly the union’s subjection to management can 
be largely attributed to the statutory requirements that the enterprise should pay for 
the main income of the trade union, amounting to 2% of the total wage bill. Secondly, 
the full-time trade union officials, including their salary, bonus and subsidy are paid 
by the company, 213  while the part-time union officials’ personal relations with 
enterprises is another hindrance to their acting independently on behalf of workers. 
Moreover, the restrictions on the resources and methods render the grass-roots trade 
unions lacking sanctions to effectively carry out their functions. As a result they have 
to rely on the management to perform them.214 Additionally, in the most recent decade, 
the ineffective campaigns for the establishment of grass-roots organisation have 
resulted in numerous trade union organisations which are established and controlled 
by management. 
 
3.24 Concluding Remarks 
 
The structural framework decides the legitimacy and sources of leverage of the trade 
union, thereby maintaining the dualist functions of the trade unions. At levels above 
individual enterprises, regional trade union organisations are incorporated into the 
state apparatus, and heavily rely on the party’s administrative arm of the government. 
At the workplace level, the democratic tenet implies that unions in enterprises 
theoretically possess something approaching autonomy. Trade unions are supposed to 
be elected and approved by their constituents, demonstrating the creed of democracy 
of the trade union. Since the middle 1990s, electoral practices at workplaces 
resurfaced in the FIEs in some regions such as Guangdong, Zhejiang. But this is 
hampered by a number of facts, including union submission to the party organisations, 
the munificent compensation and benefits granted to the union officials, and the 
officials’ personal affiliation to the party. 215  
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3.3 Evolving Union Functions 
 
3.31 An Overview  
 
Accompanying the reduction in the authority of the Party in SOEs in the socialist 
market economy, the trade union’s formal status within enterprises by relying on the 
Party organization has been substantially weakened. At the same time, private 
enterprises and foreign investment enterprises were permitted and encouraged, 
expanding the spheres where union organisations were previously absent. These 
changes mean the trade union has to rebuild its organisational base in the new 
economic and social environment. This development has been largely confined within 
the ‘Classic Dualist’ framework. 
 
Issued in 1994, the Labour Law implemented in 1995 introduced the labour contract 
system. It substantially transformed the administrative-command system into one of 
market relations. The collective contract system was drawn up by the ‘Labour Law’ 
and the ‘Provisions on Collective Contract’ issued by the National Ministry of Labour. 
In the ACFTU’s 12th Executive Committee Meeting in 1994, the national trade union 
issued ‘the Decision on Implementing the “Labour Law”’. An ‘Overall Union Road’ 
(gonghui gongzuo zongti silu) was declared in the meeting. The ‘Overall Union Road’ 
stated that the establishment of workplace union organisation, especially in the private 
sectors including FIEs and domestic private enterprises, was the foundation for 
putting the collective contract system into practice.216 At the same time, the ACFTU 
had also proposed drafts of revised trade union law to the national legislative agencies. 
These proposals reflected the inadequacy of the 1992 trade union law with regard to 
the establishment of trade unions in private sectors, and also in collecting union funds 
and protecting union property, in the protection of union officials, and in the lack of 
legal liability rules.217 The revised trade union law released in 2001 gave substantial 
attention to primary union organisation; which enhanced the primary trade union’s 
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authority in dealing with the autonomy of enterprise management and underlined the 
union’s protection function.218  
 
In 2002, the new leadership of the national trade union took on conservative trade 
unionism, which had significant influence upon union development for a decade. It 
brought about the idea of strengthening the primary union establishment, having the 
primary union organisations playing their role, taking care of workers’ production and 
life, protecting workers’ direct interests; summarised as ‘organising and truly 
protecting’ (zuzhi qilai, qieshi weiquan). In the ACFTU’s 3rd Plenary 14th Executive 
Committee Meeting in 2005, the focus on the primary organisation was de-
emphasised, and replaced by the politicised catch-phrase of ‘developing harmonious 
labour relations’. The ‘Resolution of Taking the Development Road of Socialist Trade 
Union with Chinese Characteristics’ (short for ‘New Union Road’) announced in 
2006 echoed the messages from the CCP’s decision at the time in delineating the 
social governance framework. 219  The framework was ‘Party-led, government 
accountable, with the social actors co-operative, and mass participated’.220 In the 
‘New Union Road’, the trade union’s ‘concept of rights protection’ (weiquan guan) 
was stressed as ‘non-adversarial employment relations’.221 The Party’s leadership was 
reinforced. Independent trade unions were strictly prohibited. The basic principle for 
the work of the workplace trade union was ‘promoting the enterprise development 
and protecting workers’ rights and interests’.222 New schemes and approaches were 
pronounced in accordance with the ‘socialised approach’, in which the collective 
contract system was replaced by various protection mechanisms. The protection of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Chang, C. (2014), ‘Chapter 4, Legal Regulation of Trade Union in China’, in Chang K. 
(eds.) Legal Regulation of Collective Labour Relations in China, forthcoming. In Chinese. 
219 Here, the term ‘socialist’ indicates the forces from the society, which for the most part 
refers to a number of government bodies. See China Labour Bulletin (2008), Who Protects? 
For whom protect? – The politisation of the ACFTU’s protection function and the future of 
China’s trade union movements, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/files/No.14%20ACFTU(PS).pdf (accessed 14/08/13). In Chinese. 
220 ACFTU, Resolution on Taking the Development Road of Socialist Trade Union with 
Chinese Characteristics, 30th July 2005, English version online, 
http://english.acftu.org/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=66&aid=157 (accessed 14/08/20). Also 
see Zhang, C. W. (2007), ‘Insisting the rights protection arrangement of Party led and union 
operated’, in Chinese Workers’ Movement 2007 (1). In Chinese. 
221 ACFTU, (2005), Resolution on Taking the Development Road of Socialist Trade Union 
with Chinese Characteristics, 30th July 2005, English version online, 
http://english.acftu.org/template/10002/file.jsp?cid=66&aid=157 (accessed 14/10/24). 
222 Article 4, Regulation on the Work of Enterprise Trade Unions (2006). 
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union rights was constituted of six basic activities: broad participation in government 
and legislative affairs; initiatives for co-ordinating grassroots labour relations; 
workers’ democratic management; oversight of labour law compliance; early warning 
systems and measures to deal with labour disputes; and mechanisms to aid workers in 
difficulty. 
 
The ‘socialised approach’ was adopted to perform these functions. Statistical evidence 
shows the tendency of union practice for adopting a co-operative attitude and strategy 
with the government and the party. By monitoring the ACFTU’s major journal and its 
policies, two Chinese scholars separately and independently concluded that, since the 
new leader group of the ACFTU came into power in 2004, ‘protecting workers’ 
interests with (assistance from) the social forces’ (shehuihua weiquan) has become 
the union’s focus. 223  This socialisation refers to approaches ‘led by the Party, 
supported by and co-operating with the government and other actors’.  
 
In practice, these were typically supported or initiated by the local Party-governments 
for the purpose of social stability, growth of the economy, improvement of the 
investment environment, as well as in resolving problems such as labour shortage.224 
Led by city federations of trade unions, programmes were carried out alongside the 
regional experiments or with particular occupations, in the form of legal aid, labour 
inspection, and severance payments.225 This approach, regarded as the ‘top-down 
method’, spread to aspects of the union’s basic functions of the establishment of 
union organisation at workplaces, and the implementation of the collective contract 
system as the two crucial and inter-related functions in trade unionism. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Wen, X. Y. (2012), Corporatism without Workers Participation – Analysis on Trade 
Union Operation in Transition, PhD Thesis, Renmin University; You, Z. L. (2010), ‘Three 
Major Reforms of Chinese Trade Union from 1960s’, in Sociological Studies, 2010(4), pp. 
76-105. 
224 Wu, J. P. (2011), ‘From Enterprise Participative Management to Participating Regional 
Governance: Organisational and Institutional Reform of Chinese Trade Union’, in Xuehai, 
(2011)(1), online, 
http://www.sociology2010.cass.cn/upload/2011/07/d20110707134915515.pdf (accessed 
14/08/20). In Chinese. 
225 Workers’ Daily, February 2006, online, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49153/4085122.html, (accessed 14/08/20). In Chinese. 
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3.32 Establishment of Union Organisation at Workplaces 
 
Under state socialism, trade union membership was almost universal in urban SOEs 
and COEs.226 Entering into the reforms, the establishment of the workplace union 
organisation was experimented with in private sectors, including the FIEs and the 
domestic private enterprises, in the 1980s and 1990s. But the effect was limited, 
because the recognition of trade unions in the private sector encountered severe 
challenges from enterprises as well as local governments, wary of the potential 
disruption to the economic expansion that might be brought about by the union. By 
1992, the FIEs with established union organisations numbered 4274; 92.2% of these 
were joint venture enterprises in which the union was transplanted from the Chinese 
invested companies to the new companies.227  
 
The conference in Ningbo in 1999 confirmed the ACFTU’s ability to use government 
authority and resources in order to advance its functions. It laid out the principle of 
the ‘Party Committee leading unionisation’. By this approach, top organisations of the 
union, party and government bodies were to assign the targets. Corresponding 
organisations at lower levels should sign up to their responsibilities in fulfilling these 
targets.  
 
In this ‘top-down’ approach of implementing union policies, the township/street 
unions take the major responsibility in establishing the grass-roots organisations. The 
township/street unions at the lowest level of a union bureaucracy serve as the 
interface between the higher level and the workplace level. By 2000, the state-owned 
sectors were the foci of union membership, while the organising rate of the trade 
union in private sectors was very low. 228  From 2000, the ACFTU started off 
unionisation at the township/street level. These low-level trade union organisations 
severely lacked authority and resources, and were reliant on their government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Clarke, S. (2005), ‘Post-socialist trade unions: China and Russia’, p. 5, in Industrial 
Relations Journal, 36, 2-18. 
227 Jiang, K. W. (1996), ‘The Conflicts between Trade Unions and the Party-State: the reform 
of Chinese trade unions in the eighties’, in Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, (Autumn 
1996)(8). In Chinese. 
228 Baek, S. W. (2000), ‘The Changing Trade Unions in China’, in Journal of Contmporary 
Asia, 30(1), pp. 46-66. 
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status.229 They normally work with the town government bodies under one roof, and 
the presidents are government officials who hold the concurrent post in the union. 
Their closeness with the government provides the advantage to use the governmental 
administrative resources to boost the union’s leverage; thereby achieving an increased 
number of both union organisations and membership. 
 
There is evidence of workers’ attempts to organise a trade union. A recent well-
known one is the case of Sumida workers’ struggle for a union organisation in 
2013.230 The impasse between the workers and the management was mediated by the 
superior trade union. At the end, workers accepted the superior trade unions’ 
suggestions, and allowed the company to be in charge of the union organising process. 
The majority of worker activists now are excluded from the established union 
committee. The other one is the Olewolff trade union231, which was established with 
approval and support directly from the ACFTU in 2006, and then aroused the local 
union organisation’s positive intervention. The ensuing accounts reported the newly 
established union assisted the workers in a host of labour cases, while at the same 
time, the company made things difficult for the trade union committee members, and 
several of them resigned.232 In both cases, workers were motivated by severe labour 
disputes to establish a trade union. In addition, the union organising campaign in Wal-
mart in 2006233 demonstrated the official union’s efforts to establish trade unions 
without the involvement of the company. One of the young union presidents was 
forced to resign, and the company gradually dominated the remaining union 
organisations. These cases of workers’ taking the lead have been met by an 
unenthusiastic and unsupportive, if not hostile, attitude of trade union authorities 
towards the union organisation initiated by workers themselves.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 China Labour Bulletin (2008) Who Protects? For whom protect? – The politisation of the 
ACFTU’s protection function and the future of China’s trade union movements. 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/files/No.14%20ACFTU(PS).pdf (accessed 2014/08/04). In Chinese. 
230 Sumida Company is a Japanese company in Panyu District, Guangzhou City, Guangdong 
Province. 
231 Olewolff is a Danish company union in Yantai City, Shandong Province. 
232 See the ‘Chronology of Ole Wolff (Yantai) Trade Union’s Struggle’. An English version 
online, http://www.globalmon.org.hk/en/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/chronology-of-ole-
wolff-ya.pdf, (assessed 14/09/04). 
233 It was at the time when the ACFTU launched its nationwide campaign of unionisation in 
the world’s largest 500 enterprises in 2006, in which the Wal-mart’s branches were one of the 
main targets to establish the workplace trade unions. 
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The ‘statistical achievements’ in the coverage of both union establishment and 
collective agreement were significant. By the end of 2009, the total figure of 
collective contracts at both workplace and higher levels was 1.1 million, of which one 
fifth were sectoral/occupational agreements. These sectoral/occupational agreements 
involved 50 million members, accounting for more than one third of the 150 million 
members that were covered by the collective agreements. 234 Between 2002 and 2007, 
since the new leadership of ACFTU came into power, the number of union 
organisations increased from 1 million to 1.5 million; and the membership went up 
from 13 million to 193 million. By late 2010, the membership and the collective 
contract amounted 239 million and 1.4 million respectively. 235  
 
These trade unions were basically ‘shell unions’ or ‘bosses unions’,236 because the 
local trade unions usually mobilise the enterprise’s management in setting up the 
workplace trade unions. As a reward for the management’s ‘cooperation’, the local 
trade unions tend to not enquire too closely how much these workplace trade unions 
are manipulated by the employer.237 These trade unions were commented on by a 
high-profile union official in Guangdong Province:  
 
A host of the workplace trade unions are viewed by workers as an organ subject to 
the management. In a peaceful time, these trade unions do works such as help 
workers in difficulty or host activities and competitions, to mobilise workers to better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Legal Work Department ACFTU, Labour contract coverage in medium and big scaled 
enterprises is more than 90% in most of the provinces, 25th Jan 2010, online, 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-01/25/content_1519017.htm (accessed 14/08/20). In Chinese. 
235 The 2002 Official Reports of ACFTU, 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/MATERIAL/268398.htm; Grass-roots Organisation 
Department of ACFTU: The significant achievement of grass-roots organisation from 14th 
National Congress of ACFTU, 
http://www.acftu.org/template/10001/file.jsp?cid=201&aid=72843; Renmin Daily, China 
union membership amounted to 239 million, http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/14530330.html. 
(All accessed 14/08/20). All in Chinese. 
236 Chang, K. (2013), ‘The Collective Transformation of Labor Relations and the 
Improvement of the Government’s Labor Policy’, in Social Sciences in China, 2013(6), pp. 
91 – 108. In Chinese; Chen, F. (2009), ‘Union Power in China: Source, Operation, and 
Constraints’, in Modern China, 35(6), pp. 662-689. 
237 Wu, Q. J. (2010), ‘Establishing Trade Unions within Foreign Companies in China’, in 
Employee Relations Journal, 32(4). In Chinese. 
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produce production value for the boss. However, at the time of acute labour conflict, 
the trade union will represent the boss’s interests.238 
 
3.33 Implementation of Collective Contracts  
 
The collective contract system, alternatively named collective negotiation, has 
different connotations from collective bargaining in the West. Literally, the use of 
‘consultation’ highlights the supposed identical interests of different groups, which 
whittles down the adversarial features of the relationship between labour and 
capital.239 It implies that conflicts arising from the differing interests shall be resolved 
by amicable negotiation.240 These principles were maintained and reinforced by the 
state-dominated approach in implementing the collective agreement system. 
 
The collective contract system had been formally implemented in the private sector in 
China until the nationalisation of the private sector in 1957. 241 The resurgence of the 
collective contract system after three decades was taken as  a means of adjusting 
transitional labour relations. It was initiated by the Ministry of Labour (abbreviated as 
MOL) and by the ACFTU to be implemented in various types of enterprise, with an 
aim of establishing ‘independent negotiation’ between labour and capital.242 It was not 
formally introduced until the promulgation of the  Labour Law, and then was 
supplemented by the more detailed ‘Provisions on Collective Contract’ issued by the 
MOL in the same year.243 The latter regulation stressed that the collective contract 
should be concluded on the basis of ‘equality and unanimity through consultation’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Deng, W. L. (2010), ‘Most of the workplace trade union presidents are not directly elected 
by workers’, Yangcheng Evening News, 3rd July, 2010, online, 
http://www.ycwb.com/epaper/ycwb/html/2010-07/03/content_867517.htm (accessed 
2014/08/04). In Chinese. 
239 Baek, S. W. (2000), ‘The Changing Trade Unions in China’, in Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, 30(1), pp. 46-66. 
240 Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (1986), ‘Communist Trade Unions: Varieties of Dualism’, p. 6, 
in Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (eds.), Trade Union in Communist States, London: Allen & 
Unwin Press. 
241 Clarke, S. (2005), ‘Post-socialist trade unions: China and Russia’, in Industrial Relations 
Journal, 36, pp. 2-18. 
242 These can be concluded from the early regulations of collective contract system, and the 
speeches of the high profile officials of MOL. A recommended website in further exploring 
the initiations of the labour policies is the ‘reformdata’ (zhongguo gaige xinxiku), 
http://www.reformdata.org/special/474/ (accessed 2014/08/04). In Chinese. 
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The laws required that the contract shall be signed between the enterprise union, on 
behalf of workers, and the enterprise. In an enterprise without a trade union, workers 
could elect democratically representatives to sign the contract with the enterprise. 244 
The draft agreement should be approved by a workers’ congress or all the workers. 
The scope of the contract was broad, concerning pay, working time, labour safety, 
insurance and welfare, etc. Generalised collective contracts had been the main form of 
collective contracts, while wage negotiation was not formally specified by regulations 
until the Provisional Measures on Collective Wage Negotiation issued by the Labour 
and Social Security Bureau in 2000.245  
 
In 1996, a joint circular was issued by the MOL, the ACFTU, State Economic and 
Trade Commission (abbreviated as SETC) and China Enterprise Directors 
Association (abbreviated as CEDA). It was intended for non-state sectors and 
enterprises with marketised management. FIEs and domestic private enterprises were 
targeted to implement the institution alongside the rising unionisation in these non-
state establishments.246 This circular established the use of government led bilateral 
institutions to assist the grassroots actors to sign collective agreements. In this 
approach, the relevant government departments were obliged to provide the 
framework of the collective contract, set out the legality and valid terms of the signed 
contract, and co-ordinate the two sides. The regional trade unions and the employer 
associations were then obliged to provide their subordinates in enterprises with 
guidance, opinions and information support. It is reported that within half a year, 
enterprises concluding collective contracts had increased by six-fold.247 
 
Multi-employer agreements were concluded as supplementary to enterprise 
negotiations in order to overcome various obstacles and resistance from enterprises. 
Sectoral/occupational agreements, as the major forms of multi-employer agreements, 
were originally applied within a limited geographical area, where the small 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Article 33, Trade union law (2001). 
245 The wage negotiation was regulated to set up experimental trials in FIEs. See MOL, 
Several Opinions on the Wage Negotiations in FIEs (1997). 
246 MOL, the ACFTU, the SETC and the CEDA (1996), Notice on the Gradual 
Implementation of Collective Negotiation and Collective Contract System. 
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247 Taylor, B., Chang, K. and Li, Q. (2003), Industrial Relations in China, p. 190, Cheltenham: 
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enterprises were organised under a sectoral union organization. The law stated that the 
local federation of trade unions should guide the enterprise union to sign, or directly 
sign itself, collective contracts in those cases where the enterprise trade union was 
absent, or it should sign sectoral collective contracts with the local employer 
associations. The upper trade unions distributed targets for the agreement of collective 
contracts to the lower level trade unions. Trade unions at all levels were required to 
secure administrative compliance, with substantial quotas assigned from above. 
Substantially implemented after 2000, this approach towards sectoral/occupational 
agreements has been used to fulfill the assigned targets, by virtue of its strength in 
achieving a substantial magnification of the contract coverage.248 Between 2003 and 
2007, the number of collective agreement increased by 45%, and the coverage of 
enterprises and workers rose by 40% and 28% respectively.249 But these collective 
agreements are formal documents ‘largely enumerating the rights and benefits already 
prescribed by the law’.250  
 
In a similar way to the process of union organisation at workplaces, by employing its 
political leverage in influencing the government administration, thereby gaining the 
latter’s co-operation, the trade unions have formed an alliance with the Party and 
government to put pressure on the employers. The mechanism was substantially 
backed by the Party-led coordination of bodies such as the Industry and Commence 
Bureau, Tax Department, and Administration of Justice. Worked on this in the name 
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of labour inspection, security checking, tax checking, and business checking, the 
unions gain both the sanctions and the legitimacy that gives them power.251   
 
3.34 Concluding Remarks 
 
In the marketised economy, although undermined by the dismantling of the state 
socialist economic system, the trade union’s traditional role had been re-established 
within the dualist functioning framework. The union’s large scale campaigns of 
workplace union organisation, and the establishment of the collective contract system, 
show clearly the ACFTU’s attempts to make the union active and adaptive in the new 
economic society.  
 
Decades of trade union reforms are indicative of the realistic approach adopted by the 
Chinese trade union, in which the trade unions became more reliant on and embedded 
in the state apparatus. But while the 2002 ACFTU leadership undoubtedly reinforced 
the bias within the union’s dualist functions, the underlying forces were those of the 
dualist functioning unions themselves. This is evident in two facts. Firstly, the 
approach for union collaboration with the government had been initiated before the 
tenure of the new leadership. For the workplace union, the approach can be traced 
back to the 1999 Ningbo Conference, while collective agreement campaigns adopted 
this approach soon after it was implemented in 1995. The non-adversarial way, which 
prevents the trade union from developing its basic functions by mobilising the rank-
and-file, was the root cause. Secondly the ACFTU leaders are directly controlled by 
the party and central government. Decisions made by the ACFTU have the support of 
the party-state. Chinese union history tells of the tragic end of radical ACFTU leaders 
who challenged the tolerance of union dualism. These approaches are characterised 
by top-down union campaigns employing administrative resources. The developments 
of establishing workplace unions and collective contract implementation, as two 
major trade union functions, illustrate the methods in these approaches.  
 
It has been argued that, in the process of the top-down campaign of grassroots 
unionisation, the regional trade unions largely relied on their political status to gain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Wu, Q. J. (2012), ‘Collective Negotiation and the ‘State-led’ Regulation of Labour 
Relations – strategy and practice of quotas management’, in Sociological Study, 2012(3). In 
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the support of the government. The foci of trade union functions thus moved from 
inside the company to outside the company, where substantial collaboration exists 
between the local trade unions and the government. As the local trade unions were 
increasingly embedded in the state apparatus, the government thus became the 
primary influence behind the local union activities.  
 
The decrease of the trade union’s independence from the local government changed 
the trade union bureaucracy itself. This cuts off its upper from its lower organisational 
levels. The gap became more significant between the helpless workplace trade union 
and the powerful local trade unions that are embedded in the government apparatus. 
The isolation of the grass-roots trade unions from the higher level union is indicative 
of a genuine separation between the trade union and the workers. Hence the 
workplace trade union became vulnerable to management, who can exert substantial 
influence, and collective contracts exist in name only. This dysfunctional institution 
became one of the key culprits in accelerating labour unrest.  
 
3.4 Regulatory Framework of the Strike Resolution 
 
3.41 The Right to Strike 
 
There is a fear that guaranteeing the right to strike may accelerate industrial instability. 
Governments have revealed their negative attitudes towards strikes by trying to not 
touch this issue.252  
 
Whether the strike is legal in China is a debatable issue. The existing laws, such as the 
constitutional law, labour law, labour contract law, trade union law, etc., do not grant 
either workers or trade unions the right to strike. This fact induces a common 
assertion that ‘strikes are illegal in China’. In academia, opinions from the 
mainstream, both overseas and domestic, argue that the ‘strike is not illegal in 
China’.253  	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China: A Case Study of the Nanhai Honda Strike’, in The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 29(2), pp. 133-144.  
253 Representative scholars of advocators include Anita Chan, Tim Pringle, Chan C. K. C., 
Chang Kai, etc. Two legal professors are representative of the opposite view. They are Dong 
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This debate concerns two facts within the relevant legal frameworks. The 
constitutional law removed the right to strike in its latest edition. Some argue that, 
‘(since) it is commonly claimed that the absence of legal prohibition means freedom, 
with the implication of ‘as long as it is not expressly prohibited by law, (the right) is 
feasible’.254 Some aver the right is only present at an abstract level, and it lacks 
specific provisions, such as those releasing strike activities from tort liabilities; hence 
this right is not realistic at all because those organizing strike action can in principle 
be punished.255 
 
The other fact is that, except in the constitutional law, no other laws at national or 
local levels formulate the procedural rules of the strike.256 Some scholars draw their 
conclusions from the fact that some laws provide provisions concerning strike 
resolution. Most focus on article 27 of the Trade Union Law on the role of the trade 
union in resolving the strike. Some also refer to Martial Law (1996), and Civil 
Servant Law (2005), which have banned strikes in wartime or those conducted by 
civil servants.257 They argue the implied premises can be assumed by these legal 
contexts, meaning that Chinese law does not ban the strike in general, but also 
provides a legal basis for strike activities.258 The right to strike was thus viewed as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Baohua, see Dong B. H. (2012), ‘Mechanism and Legal Limits of Workers’ Spontaneous 
Strike’, in Gansu Social Sciences, 2012(1), and Hou, Lingling, see Hou L. L. (2012), ‘British 
Workers’ Collective Action Legislation – analysis and learning’, in Shenzhen Blue Book: 
Labour Relations Development Report in Shenzhen, Beijing: Social Science Archive Press. 
The latter two are in Chinese. 
254 Chang K. (2013), ‘Legitimacy and the Legal Regulation of Strikes in China: A Case Study 
of the Nanhai Honda Strike’ p. 136-137, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations 29(2), pp. 133-144. 
255 Hou, L. L. (2013), ‘Legal Regulation on Workers’ Collective Dispute Actions – from the 
perspective of comparative laws’, in Science of Law, 2013(4). In Chinese. 
256 One exception was the ‘Contemporary Regulation on the Labour Dispute Resolution in 
Dalian Development Zone’ issued by Liaoning Provincial Labour Bureau in 1994, providing 
procedural provisions on the strike. But this regulation expired in 1999 due to some reason.   
257 In Martial Law of the PRC (1996), Clause 2 under Article 13 says during the period of 
martial law, it is allowed ‘…to ban strikes of workers, shop assistants and students’; In Civil 
Servant Law of the PRC (2005), Clause 2 under Article 53 says the civil servant shall not 
have the acts including ‘…organizing or attending any strike’. 
258 Ge, S. Y. (1996), ‘A Preliminary Exploration on Strike Legislation in China’, in Law and 
Commence Study – Journal of Zhongnan University of Political Science and Law, 1996(3), 
pp. 34-38; Chen, B. L. (2006), ‘Discussing Conflictual Roles and Duty Sequences of the 
Union Practicer’ in Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 2006(1). Both in 
Chinese. Chang, K. (2013), ‘Legitimacy and the Legal Regulation of Strikes in China: A Case 
Study of the Nanhai Honda Strike’, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
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‘concealed’ right.259  
 
Another debate is about international law. In 2001, the Chinese government ratified 
the ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’. When 
approving the covenant, the government placed no reservation on Article 8 which is 
‘recognising the right of workers to form or join trade unions and protecting the right 
to strike’. Advocates see this as proof that the Chinese government acknowledges the 
principle of the right to strike, despite the acknowledgement, held by both advocates 
and critics, of an absence of any way of transforming international into domestic law 
to make it practicable.260  
 
In addition, one line of argument focuses on whether there is an urgent need of 
legislating for the right.261 Opposing this, some suggest taking the issue off the legal 
agenda. It indicates their concern about possible adverse consequences for social 
stability if strikes were to be made legal. The other argument, by contrast, suggests 
that any legislation on the right to strike may become de facto a ban on workers’ 
collective actions.262 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and Industrial Relations 29(2), pp. 133-144. Scholars who refer to other laws employ a 
similar approach.  
259 Chen, B. L. (2006), ‘Discussing Conflictual Roles and Duty Sequences of the Union 
Practicer’ in Journal of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 2006(1). In Chinese. 
260 Chang, K. (2013), ‘Legitimacy and the Legal Regulation of Strikes in China: A Case Study 
of the Nanhai Honda Strike’ in The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and 
Industrial Relations 29(2), pp. 133-144. Hou, L. L. (2013), ‘Legal Regulation on Workers’ 
Collective Dispute Actions – from the perspective of comparative laws’, in Science of Law, 
2013(4). Su, M. H., Yao, H. M. and Zheng, L. (2001), ‘Legal Affirmation and Regulation on 
the Right to Strike’ in Science of Law, 2001(6). The latter two are in Chinese. 
261 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, 
paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 2nd-5th 
July 2012. Also see Estlund, C. and Gurgel, S. (2012), ‘A New Deal for China’s Workers? 
Labor Law Reform in the Wake of Rising Labor Unrest’, New York University Public Law 
and Legal Theory Working Papers, 3. 1. 2012.  
262 For the formal view, see Xu, J. Y. and Wang, H. Z. (2003), ‘Discussing the Right to Strike 
shall be Postponed’ in Journal of Shanxi University. In Chinese; for the latter view, see Feng, 
T. Q. (2011), The Sensitive Issues and Rational Solutions to Collective Labor Disputes in 
China, paper for Conflict and Cooperation: The International Symposium of Collective Labor 
Dispute Resolution and Regulation  , Beijing, 17th-18th Dec 2011, and a summary of the view 
by Qiao, J. (2009), ‘Chapter 16: Investigation and Analysis on the Situation of Trade Union 
Officials in Enterprises –Investigating 1811 Trade Union Presidents by Questionnaires’, in 
Chang, K. (eds.), Characteristics and Tendencies of Labor Relations in Contemporary China, 
Beijing: Chinese Labour and Social Security Press. All above books and articles are in 
Chinese.  
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3.42 Regulations on Trade Unions in Strikes 
 
The legal framework of the function of trade unions in strike resolution relates to the 
Trade Union Law, Collective Contract Regulation, and tripartite coordination system. 
In the absence of a legal basis for the trade union to support strikes, the law rules out 
collective action as a legitimate form of union strategy.263  
 
When strikes occur, the trade unions are required to resolve the disputes. Article 27 of 
the Trade Union Law specifies the role of the trade union in resolving a strike.264 It 
stipulates ‘When a strike or stoppage occurs in an enterprise, the union shall represent 
workers to negotiate with the enterprise or with relevant parties, express workers’ 
ideas and demands, and give the union’s proposal. The enterprise shall resolve 
workers’ reasonable requests. The union shall assist the enterprise to restore 
production and working order as fast as it can.’ The 1992 Trade Union Law (Article 
25) stated, ‘when the strike or stoppage occurs in enterprises, the union shall work 
with enterprise administration or relevant parties, to negotiate to resolve workers’ 
reasonable requests which can be resolved, and restore production orders as fast as it 
can.’  
 
Several implications can be drawn from the comparisons between these two 
regulations. The 2001 law enhances the union’s representation of workers, and it also 
regulates the enterprise’s duties in positively resolving the conflict. But the law does 
not provide the union with a right to strike, as was in the 1992 law. An implicit 
implication is that the union shall adopt methods of representing workers to negotiate, 
as well as methods in the workers’ favour, such as persuading, reminding, assisting, 
impelling workers, to go back to work. (Though Article 27 of the 2001 Trade Union 
Law may treat strikes as normal and allow space for the union to play a more forceful 
role on behalf of workers in the event of a stoppage, the article also tellingly states, 
“The trade union shall assist the enterprise or institution in properly dealing with the 
matter so as to help restore the normal order of production and other work as soon as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Chen, F. (2003), ‘Between the State and Labour: The Conflict of Chinese Trade Unions’ 
Double Identity in Market Reform’, p. 1018, in The China Quarterly, No. 176 (Dec., 2003), 
pp. 1006-1028.  
264 In terms of strike resolution, there are a number of relevant laws providing provisions. 
Martial Law (1996), Civil Servant Law (2005), etc., ban strikes in a martial period or those 
conducted by civil servants. 
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possible.” Thus, the ACFTU’s subordination to the Party and State ensures that it is 
impossible for the union to initiate strikes and protests on behalf of its members.265) 
 
The Collective Contract Regulation (2004) is among the few national laws regulating 
the resolution of disputes arising from the signing of collective contracts. Although it 
does not provide strike resolution, the principles it contains may be instructive to 
understand the authorities’ preference in utilising resolutions in the summer 2010 
strike waves, since these disputes concern the matters falling outside established laws 
or rights. 
 
The Collective Contract Regulations adopt a tripartite principle that is to be employed 
in the resolution process. Article 49 provided, ‘one or both parties can bring forward 
the application to the administrative department for coordinated resolution; if there is 
no application, the administrative department can in a coordinated way resolve the 
dispute when necessary.’ Article 50 provides, ‘Administrative departments for labour 
shall organise the trade unions at the corresponding levels and the representatives of 
enterprises, jointly coordinate the collective labour disputes.’ In regulating disputes 
arising from establishing a collective labour contract, this regulation states the duty of 
the negotiation parties (which here mostly refers to the workplace trade union and the 
manager) that they shall ask for government bodies to coordinate the dispute 
resolution.  
 
This regulation does not see strikes as a normal part of collective negotiation. But the 
regulation indicates similar principles for the trade union’s role in collective labour 
disputes as those in the trade union law. It prescribes the trade union’s function in 
strikes as both a representative of workers at the workplace and a coordinator with the 
government in a tripartite framework at higher levels. The law also indicates the 
primary responsibility of the government in resolving disputes. In addition the law 
empowers the government with ‘active intervention’, that the government can 
intervene when ‘there is no application’. By 2012, 87% of provinces had promulgated 
their own provincial regulations on collective negotiation. Closer examination finds 
that, except for a few cases, these regulations on addressing collective disputes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China, p. 
6, paper for the International Labor and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, 2nd-
5th July 2012. 
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seldom involve further provisions, but are simply a copy of the national provisions.266 
This indicates a lack of specific legal guidance on the behavior of the authorities in 
strike resolution. 
 
Since the 2000s, the tripartite system has been developed to resolve collective labour 
disputes.267 The institution of the ‘State Coordinating Labour Relations Tripartite 
Meeting’ (abbreviated as ‘tripartite coordination meeting’ or ‘TCM’) was formally 
created in 2001. It is constituted by chief members from MOLSS, ACFTU and CEC. 
Due to the fact that the CEC mainly represents public enterprises, there is tendency, 
especially at local levels, for including various enterprise organisations in the meeting 
institute, such as the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), 
employer associations, Chambers of Commerce, and other enterprise or entrepreneur 
associations. At the national level, the ACFIC was recently included to be the other 
employers’ representative at the national meetings. The TCM institution is chaired by 
the deputy minister of MOLSS, while the two vice chairs are from the other two 
parties. The institution extends from national, provincial and municipal meetings to 
local meetings at city, county/township/district levels, while the configuration remains 
the same. The TCM mechanism was set up comprehensively, by 2009, and all 
provinces had established the TCM system. Many of them reached down to the city, 
town, and street levels. 
 
The TCM has four main functions: (1) making and implementing legislation and 
policy on major labour issues, (2) promoting collective bargaining at enterprises, (3) 
participating in labour dispute resolution, and (4) implementing the campaign of 
establishing harmonious labour relations in enterprises and industrial regions.268 The 
function of dispute resolution is prescribed to be ‘Investigating and analysing cross-
region or national-wide factors influencing collective labour disputes or collective 
accidents, and proposing opinions and suggestions on their resolution.’269 From 2009, 
confronted with the dramatic increase in labour disputes, the national TCM adjusted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Tu, W. (2013), ‘The current legislation of collective dispute resolution and its problems’, 
in Human Resource Development of China, 2013(21). In Chinese. 
267 The term used here refers to both disputes of interests and disputes of rights.   
268 Renmin University Research Group, (2010), Tripartite Institute of Labour Relations 
Coordination – Analysis on its Improvement and Reform, p. 40-46, unpublished report. In 
Chinese. 
269 ‘Directory Opinions on the Establishment and Improvement of Tripartite Coordination 
Institution of Labour Relations’, MOLSS Document, (2002-08-13). In Chinese. 
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its main functions. 270 In terms of dispute resolution, there were some additional 
emphases on collective dispute resolution:  
• Strengthening the overall direction and service to local workers in 
coordinating labour relations, and establishing information communication and 
coordinated handling mechanisms.  
• Working out resolutions together, adopting consistent actions in a co-
ordinated way, and proposing opinions and suggestions on resolution. 
 
But it rarely functions. Some of its professional committees only exist on paper. 271 An 
important reason is the government’s overwhelmingly dominant role in the operation 
of the mechanism while the organisations’ representativeness is questionable, thus 
lacking adequate credibility with their members.272 In some regions, the tripartite 
meetings are actually operated by a joint meeting between the government and the 
trade union, while the number of union officials involved compared with government 
officials is relatively few.273 Owing to these weaknesses, apart from a few cases, it has 
not been widely adopted in strike resolution.  
 
3.43 The Practices of the MSS System 
 
Recent years have witnessed an increasing proportion of cases with the involvement 
of political and administrative resolution. These resolutions have been achieved 
through the mechanisms of the ‘weiwen’ system (‘Maintenance of Social Stability’, 
abbreviated as ‘MSS’). In terms of the government regulation, strikes are classified 
invariably as ‘unexpected accidents’ with other forms of collective disputes that are 
not restricted to labour relations. In this framework, strikes are regarded as disturbing 
factors to social stability, and thus suppressed by the government. In doing this the 
political consideration is in collusion with capital in pursuit of exploitation of labour.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Renmin University Research Group, (2010), Tripartite Institute of Labour Relations 
Coordination – Analysis on its Improvement and Reform, p. 40-41, unpublished report. In 
Chinese. 
271 Renmin University Research Group, (2010), Tripartite Institute of Labour Relations 
Coordination – Analysis on its Improvement and Reform, p. 40-41, unpublished report. In 
Chinese. 
272 Clarke, S. and Lee, C. H. (2002), ‘The Significance of a Tripartite Consultation in China’ 
in Asia Pacific Business Review, 9(2), pp. 61-80. 
273 Renmin University Research Group, (2010), Tripartite Institute of Labour Relations 
Coordination – Analysis on its Improvement and Reform, p. 40-41, unpublished report. In 
Chinese. 
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The MSS system was established in the 1990s. The highest authority is the Central 
Leader Group of MSS, as one of the deliberative and coordinating bodies within the 
Central Committee of the CCP. In each and every region, ranging from the provincial 
level to the town level, ‘offices of MSS’ (‘weiwenban’) have been established.274 The 
main actors in the MSS are the Ministry of Public Security, Public Prosecutions 
Office, National Security Bureau, and courts. The MSS system is employed in the 
dispute resolution process to intervene in a wide range of mass incidents, provoked by 
a multitude of factors such as SOE transformation, land acquisition, ethnic or 
religious disputes.  
 
The trade union is institutionally integrated into the MSS mechanism. In resolving 
strikes, multilateral actors are involved. The local union is supposed to work with 
other departments, such as the labour bureau, the public security bureau, the courts, 
etc., under the centralised leadership of the local Party and government. The status of 
the trade union in the MSS system varies in accordance with local policies in different 
regions. And a more common requirement on the trade union is an informant role. In 
most regions it requires that, within 1 to 2 hours after the occurrence of a strike, the 
workplace union should report the strike to its upper-level union organisations and 
meanwhile report to the local party committee and government. And in some of these 
regions there are trade union informants, in targeting arenas and enterprises, 
monitoring the grievances of workers, and reporting the possible unrest to the higher 
trade union.  
 
Rights to strike are absent in China, so the local government’s discretion has become 
determinant in handling them.275 In reality, organizing strike action is often seen to 
violate the social order. In resolving workers’ protests, local government’s resolutions 
are commonly implemented by judicial and administrative means in the MSS 
framework. Sometimes, the urgency of ending the protests can trigger the use of 
military means.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 Caijing Magazine (2011), the Machine of MSS, 6th June 2011, online, 
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2011-06-06/110738832.html (accessed 14/08/21). In Chinese. 
275 Baek, S. W. (2008), ‘The changing trade unions in China’, p. 60, in Journal of 
Contemporary Asia, 30(1), pp. 44-66. 
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3.44 Concluding Remarks 
 
The trade union is not empowered with the right to strike. The formal legal 
framework entrusts the trade union with a role in the settlement of strikes. They 
prescribe the trade union functions in strikes as both a representative of workers at the 
workplace and a coordinator with the government in a tripartite framework at higher 
levels. In practices of strike resolution, the trade unions have to carefully balance the 
weight between their dualist functions, which are between ‘weiwen’ (protecting the 
Party’s interests) and ‘weiquan’ (protecting workers’ rights).276 
 
In the thirty years development of the reform, the state corporatist framework, in 
maintaining the principle of Classic Dualism, has undermined the balance within 
Classic Dualism. The trade unions are increasingly embedded in the government and 
management apparatus. This is the institutional and structural basis of the trade unions 
in their general activities and in strikes. At local levels, the local government’s 
dominant status in strike resolution is the main constraint on the trade union’s 
‘weiquan’ approach. At the workplace level, a large number of them were controlled 
by the management, as a product of a decade of ‘top-down’ campaigning by the union 
organisational establishment. 
 
Reviewing the national trade union’s attitudes towards strikes in history, it can be 
seen that experience of the past and the present are both indicative of the principle of 
union classic dualism, whereby conflict is resolved not by compromise but by what is 
seen as the common interest. In the 1956-1957 labour unrest, in an investigation in 
three districts in Shanghai in the 1950s, among 123 union presidents, only 3 had 
participated in protest leadership. But in the ACFTU report to the central committee, 
the union implicitly acknowledged the contradiction between the position of workers 
and management in socialist enterprises. And it also justified strikes by stating that 
‘the bureaucratisation of enterprise administration is the main cause of workers’ 
strikes and petitions’. It admitted that ‘the unions were lacking in experience in 
dealing with the strike’. The official perception was one of ‘no encouragement, no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Xu, X. J. and Wu, Q. J. (2011), ‘An Academic Analysis on the Chinese Trade Unions’ 
Characteristics of Nature and Core Function’, in Journal of Humanities, 2011(5), pp. 165-172. 
In Chinese. 
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support, (but) participation’,277 which reflected a more pro-active attitude. In an 
official interview, the ACFTU president requested the enterprise unions to actively 
resolve disputes by ‘going to the mass to persuade the mass’.278 
 
The present ACFTU’s perception of the union’s role in strikes is in a more 
conservative tone which is ‘no-encouragement, no-support, no-participation’.279 As 
one high-profile official publicly expressed it: ‘I do not agree with “strikes are the last 
resort in labour disputes”, the radical approach does not fit with China’s condition. 
Nor does it conform to the nature of the current state of Chinese labour relations or 
the fundamental interests of Chinese workers mass.’280  
 
In 2006, the vice president of the ACFTU appointed scholars in the China Institute of 
Industrial Relations, the academic institution affiliated to the ACFTU, to conduct 
inquiries into a number of trade union issues, one of which was to establish a trade 
union mechanism for addressing collective labour disputes. This subject was chaired 
by Qiao Jian, the vice chancellor of the institution and an eminent labour and trade 
union expert. He observed: 
 
In dealing with collective labour disputes, the trade union had by and large remained 
silent. We’ve missed chances to investigate how the trade union takes part in 
incidents and how to protect workers’ rights. The vice president asked us to work out 
some rules for the trade unions in coping with strikes.281 
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1950s’, in Feng, T. Q. Focusing on Labour ‘Central Issue’ Problems in Contemporary 
Chinese Society, Beijing: Chinese Worker. In Chinese.  
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Chapter Four - The Research Method 
 
Strikes and the trade unions can be understood from many perspectives in China. 
From workers’ emerging consciousness of the labour process, tensions on the shop-
floor, and union officials’ daily work, to transformations of the traditional enterprise, 
the political context in a given locality, and the evolving functions and structures of 
the ACFTU and its branches. Case studies, observation and interviews were the main 
forms of fieldwork for this study of Chinese trade unions. The varied empirical 
tradition in industrial relations research has long proved to be a rigorous method, 
especially in the UK.282 It is necessary to describe the different approaches adopted. 
 
4.1 Ethnographic Methods Used 
 
4.11 Background to the Research Method 
 
After my undergraduate degree I wanted to gain some direct experience of routine 
industrial employment. In early 2007 I worked in a Hong Kong owned electronics 
factory in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province. In Namtai, I did not separate myself from 
other working girls. I was not a bystander, but became one of them. It gave me an 
awareness of the normal, if not typical, experience of Chinese workers, illuminating 
some facets of life in the workshops, the nature of discontent, the power of 
management, and the (as it turned out) invisible nature of the union organisation in 
helping and protecting workers.  
 
After I returned to Beijing, in the summer, I had a chance to work as an informal 
assistant for the head of a division in the legal department in the ACFTU. Working in 
the building of the ACFTU on the most famous thoroughfare leading to Tiananmen 
Square gave me a different feeling from the Gushu village where I had worked and 
lived a couple of months previously. Because officials in the four sections of the legal 
department worked in the same open office, I had chances to talk with staff in other 
sections and subsequently kept in contact with some of them. I acquired candid and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 Brown, W. and Wright, M. (1994), ‘The Empirical Tradition in Workplace Bargaining 
Research’, p. 153-154, in British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32(2), pp. 153- 164. 
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insightful views from these officials, and heard about the anxieties arising from their 
roles. 
 
I went to the University of Warwick in 2007 to undertake a master’s degree in labour 
law. And then from Spring in 2009 I had a chance to work in ‘Lao Wei’, a law firm 
based in Shenzhen which specialised in labour disputes. Its name can be literally 
translated as ‘labourer protection’. It had the stated mission that ‘we act on behalf of 
the worker, not the enterprise’.283 While there, I witnessed numerous disputes, of 
which most were collective and were brought to the arbitration bureau and court. 
Because of Lao Wei’s high reputation among worker activists, I came across cases of 
collective action, and was impressed by the worker leaders’ wisdom and ambitions. 
This was far beyond my limited observations as a worker in the electronics factory, 
where my workmates complained, quarreled and quit to express their grievances. 
 
I started my PhD study in Cambridge in 2009. In May 2010, just when I was about to 
start my fieldwork, the famous strike in Honda Nanhai broke out, which triggered the 
wave of broad labour unrests across China. Because my father as a labour scholar was 
involved in several cases in the strike wave, I had opportunities to get a close look at 
them and to some extent to be involved in them. In August, I went to Pingdingshan in 
Henan Province, a city in the central plain of China. Partly because of the area’s 
association with the roots of Chinese civilization, people in Henan have a reputation 
for their obedience and hard work. Between 14th May and 1st June, at the same time as 
the Honda Nanhai strike, a strike took place in a textile company in Henan which 
involved around 5000 workers. I took part in the legal assistance for an arrested 
worker in the strike, carrying out investigations on the site to prepare for the trial. I 
studied the working conditions of the factory, looked into the views of the actors, and 
visited the city federation of the trade union. I dealt with the government respondents 
to the company and striker, and saw the awkward position of the city trade union and 
became aware of the absence of the workplace trade union in the settlement process. 
 
Drawing on these experiences, now we move to three specific aspects of labour 
relations - workplace labour relations, the ACFTU, and the strike – through my eyes. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 The website of Lao Wei, http://www.gdlaowei.com/index.html, (accessed 14/09/06). In 
Chinese. 
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These experiences are used to present an initial picture of Chinese labour relations. 
The experiences of the ACFTU administration, and of the economic, social, political 
and institutional arrangements of workers’ protests provided the basis for the 
understandings on the Chinese trade union’s role in strikes.  
 
4.12 Understanding Workplace Labour Relations 
 
In early spring 2007, I worked in the Hong Kong owned Namtai electronic factory in 
Bao An District in Shenzhen. Namtai is a China-based contract manufacturer of cell-
phone components. Major customers included Sharp, Sanyo, Epson, Motorola, Sony 
Ericsson, and Texas Intruments. At that time, it employed around 1500 workers. 
  
My initial role in the factory was as a college student having her internship in the 
Namtai workplace trade union. The union president assigned me to assist the officer 
in the factory library that was run by the union. I noted down workers’ names and 
found the books they requested. Apart from running the library, the union took 
responsibility for a wide range of activities, mostly they were entertainment. It was 
also in charge of allocating the workers’ welfare provided by the company.  
 
On the third day, I told the union president that I wanted to work in the workshop. He 
was astonished but agreed to let me go. Because the president had no authority to 
directly transfer me to the production department, I needed to take the factory’s 
enrollment exams. Since it was shortly before the 2007 spring festival, some workers 
had left for home. Under an urgent order from the cellphone manufacturers, Namtai 
had to rush to fulfill production before the 7-day national holiday. Around a hundred 
additional workers were needed. After simple literacy and physical tests, the company 
recruited most of the candidates. A few of the new workers were males. We were 
assigned to a new order from Motorola to produce bluetooth wireless headsets.  
 
The training for the new-comers lasted a couple of hours. After we had watched a 
short video about the workshop rules, we were led to the workshop K2, where 
hundreds of workers were busying themselves on the assembly lines. Training was 
not very significant because scientific management has simplified the whole 
production process into hundreds of short procedures. All the motions of each 
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procedure were normally controlled into less than a couple of minutes. One of the 
jobs which I took was sticking a slip of logo (around 20mm by 5mm) with paste to the 
shell. It was supposed to be finished within five seconds. The number of workers in 
each production procedure was precisely designed to ensure it to be best fit in the 
pace of the overall production. 
 
‘Catch up with the line’ became my motto during that time, and I would be very 
happy when I was able to catch it up, not only because I did not have to be scolded by 
others, but also because I felt proud of myself as my pace had been integrated into 
that of the whole team. Working on the assembly line, any slow work will cause a pile 
up of uncompleted production, and thus slow down the whole line. This often aroused 
other worker’s dissatisfaction. At the same time, the concerted effort among workers 
was reinforced by the line, when everyone had to work at the speed of the line. After 
working for a couple of hours, my body suffered from pain because of the repetitive 
action. The pain lasted for a couple of hours and then disappeared as the feelings 
turned dead. Before the end of work, I was overwhelmed by a sense of numbness, 
without discomfort, irritation, or thinking.  
 
During the week, we had a day off on Sunday. Morning work started at 7.10, and 
finished at 12.10. In between there was a five minute break. The lunch time was fifty 
minutes. Similarly, the afternoon work was from 1.00 to 5.10 with a five minute break. 
From 5.10 to 7.10 we had overtime work. The total working time for a day was 11 
hours. The wage components were fixed. The basic earnings were determined by the 
labour grade of the duty. All the assembly workers were at the lowest level, paid on a 
monthly basis. The earnings consisted of  (a) the base wage rate, based on a daily 
work requirement of 8 hours, which was at the level of the minimal wage in Shenzhen; 
(b) the overtime wage rate which was 150% premium percentage in weekdays, and 
200% in weekends; and (c) the meal allowance of 900 RMB every three months. I 
worked in K2 for two weeks. In the week before the Spring Festival, we finished our 
tasks for Motorola. By the day, I received my two weeks’ salary which was 614.26 
RMB. 
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Managing workplace labour relations 
 
The management hierarchy at my workshop was, in order, the production chief, 
production managers, office foremen, line foremen, deputy supervisors, operators. 
The production chief (male, 40 years old) was in total charge of the production, and 
production managers decided the overall scheme of the production, then office 
foremen allocated production to different lines. The line supervisors (lazhang) were 
responsible for all production issues of the tasks allocated to their own lines.  
 
The higher-profile managers and administrative staff worked behind the scenes. They 
worked in another building and seldom appeared at the workshop. The managerial 
authority was transferred from higher level managers to line supervisors. The foremen 
were in charge of adjusting the production pace, of job allocation for new comers, 
supervising workers, monitoring produce quality, and addressing problems that 
occurred in production etc. Unlike operators who were attached to the line, they can 
walk around to inspect the production procedures, and they also had the right to give 
operators permission to leave for the bathroom. Our foreman (female, 19 years old) 
did not like the task we were doing. But she could not refuse the complicated and new 
task that was allocated to her. She had to accept it and work with all the workers in 
her line, including on overtime.  
 
The foremen played a crucial role as the interface between the manager and the 
managed in the daily production. Their authority was indeed limited, but their roles of 
daily supervision appeared more conspicuous in workers’ eyes than the production 
manager sitting in his office. One day, I witnessed a girl quarreling with our foremen 
when the latter accused the girl of slow working. The quarrel later intensified and the 
foreman shoved the girl’s production to the ground. The girl spoke out “I quit!” and 
then left. I was informed by my workmate that ‘on the line, quarrels were frequent, 
but quitting was rare.’  
 
I lived with nine girls in the dormitory. Most were in their early twenties. A-Mei 
showed me her photo taken in her first year working at Namtai. I could hardly 
recognise her in the photo, for the girl sitting in front of me looked like my aunty. 
Another girl in my dormitory was Lingling; she had a 20 pound weight loss after 
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working here for three years. In chatting, I was told that girls commonly had alopecia 
and insomnia to different degrees when working in this factory.  
 
Most of my workmates had worked in other factories before they worked in Namtai. 
Compared with other factories nearby, the work in Namtai was more stressful and 
more restrictive in the line management techniques, though the working conditions 
were better and wages were higher. But almost everyone I talked to wanted to have 
overtime work, saying that ‘six-working days a week is the best!’ Without overtime 
work, workers were paid the basic wage that amounted to 600 RMB p/m. The 
remuneration mechanism in Namtai made no distinction between the long-standing 
and new workers. The turnover was high. And compared with ten years ago, the wage 
had remained the same in real terms, except for the food subsidy of 300 RMB. 
 
Girls in my dormitory had different experiences. A-Mei was in her late 20s. She and 
her husband both worked in Shenzhen, in different factories. They had left their 
daughter at their hometown. Trying to save every penny, they would deposit 500 
RMB every month. Fang, born in 1984, was married and had a son. Her family ‘can 
hardly put down any penny, except for the money for my son’s milk powder.’ 
Lingling sent money home every other month, because her parents would keep the 
money for her, otherwise ‘I would spend my entire wage soon after I am paid.’ The 
reasons to work out of their hometowns for these girls, born in the mid- or late- 1980s, 
varied. 
 
“Do I want to leave? Yes but no. I want to taste something new. I was getting bored 
when I worked at one factory for a long time. But I am not well educated, so it is not 
easy for me to find a better job. If I work in here, my parents do not have to feed me. 
They are not rich.”284 
 
“I am from a small village. I want to have a look at the outside world. And the wage 
in Shenzhen was higher than working in enterprises in my town. Plus, agriculture 
does not make money and it is toilsome. Working in the factory is also hard work, but 
I have no choice, because I am not educated. I need to survive.”285 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Interview, worker 2, Namtai, 6th February 2007. 
285 Interview, worker 3, Namtai, 6th February 2007. 
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A-Mei had been working for 13 years in Namtai. She worked in the inspection 
department. The workers in her department were seniors at higher job grades. A-Mei 
had a personal grievance against her department production manager who at times 
made things hard for her. The grievance procedure in Namtai was a part of the 
managerial mechanism. Having tried several times to express her grievance to the 
high-profile managers, she found ‘every time there were several supervisors in 
between, who concealed or misrepresented the grievances’.286 Workers neither went 
to the trade union nor sought to go to the district arbitration bureau for grievance 
settlement, because ‘there is little chance to win.’ Small-scale strikes took place 
sometimes for the sake of wages and promotion. 
 
This was at the time when the Labour Contract Law was being drafted. A-Mei liked 
discussing it with other girls. She believed the labour legislation needed to be 
improved, so that workers’ rights and interests could be protected by the formal 
mechanism rather than at the random mercy of the managers. And she also believed 
that, ‘Workers will be aware of their rights, sooner or later, and struggle for them. The 
development of China does not go backwards.’287 
 
4.13 Understanding the ACFTU 
 
In June, 2007, I had an internship in the Legal Department in the ACFTU for a month, 
working as the director’s assistant in the division of legislation. The legal department 
contains four divisions, they are legislation, legal inspection, labour dispute resolution, 
and general administration. The duties of the department are ‘to participate in the 
legislation concerning workers and the trade union’, ‘to coordinate the trade union’s 
participation in legislation’, ‘to participate in the investigation and resolution of major 
labour dispute cases’, ‘to analyse and make drafts of policy and regulations 
concerning labour dispute resolution’, ‘to guide and take charge of legal assistance 
and legal services of the trade union’, ‘to cooperate with the relevant department to 
carry out legal education and propaganda’, and ‘to take charge of the daily operation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Interview, worker 1, Namtai, 5th February 2007. 
287 Interview, worker 1, Namtai, 5th February 2007. 
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of the legal consultants’ committee’.288 In the ACFTU, I observed and interviewed 
staff about major duties of the legal department. Two functions of ‘participating in 
legislation’ and ‘coordinating the labour disputes’ will be discussed below.  
 
Participating in legislation 
 
The legal department is an important part of the ACFTU’s function. The trade union 
law empowers the union with rights of ‘making (policies of) national economic 
development, legalising law/regulation/methods, making major departmental policies, 
working out workers’ problem resolution, conducting surveys, etc.’ And the law also 
asks ‘government legal departments at all levels to listen to the union’s opinions, and 
make reports to the union about the government’s administrative agendas and 
resolutions relevant to union work.’ Trade unions at several different levels exert 
influence over wage policies. It is the trade union’s political status within the party 
and government that enables it to have significant access to legislation. 289 My 
supervisor attended the meetings of the People’s Committee every two months, 
though he was not allowed to speak in the meetings. The department regularly 
submitted documents with the union’s opinions to the Committee.  
 
One scholar argues that the prior endorsement of the party stemming from this formal 
arrangement and empowerment provides the trade union with a ‘safe’ sphere within 
which to function.  
 
“The legislation is for the most part the state’s responsibility. Even the participants, 
workers will not take it as the union’s responsibility. The union wants workers to 
honour the party not to honour itself. Otherwise the party will worry that the union 
may have the intention to unify workers in order to become autonomous and 
independent of the Party.”290  
 
This scholar’s argument was supported by the ACFTU officials, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288ACFTU, Organisational Arrangement of the Legal Work Department, online, 
http://www.acftu.org/template/10001/column.jsp?cid=150 (accessed 14/08/14) 
289 Chen, F. (2009), ‘Union Power in China: Source, Operation, and Constraints’, p. 662, 679, 
in Modern China, 35(6), pp. 662-689. 
290 Interview, Mr W, associate professor, China Institute of Industrial Relations, Beijing, 19th 
January 2012. 
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“This direction [of legislation] is no problem [for the union-party relations]. 
Legislation is an objective subject, it is hardly influenced by the union’s dependence 
upon the political regime. And it is the party’s ideology of ‘rule by law’. [However], if 
those above say about a particular issue, ‘Let us not talk about this question any 
more’, the union will be silent on that.”291  
 
In recent years the ACFTU has made great efforts in influencing legislation.292 It has 
actively participated in the law-making of the labour and trade union, a process called 
‘original participation’ (yuantou canyu). When the draft of Labour Contract Law was 
published for discussion, the ACFTU delivered notices to its branches, asking the 
trade union organisations and workers to deliver comments.293 Within a month, the 
draft received 191,849 comments from various interest groups, of which about 65% 
came from ‘ordinary labourers’.294 Every year the legal department set up a special 
fund within its budget. This fund would be used to ‘build good relationships’ with the 
law makers, by ‘inviting them to travel around China or go abroad.’295 However, my 
supervisor had been pessimistic about the legal framework: ‘I have seen the 
substantial influence of (capital’s) politics on legislation. Capital can spend a lot of 
money influencing the law. Workers do not have a voice.’ 
 
Labour dispute resolution 
 
In January 2011, I interviewed the head of the Labour Dispute Resolution Division by 
telephone. The interview was based on a formal semi-structured interview, with a 
clear set of topics constituted by five broad questions concerning the ACFTU’s 
attitude and practice on strike resolution and union reform. The second interview was 
with the retired official who was my supervisor during my internship in the ACFTU, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Interview, Mr G,  director of Division I, Legal Work Department, ACFTU, 10th January 
2012. 
292 Chan, A. (1993), ‘Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao 
China’, in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29, pp. 31-61. 
293 Interview, Mr W, associate professor, China Institute of Industrial Relations, Beijing, 19th 
January 2012.  
294 Xinhua Net, (2004), The publicised Labour Contract Law Draft drew 191849 pieces of 
commends, online, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-04/21/content_4457789.htm 
(assessed 14/07/18). In Chinese. 
295 Interview, Mr G,  director of Division I, Legal Work Department, ACFTU, 10th January 
2012. 
	   87	  
the former head of the Legislation Section. It was conducted in a more casual way. I 
also interviewed scholars who work in the academic institutes of the trade union. The 
role of the trade union in strikes is perceived by the ACFTU official: 
  
“The basic attitude of ACFTU towards the strike is that, ‘the union does not support, 
does not encourage, does not use the strike to resolve the dispute’. In a strike, the 
union should understand the situation, listen to workers’ opinions and voices, and 
transmit the workers’ opinions and demands to the party and superior trade union. It 
should help the party and superior trade union to resolve the dispute.”296  
 
“However, it is difficult to implement the position of the ACFTU in practice. Workers 
neither approve the workplace union in cases where one exists, nor accept the people 
from superior union who had few contacts with them before. The mass base of the 
trade union is absent. This makes it impossible for the trade union to have its mass 
base, because the union which has a good reputation among workers will inevitably 
be confronted by the hostility of the management, which results in a short-lived 
president.”297   
 
Although there had been lots of strikes recently, the ACFTU were not well informed 
from below. The subordinates concealed these incidents and did not report to the 
superior organisations. For the head, ‘It is indeed not a good thing for the ACFTU, if 
we are not aware of the actual situation. (But in reality), we stay aloof from the actual 
situation. We do not know what happens.298  
 
And there were also worries about the severity of the situation. One union expert 
observed of this crisis for the ACFTU that, ‘I heard this from the head of the ACFTU, 
“The sounds (‘dongjing’, the social effects of the workers’ strikes) are louder. 
Without being reformed, we will find it difficult to survive.”’299 An academic official 
in Guangdong provincial trade union stated, ‘If it fails to address it (the strikes), the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Interview, Mr L, director of Labour Dispute Division, Legal Work Department, ACFTU, 
10th January 2012. 
297 Interview, Mr L, director of Labour Dispute Division, Legal Work Department, ACFTU, 
10th January 2012. 
298 Interview, Mr L, director of Labour Dispute Division, Legal Work Department, ACFTU, 
10th January 2012. 
299 Interview, Mr F, chancellor of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 10th January, 2012.  
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trade union is going to die, as the Party will say “stop playing, you are useless!” This 
is a gamble for the union.’300 
 
4.14 Understanding the Strike  
 
In August 2010, I worked with a lawyer on legal assistance for a worker arrested in 
the Pingdingshan Cotton Textile Co., Ltd. (short for Pingmian) strike. The worker had 
worked in the company for more than two decades. After the outbreak of strikes in the 
middle of May, he, among a group of workers, went to petition the authorities in the 
capital city of the province, and, on his own, hung banners in front of the factory gate. 
After that he was detained as ‘disturbing the social order’. Two days later the strike 
was suppressed by riot police. In the middle of August, the lawyer and I paid a visit to 
the city.  
 
My experience 
 
After submitting an application to the police office to meet our client, we were told 
that we had to find the section chief of the police office, who would be guarding the 
worker. But the chief did not appear until the office closing time. The next morning, 
we paid another visit to the police office, but did not see the section chief who was ‘in 
a meeting.’ Then I went to the factory with a worker. To the gate keeper, he 
introduced me as his niece to get permission to enter into the factory, where I 
witnessed terrible working conditions. The workshops were stuffy. The noise of 
machines was loud. And the cotton dust got into my nostrils with my every breath. 
When we were about to leave, the security head caught us, then detained and 
questioned us in a meeting room for a couple of hours. That afternoon, we met around 
twenty workers in our residential room. Soon the residential room was monitored by 
the enterprise. At night, the lawyer and I went out for dinner. On the way our taxi was 
followed by a car. It watched us during the meal. On the third day, we interviewed 
two company managers, the security head whom we had met the day before and an 
office manager. In spite of our request, the officer of the company union did not make 
himself available since he was ‘in a meeting’. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Interview, Mr L, vice president of Cadre School of Guangdong Province Federation of 
Trade Unions, Guangzhou,18th November 2011. 
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We stayed at Pingdingshan for three days, and did not have a chance to meet the 
section chief of the police office. After a fortnight, our client was released on bail. It 
was reported that the authority was under pressure from a number of labour activists 
and NGOs.301 While there I interviewed six union officers of the City Federation of 
Trade Unions, two medium level managers at the company, and several workers. I 
had no access to the workplace trade union.  
 
The government in the strike 
 
Chen (2003) distinguished the workers in SOE/COE restructuring from the protesters 
in wholly private-owned enterprises in terms of the ‘claims, reports of contention and 
outcomes’. The cause of the Pingdingshan strikes was typical of those in SOE/COE 
restructuring, where the workers’ rights and interests were violated by the 
privatisation scheme and the corruption of the management.302 These two are the most 
common factors which have triggered workers’ protests.303  
 
In 2006, the company proclaimed itself to be bankrupt and then was privatised by 
being merged with another company in Zhejiang. A number of workers were laid off 
with low compensation. They were bought-out at a price of 6000 yuan, which was 
much less than the dismissal compensation, as the legal compensation was 
approximately 10,000 yuan. In addition, because the company did not pay for their 
social insurance, which amounted to tens of millions yuan, there was no pension for 
them after the lay-offs. Workers had tried many times over the years to resolve their 
problems by visiting the labour bureaux and Discipline Inspection Commission at the 
local and provincial capital levels. They went to the local arbitration bureau, but their 
appeals were rejected as ‘it was not their business’. They lodged petitions to the local 
government, but again they did not receive any response. Earlier that year, a group of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 China Labour Bulletin, (2011), A Criminal Case: the case of detaining Miao Wanli, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/content/%E5%88%91%E4%BA%8B%E6%A1%88%E4%BB%B
6%EF%BC%9A%E8%8B%97%E4%B8%87%E9%87%8C%E7%BD%A2%E5%B7%A5%
E8%A2%AB%E8%A1%8C%E6%8B%98%E6%A1%88 (accessed 14/08/14). In Chinese. 
302 The chief manager was believed to have siphoned off the collective assets and stripped the 
majority of the company equipment. See a worker’s blog, online, 
http://hi.baidu.com/%C1%B5%D1%A9%D0%A1%B1%F9/blog/item/e13c8c1ed8bb2ac4a78
66996.html (accessed 14/08/14). In Chinese.  
303 Chen, F. (2003), ‘Industrial Restructuring and Workers’ Resistance in China’, in Modern 
China, 29(2), pp. 237-262.   
	   90	  
them had distributed a petition letter to the central government, including the State 
Council’s Letter Bureau as well as the ACFTU in Beijing. The managers and 
government officers were soon informed about this action. 
 
“We went [to Beijing] by train while they went by plane. They arrived at Beijing one 
day earlier than us. They held us back on our way, and promised to give us the 
compensation if we did not petition to the central government. But when we returned 
back, only some of us were paid a little compensation, most did not get anything.”304  
 
Resolution of disputes arising from enterprise restructuring are commonly confronted 
with these institutional barriers. Cases concerning enterprise restructuring are not 
usually accepted by local arbitration bureaux, because of the significant social 
influence of these major grievances and the complexity of the causes relating to the 
government reform policies.305 Lacking formal dispute resolution channels, protesters 
have to go to the government departments providing informal grievance channels or 
the street. These protests normally took the forms of ‘protest or riot on the streets, 
camping outside government buildings, and blocking vital communication lines such 
as railroads and highways to bring public attention to their plight and force the 
authorities to take action.’306 In a leaflet distributed to all the workers, it said, ‘we 
hope the superior leaders could listen to workers’ opinions patiently, punish the 
manager with severity, and give the five thousand workers justice’.307 
 
The involvement of the government in the strike did not immediately end the conflict. 
After the occurrence of the strike, the city party/government organised a joint working 
team including officers from the Labour Bureau, officers from the National Land and 
Resources Bureau, officers from the local police office and three city union officers. 
After the government negotiated with the company, the latter raised the monthly wage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Interview, worker, Pingdingshan, 18th August 2010. 
305 This argument is summarised from those of judicial practitioners in meetings concerning  
labour dispute resolution which I have attended. 
306 Chen, F. (2003), ‘Industrial Restructuring and Workers’ Resistance in China’, p. 241, in 
Modern China, 29(2), pp. 237-262.   
307 Workers Forum, June 2010, online, http://www.pdslt.com/topic-701-1.html (accessed 
14/08/14). In Chinese. 
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by 220 RMB. But workers rejected the offer.308 On 25th, a group of people burst into 
the strikers’ camps and attacked workers. The policemen witnessed the attack but did 
not intervene until some of the female workers kneeled down and begged them. But 
workers later found that, although the police arrested some, they later secretly let the 
attackers go.  
 
On the morning of 1st June, more than three thousand riot policemen appeared at the 
strike site and dispersed the crowd. The police took dozens of workers away. Three of 
them were later arrested for a month. The local mobile phone communication was cut 
till next day.309 The strike was officially ended. In the evening, a small number of 
workers tried to go back to the strike site. They were then monitored and controlled 
by the police. It was reported that on 3rd June, the vice mayor went to the company, 
asked the manager to resolve workers’ demands and ameliorate the working 
conditions, to ‘let workers see some real changes.’310 
 
Although the government had intervened, the company did not make many 
concessions. Pressures from the potent threat that it might expand the workers’ social 
influence triggered the government’s anxiety to curb the strike. Because the site of the 
protests was located outside the factory, it aroused great public attention and support. 
Workers from nearby factories and the local residents offered financial support by 
fund raising or donating bottled water and tents. These may have been the reason of 
the government cruel intervention. Before I went to Pingdingshan city, in Beijing I 
interviewed the Party Secretary of the Pingdingshan City Party Committee. In the 
interview, he explained his decision on repressing the strike. ‘The strike has lasted for 
more than half a month, which is a long time. So I have to stop it, otherwise the 
situation might get out of control.’311 But the Party Secretary also admitted that he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 China Newsweek, Workplace Union kept Silent in Workers’ Strike Incident, June 2010, 
online, http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0624/22/231593_35050624.shtml (accessed 
14/08/14). In Chinese. 
309 Workers Forum, June 2010, online, http://www.pdslt.com/topic-701-1.html (accessed 
14/08/14). In Chinese. 
310 China Newsweek, Workplace Union kept Silent in Workers’ Strike Incident, June 2010, 
online, http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0624/22/231593_35050624.shtml (accessed 
14/08/14). In Chinese. 
311 Interview, Party Secretary, Pingdingshan City, 1st August 2010. 
	   92	  
personally was not well informed on the strike situation, and he had made the decision 
because his subordinates’ report made him realise the ‘gravity of the matter’.  
 
In resolving the strike, the detaining of strike activists was intended to intimidate 
other strikers. In some cases, the strikers who are arrested receive criminal penalties 
or were sentenced to forced labour.312 In this case, after being held by the police for 
two months, the strikers were formally arrested as the leaders of the strike on a 
sentence of ‘disturbing social order’. After one worker’s arrest, his parents went on 
the street, clothed in white paper on which was written their appeal to the government 
to release their son. In their letter, they promised their son would behave himself in 
the future and they will never let him ‘rush to the fore’.  
 
The tough attitude of the government constrained the trade union. Three union 
officials of the City Trade Union joined the working team organised by the 
government. In my investigations, the city trade union officers were generally 
reluctant to talk about the strike. After introducing myself as a researcher from the 
ACFTU, the chief of the legal department, who had been recently transferred from the 
personnel department, met me and made a speech concerned with a number of 
‘achievements’ of the trade union in recent years. I contacted some union officials in 
unauthorised ways. These unofficial interviews went smoothly and interviewees 
tended to be frank, though all rejected my recording of the interviews. 
 
4.15 Reflections on Participant Observation 
 
These experiences are drawn from my participation in these three settings, seen from 
the perspectives of the working girl, the intern student in the ACFTU, and the legal 
assistant for a striker’s trial. These first hand experiences are conducive for exploring 
the meaning of the context for the actors, by understanding ‘what is happening around 
them’.313  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
312 China Labour Bulletin, (2008), ‘An analysis on the evolvement of workers’ collective 
action’, online, 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/files/No%2012%20SOE%20workers%20rights%20report_finalS.
pdf (accessed 14/08/13) In Chinese. 
313 Merriam, S. B. (1988), Case study research in education: A qualitative approach, p. 19-
20, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
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In Namtai, my studying of workers’ behaviour in day-to-day life revealed how 
conflict unfolds in specific contexts. Workers were attracted by the better working 
and living conditions in urban factories, for they were generally from the less 
advanced regions where the economy was much poorer. Worker’s working conditions 
were based on an individual contract, which is a unilateral imposition from the 
managerial authority. They had ambiguous targets of their grievances due to the 
dispersion of the managerial authority. The Namtai trade union was a ‘model’ union 
in terms of democratic election.314 But from my observation, it did not play any 
visible role in resolving workers’ grievances, nor in adjusting daily employment 
relations.  
 
Workers who were born prior to the mid-1980s normally had heavier burdens of 
raising their family. Younger workers tended to be in less need of the wage, and they 
were desirous for experiencing a living style different from the one of their home 
towns. So long as their income would maintain their basic life, they would like to 
spend more time ‘living a life’.  
 
In the ACFTU, the national trade union organisation’s participative legislation 
function is powerful in effecting favourable labour legislation. It reflects the fact that 
the unions’ legitimacy has been primarily reliant upon their political status. Because 
of their bureaucratisation and reliance on the Party, they are de facto prevented from 
mobilising or empowering grass-roots forces. Their impact on the balance of power 
between labour and capital in the workplace is limited.315 The increasing labour unrest 
accompanying workers’ growing awareness and confidence leaves the trade unions 
trapped in a dilemma. More formalised and favourable legislation might arouse more 
protests of workers to defend themselves in disadvantageous employment relations, 
which is a symptom of union failure. Yet the unions can do little except continue to 
engage in the ‘safest behaviour’ of participating in law-making. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Nanfang Daily, Trade Union Direct Election: Pushing forward the Grass-roots 
Democracy, 8th July 2003, online, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-07-08/1141341274s.shtml 
(accessed 14/08/01). In Chinese. 
315 Chen, F. (2009), ‘Union Power in China: Source, Operation, and Constraints’, in Modern 
China, 35(6), pp. 662-689. 
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In the case of Pingdingshan, the workers’ defense of their rights confronted 
institutional barriers. Normally the shortest duration of the whole judicial procedure 
for a simple dispute case lasts two years. Most of the workers thus abandon use of 
judicial resolution and accept compensation by mediation, which means the amounts 
of the compensation are substantially lower than the statutory requirements. My 
experience of the difficulties of legal assistance also emphasises the managers’ 
typically strong personal economic and political background.   
 
4.2 Research Method 
 
4.21 Adjusting the Analytical Framework  
 
Through my links with Renmin University I participated in several research trips 
concerned with topics associated with mine. The programmes offered rare access to 
individual workplace organisations, which would have been inaccessible to most 
individuals. Some of the research programmes were funded by government or trade 
union bureaux, which provided access to national government departments and local 
labour departments at provincial, city and district levels, along with local trade union 
bodies. A number of the workplace trade unions were thus introduced through the 
local union bureaux. Most of the interviews with workplace presidents used a group 
discussion. After establishing connections with these presidents, I personally 
contacted them and expressed my wish to interview them again on a one-to-one basis. 
Some accepted my request. I therefore had several second or even third visits to these 
cases on my own. 
 
Between August 2010 and December 2013, I carried out researches in a number of 
provinces including Liaoning, Guangdong, Tianjin, Henan and Jilin. I interviewed 
officials of 17 workplace unions, and 9 regional (district, town, city and provincial) 
union presidents. The 17 cases are listed in Appendix A at the end of the chapter. In 
terms of company ownership, these cases include 12 FIEs, three joint ventures, one 
POE and one SOE. 12 of them had at least one strike experience. Two of them traced 
their first strikes back to the 1990s; the stories of these two gave insights into the 
rather different approaches adopted by the local authorities to resolve disputes 
throughout the decades. The latest strikes in Tianjin Futaba (Japanese owned 
enterprise) and Jilin Kumbo (Korean owned enterprise) had taken place in 2011. The 
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rest of the companies that experienced strikes were all involved in the summer of 
2010 strike wave. 
 
In addition, I had interviews with two ACFTU officials and a number of scholars who 
worked at colleges or institutes affiliated to the national and regional trade unions.  I 
had also interviewed six officials from relevant government departments, one official 
from the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security at national level, and four 
enterprise managers. I made efforts to reach workers independently. Some of my 
colleagues rented accommodation near the factory, and thereby had the chance to talk 
with workers. 
 
The dispute resolution procedures adopted in the 17 cases appeared to be far from 
uniform in terms of the union’s role. In Guangdong, the three cases of Honda Nanhai, 
Denso, and Honda Lock all presented very different pictures. In the first workplace 
the trade union was absent; in the second it worked with workers in the negotiation; 
and in the third a physical conflict was triggered between the union and the strikers. 
In Pingdingshan the strike was suppressed by riot police, while trade unions did not 
play any visible role. In the Dalian Development Zone (abbreviated as DLDZ), the 
trade unions’ decisions were substantially the same across the district under the same 
authority, and all of the strikes were resolved by the combined efforts of the 
workplace trade unions and the district trade union. On closer examinations in DLDZ, 
the TDK and Omron workplace unions survived in the strike storm in 2010. By 
contrast, in Tostem and Seiko, the same grassroots union presidents succeeded in 
preventing the strike in 2005, whereas they lost their control in 2010. In Nidec, the 
workplace union president spent three days getting workers back to work in the 2005 
strike while in the 2010 strike it took him half a day to resolve. The two 2011 strikes 
in Futaba and Kumbo were both resolved by the government and trade unions at the 
regional level, while their workplace trade unions failed to play an effective role in 
channeling workers into the bargaining, although they were requested to do so. This 
diversity of union behaviour, and of the ensuing effects on the strikes, calls for a fresh 
perspective to explore the mechanisms behind the scenes.  
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Table 1.  Original Research Plan, 2010 
Establishment \ Event 
Union does not 
intervene 
Union 
intervenes 
 
Enterprises with union Type 1 Type 2 
Enterprises without union Type 3 N/A 
 
The initial research plan had sought to shed light on the union’s mobilisation of power 
by comparing different forms of union involvement in a strike, by distinguishing two 
categories of enterprise – those with a union and those without a union (see Table 1). 
And the initial intention was to elucidate the typical union representative’s role in the 
strike. The assumption was that the existence of the union was the primary 
determinant of its role. 
 
It became apparent that this typology for explaining types of union behaviour, based 
on a union’s presence or absence with regard to the establishment, may tell us little 
about the reality. The simple existence of the trade union was not sufficient to explain 
whether or not it was likely to play a role. It became evident, from a large number of 
cases, that the union’s function in strike resolution was only substantial when other 
supportive factors were present that permitted and encouraged the union’s 
participation. A more proper question for investigation was how the unions in some 
cases could play a role in dispute resolution, whereas in others they could not. 
Therefore the primary reason for the choice of the cases shall be that, these cases can 
provide data that were rich enough for an exploration of a number of important facets 
of the interactions among the four actors.  
 
4.22 Conducting the Six Cases 
 
Six cases were selected from my fieldwork for deeper study. Three from the North 
and three from the South. The three cases from the DLDZ are the firms Nidec, TDK 
and Tostem. The three cases from Guangdong Province are Denso, Honda Nanhai and 
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Honda Lock. All the cases are Japanese-owned.316 The cases were chosen with the 
intention of explaining and examining the underlying theories on a more observable 
and comparable basis. I will discuss the rationales for such a choice from theoretical 
and practical viewpoints next. 
 
Theoretically the choice of exclusively Japanese-owned cases reduced the number of 
variables affecting outcomes. The introduction of, for example, SOEs or purely 
Chinese-owned cases, would have added more complexity than could be investigated 
through what was necessarily a limited number of cases.  
 
From a practical standpoint, the contrasts with regards to the main components of 
labour force and the patterns of labour protests between the SOE and POE, as 
introduced in Chapter One, indicate a tendency for the emerging strikes to be 
characterised by disputes of interests in POEs, and especially the FIEs. According to 
the combined data captured by labour NGOs, such incidents around the year 2010 
were particularly prominent in FIEs. Among the 435 cases of industrial action that 
took place between January 2008 and March 2012, their occurrence in multinationals 
accounted for 31% of all strikes and protests.317 Major associated elements include the 
relatively better working conditions in these enterprises318 and the young migrant 
workers who are more legally minded, having higher demands of wages and working 
conditions.  
 
The 2010 strike waves reflected the concentration of auto plants in Pearl River Delta 
in Guangdong Province and in DLDZ which were affected by the influential Honda 
Nanhai strike, which had particularly strong demonstration effects in factories that 
were Japanese owned or related auto plants. According to the official public media, 
the Honda Nanhai Strike was followed by Fengfu Auto Parts Factory in Foshan, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Except for Honda Lock, which is a joint-venture enterprise (30% funded by local 
government). 
317 The two NOGs have kept observed the strikes in China are China Labour Bulletin and 
China Strike Map. The analysis on the data is presented in Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. 
(2012), ‘The Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, paper for The International Labor 
and Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, July 2-5, 2012. Noted, the FIEs 
included Taiwan and Hongkong owned enterprises. 
318 Lüthje, B. (2012), ‘Diverging Trajectories: Economic Rebalancing and Labor Policies in 
China’, p. 15, East-west Center Working Papers: Politics, Governance and Security Series, 
(Apr. 2012)(23). 
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Guangdong (7th June), Guli/Honda Lock Factory in Zhongshan, Guangdong (one of 
the suppliers of Honda) (8th June), Huhan Auto Parts Factory (APAC), (one of the 
suppliers of Honda) in Wuhan, Hubei (17th June);  Nansha Denso Auto Part Factory  
(one of the suppliers of Toyota), in Guangzhou, Guangdong (21st June); Atsumitec 
Auto Parts in Foshan, Guangdong (12nd July). These enterprises were generally in 
advanced manufacturing, in which workers were often highly skilled. The economic 
prosperity after the global financial crisis in 2008 led to demands for ‘sharing the 
profit with the company’ as an exceptional feature of the 2010 strike wave. In 
addition, the high incidence of strikes in Japanese-owned enterprises in the 2010 
strike waves may also be attributed to the political sensitivity of Sino-Japanese 
relations, which was readily employed by strikers in their mobilisation.319 
 
A finding of importance in this study is the effects of type of ownership on the nature 
of involvement of government in the resolution of strikes. As has been observed, 
‘…when a wave of single-factory strikes swept Guangdong Province in 2010, “the 
authorities generally avoided the use of police to break up strikes. They instead 
adopted a neutral approach, actively mediating between labour and management and 
promoting dialogue as a means of resolving disputes’.320 The relative independence of 
foreign owned enterprises of local government, both economically and personally, 
reduced the potential collusion between them. And the relatively advanced economies 
of the two particular regions in this study further contributed to the shifting attitude of 
local governments in keeping the relative balance between the workers and the 
company. Governments tended to adopt relatively relaxed or sometime pro-worker 
approaches in strike resolution, which provides the researcher with the opportunity to 
witness the more observable behaviour of trade unions within a broader scope despite 
the sensitivity of  government influence, as will be illustrated in the next two chapters. 
 
In addition, the differentiations between the South and North provide interesting 
viewpoints in observing union practices. The comparatively short industrial history of 
the modern China generates clear divergences between the original socialist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Lu, J. (2013), ‘What Affect Worker’s Mobilisation in the Strike?’, A paper presented in 
the ‘Comparative Labour Law in Japan and China’, Hokkaido, 6-7 July 2013. In Chinese. 
320 China Labour Bulletin 2011: 34, cited by Elfstrom, M. and Kuruvilla, S. (2012), ‘The 
Changing Nature of Labor Unrest in China’, p. 9 – 10, paper for The International Labor and 
Employment Relations Conference, Philadelphia, July 2-5, 
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institutions and the more recent market-oriented institutions. The Northern cases 
could be seen to reflect past socialist paternalism. DLDZ is located in the coastal city 
of Dalian in Liaoning province, an arena where heavy industries have dominated for 
decades since the socialist period. The Southern cases are more clearly influenced by 
marketisation, so that their labour relations are more exposed to capitalist production 
methods characterised by the pursuit of more efficiency and less workers’ protection. 
It is not the intention of this research to make generalisations about these differences. 
But it looks at the significance of these regional characteristics in shaping the 
particular form of the union’s involvement in strikes.  
 
In Honda (Nanhai), we had a variety of access to parties at all levels. With regards to 
local authority, it included meetings with Guangdong Provincial Trade Union 
Federation, Foshan City Union Federation, Honda workplace union president, and 
with Foshan Labour Bureau, Nanhai District labour bureau. It was possible to have a 
dinner with Zeng, the general manager of Guangzhou Automobile Group Corp. 
Limited, who played key roles in all three cases in South. In addition, informal group 
discussions with key strike figures were held in one of their accommodations.  
 
In Honda Lock, we interviewed the town Party Committee member, the deputy 
chairman of the town labour bureau, the president of the town union federation, the 
president of the workplace union, and one workplace union committee member.  
 
In Denso, we were introduced by the Guangzhou City Federation of Trade Unions 
(GCFTU) to meet the Nansha District Union. In their office, we had a discussion with 
the district union president, one senior union official, and two Denso workplace union 
presidents. After that, I had informal conversations with the district union president 
and workplace union presidents over lunch. Later we interviewed two workers and 
two Japanese managers. In May 2011, I undertook a participant observation in Denso, 
in the role of Collective Negotiation Inspector sent by the district union. I had 
interviews with the union president, the deputy president and the former president; 
with two union committee members, one of whom was the mid-level manager, and 
one union secretary. After I left the company, connections with some of the 
interviewees were maintained, and I had several chats with them by QQ (a Chinese 
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instant messaging system). In addition, during my stay, the Denso union experienced 
its first collective bargaining after the strike. It was possible to attend a range of 
meetings related to this collective bargaining. The meetings were selected to reflect 
the variety of ways in which worker representatives, union officials, and management 
interacted in the period after the strike. Finally, I conducted a questionnaire-based 
survey, targeting the union cell group leaders, who were also worker activists – 
among them were the key figures who launched the strike.  
 
In the North bloc, we carried out two main investigations on DLDZ, in April 2011 
and in August 2012. The first was a general research survey of the area. Investigations 
(in the form of workplace union committee seminars and factory tours) took place in 
Omron Union, Toshiba (Dalian) Union, Tostem Union, Mabuchi Union, Seiko Union, 
Cannon Union, Nidec Union, and with local authorities -the City labour Bureau, the 
DLDZ General Union and the DLDZ Labour Bureau. During these, we had a formal 
discussion with a Japanese manager in Seiko. Additionally, by the arrangement of the 
DLDZ General Union president, we had a group discussion and meal with union 
presidents whom we had met in our earlier interviews. 
 
On the second visit, we tightened our focus to four enterprises, Nidec Union, Tostem 
Union, Mabuchi Union and TDK Union. TDK was an interesting case, that had been 
absent in previous fieldwork. There we also interviewed a workers’ representative in 
their collective negotiation. Our return to DLDZ enabled us to witness the change in 
the conduct of workplace collective bargaining that had taken place over the course of 
a year.  
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Appendix 
 
List of the 17 workplace trade unions researched (with the number of officials 
interviewed), August 2010 – December 2013 
 Case  
(Number of 
Employees) 
Type of 
Ownership 
Date(s)  of 
Interview 
and 
Location (city) 
 
Number of 
Trade Union 
Officials 
Interviewed 
1 Honda Nanhai 
(1800) 
FIE (Japanese) August 2010,  
Nov 2010, 
Foshan 
8 
2 Denso 
(1300) 
August 2010,  
Nov 2010, 
May 2011 
Guangzhou 
7 
3 Honda Lock 
(1500) 
JVE (Sino-
Japanese) 
Nov 2010 
Zhongshan 
3 
4 Pingmian  
(5000) 
 
POE August 2010 
Pingdingshan 
5 
5 Tostem 
(3000) 
FIE (Japanese) April 2011, 
August 2011 
Dalian 
2 
6 Nidec 
(7000) 
April 2011, 
August 2011 
Dalian 
2 
7 TDK 
(3000) 
August 2011 
Dalian 
2 
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 Case  
(Number of 
Employees) 
Type of 
Ownership 
Date(s)  of 
Interview 
and 
Location (city) 
 
Number of 
Trade Union 
Officials 
Interviewed 
8 Canon 
(7000) 
April 2011 
Dalian 
2 
9 Omron 
(3000) 
2 
10 Seiko 
(1000) 
2 
11 Mabuchi 
(5000) 
2 
12 Toshiba 
(2500) 
2 
13 Futaba 
(700) 
JVE (Sino-
Japanese) 
August 2012 
Tianjin 
 
3 
14 Denso 
(1500) 
FIE (Japanese) 2 
15 Kumho 
(700) 
FIE  
(Korean) 
Dec 2013 
Changchun 
1 
16 FengYue 
(5000) 
JVE (Sino-
Japanese) 
2 
17 Jilin Guodian  
(2300) 
SOE 2 
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Chapter Five – Case Studies in Guangdong Province 
 
5.1 The Context of Guangdong Province 
 
The context of labour relations in Guangdong cannot be simply generalized, owing to 
the diversity within the province. This section attempts to give an overall picture of 
the marketised framework of the labour relations, and the openness of top leadership’s 
perception in the resolution of strikes, serving as the context of the dominant variables 
of institutions and strategies. 
 
5.11 The Development of Labour Relations  
 
Since the economic transformation in the 1980s, Guangdong has led the nation’s GDP 
growth in terms of the manufacturing sector. Foreign direct investment (FDI) played 
an important role in the fast growth of Guangdong economy. By 2007, it took up 
42.7% of all enterprises in Guangdong.321 
 
Tides of ‘inter-provincial migrant workers’ began to flood into the area from the late 
1980s. It was estimated that in the mid-1990s, the figure of migrant labourers was at 
least 12.5 times of that of the early 1980s.322 In 1996, there were 11 million migrant 
workers in Guangdong.323 In 2003, the figure reached 100 million.324 After the spring 
festival in 2004, an unpredicted ‘shortage of labour’ swept China, mostly affected 
regions were Fujian Province, Yangtze River Delta Region, and Pearl River Delta 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 People’s Government of Guangdong Province, Section of Production, online, 
http://www.gd.gov.cn/tzgd/tzhj/tzhjhy/200709/t20070921_20566.htm (accessed 14/09/02). In 
Chinese. 
322 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour 
regime in global factories, p. 22, Routledge: London. 
323 Lee, C. K. (1998), ‘The Labor  Politics of Market Socialism: Collective Inaction and Class 
Experiences among State Workers in Guangzhou’, p. 8, in Modern China, 24(1), pp. 3-33. 
324 This figure was vague. The number of the migrant workers by 2003 was independently 
estimated to be 120 million by the National Statistics Bureau, and 100 million by the 
Population and Family Planning Commission. The figure in 2004 was pronounced to be 103 
million by the Ministry of Agriculture. See Liu, J and Chen, L. (2005), ‘Employment, 
Structure and Characteristics of Migrant Workers’, in China Labour and Social Security 
News, 26th July 2005. In Chinese. 
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Region where Guangdong Province locates.325 In Guangdong the labour shortage was 
estimated to be 1 million. It affected especially the labour intensive industries, and it 
was skilled workers who were the most needed.  
 
Since the mid-2000s, the Guangdong Provincial government commenced a reform 
scheme called ‘Teng Long Huan Niao’ (empty the cage and change the bird), to 
abandon reliance on extensive manufacturing and to encourage industrial structure 
upgrade. Recent years have witnessed profound changes of the Guangdong economy. 
In 2013, tertiary industry outweighed secondary industry for the first time. In the 
same year, the proportion of advanced manufacturing accounted for 23.9% of large 
scale industry, contributing approximately half (48%) of the overall share of GDP in 
large scale industry.326  
 
Despite the diversity of different localities in marketised regions, the research 
suggests that the functions of workplace trade unions are constrained. These trade 
unions are normally non-existent or ineffective under management control; and in 
other cases, for example, multinational corporations and JVs, the unions ‘usually have 
a relatively secure position and are coopted into factory management… [though] 
contract based regulation of wages and working conditions remains weak.’327 Trade 
unions in the three cases in this chapter demonstrate this statement. The workplace 
trade unions in Honda Nanhai and Honda Lock were completely controlled by the 
management, and while the union in Denso had more enthusiasm for workers it was 
also constrained by the management. As the Denso workplace union president stated,  
 
“I am a senior manager. I also have my own business. I know the severity of the 
situation. If Denso stops, next will be the Guangzhou Toyota being stopped, then will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour 
regime in global factories, p. 23, London: Routledge. 
326 The ‘advanced manufacture’ refers to ‘high quality, high efficiency, low consumption, low 
pollution’ industries. The ‘large scale industry’ refers to the business with an average annul 
revenue amounting to 20 million RMB from its prime operation. See Southern Daily, The 
tertiary industry for the first time outweighed the secondary industry in ten years, online, 
http://gd.ce.cn/sy/gd/201402/27/t20140227_1372112_1.shtml (accessed 14/02/27). In 
Chinese. 
327 Lüthje, B. (2012), ‘Diverging Trajectories: Economic Rebalancing and Labor Policies in 
China’, p. 15, East-west Center Working Papers: Politics, Governance and Security Series, 
(Apr. 2012)(23). 
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auto parts suppliers to Toyota stop, which renders the Honda’s stoppage, later it will 
be the Hyundai. We cannot afford it. Hence, all I thought was how to restart 
production. You (workers) want to restructure the union, and re-elect the presidents? 
Fine, I would confess my mistake, I will accept anything you want me to do, only will 
you go back to work.”328  
 
5.12 Institutions and Strategies of Regional Administration in the Resolution of 
Strikes  
 
Guangdong has never been strike free. It encompasses several advanced industrial 
cities, including Guangzhong, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Zhongshan. Research shows the 
maturity of the government’s perception on the strikes, which is an important input to 
the withdrawal of the political constraints on strikes, prevailed throughout the 
province to some extent.  
 
A survey on the local governments’ perceptions on the strikes between the two 
provinces of Jiangsu and Guangdong329 revealed geographical distinctions.330 The 
survey looked into perceptions of 222 government officials specialised in the labour 
dispute. 99 respondents were from Jiangsu Province, 123 from Guangdong Province. 
The age of the respondents was between 40 to 55 years old, and the average lengths of 
respondents’ working in labour relations governance were 8.26 years. The argument 
that ‘the strike is a normal marketised behaviour in resolving labour disputes’ was 
supported and opposed by 42% and 32% respectively in Guangdong and by 31% and 
44% in Jiangsu. When it comes to government resolution of strikes, 92% of all 
interviewees stressed the importance of the government’s intervention in the disputes. 
77% agreed that the reason that ‘government intervention was necessary’ was 
‘guiding immature labourers and managers’. Remarkably, the Guangdong officials 
showed their higher tendency to minimise intervention in strike resolution. The 
method of ‘self-negotiation between labour and capital with third-party mediation’ 
was prominently favoured in Guangdong (31%) than in Jiangsu (9%), while the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 Interview, Mr K, president of workplace trade union, Denso, 10th May 2011. 
329 These two provinces represent the core regions in Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River 
Delta respectively. 
330 Wang, R. J. (2014), ‘Government Regulatory Strategy and Logic of Behaviours in Strike 
Resolution’, PhD Thesis, Renmin University. In Chinese. 
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method of ‘government emergency mechanism’331 was preferred in Jiangsu (37%) 
rather than in Guangdong (9%). The peaceful pattern of the protests served as another 
important factor in reducing the government’s anxiety when the strike broke out. 
Asked about the argument that ‘the strikes were organised in a rational way’, 34% and 
28% respectively supported and opposed this statement in Jiangsu; whereas in 
Guangdong, almost half of the respondents agreed (48%) and 19% disagreed, 
showing a more relaxed attitude towards the strikes among the Guangdong 
government officials.  
 
In addition, the attitude of the high-profile authority of the province in the resolution 
of strikes could restrain the local government behaviour in their handling in the strike. 
In the local authority’s handling of the Honda Nanhai case, the provincial Party 
secretary directly provided directions which ‘sent a clear message that strikes are 
economic conflict between labour and management, and that external force should not 
be used to handle them’.332 It is reported that the authority once had an intention to 
institutionalise strikes by having trade unions take the lead in organising the strike.333 
 
The openness at the top left sufficient scope for local authorities to act, thus yielded 
the variables of authority’s behaviour in different regions. In Honda Nanhai, the 
government adopted a laissez faire strategy by allowing the workers and managers to 
bargain on their own. In the other two cases, Denso witnessed the government’s 
withdrawal of administrative intervention, in an attempt to institutionalise workers 
into the existing mechanism dominated by the trade union. And in Honda Lock, the 
government tightly constrained both sides to make a compromise. Moreover, it is 
worth mentioning that the use of force by Public Security in all three cases was 
confined to merely maintaining public order. 
 
One thing worthy to notice is the inexperience of local governments in general in 
Guangdong. For instance, the Nanhai District, where Honda Nanhai located, alone 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 This mechanism was in essence the approach of maintenance of social stability (MSS). 
332 Chang, K. (2013), ‘Legitimacy and the Legal Regulation of Strikes in China: A Case Study 
of the Nanhai Honda Strike’, p. 142, in The International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law and Industrial Relations, 29(2), pp. 133-144. 
333 This information is from a meeting of GZCU on discussing the legal regulations of strike 
management, on 13th August 2010. The author participated in the meeting and took notes. 
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suffered six incidents of strikes between June to November, and the official in Nanhai 
District Labour Bureau admitted, ‘We have never met an incident on such a scale, we 
lacked the adequate experience to deal with it.’334 And the governments at local level 
were in a process of learning and exploring with the continuing experience of similar 
strikes in Guangdong Province. The Nanhai District Labour Bureau took the 
experience of the Honda Nanhai strike as the guide in resolving subsequent incidents. 
In the case of Atsumitec, which took place a week after the end of the Honda Nanhai 
strike, the government gave workers a certain scope to express and formalised such 
behaviour. A ‘public letter’ was sent to workers, stating that the government 
understood workers’ appeals, suggested the workers should resolve the problem by 
negotiation, asked workers to be restrained and rational. By ‘reminding workers to not 
cross the line or destroy the machines,’ according to the government official this was 
to ‘protect the workers by preventing a change in the nature of the conflict, as not to 
harm public security.’  
 
5.13 Concluding Remarks 
 
Guangdong has seen labour relations undergoing a radical development motivated by 
its rapid marketisation. This is reflected by the industrial transformation, the enhanced 
labour quality, the openness of high-profile authorities’ ideology and the variables of 
local authorities’ approach in the resolution of strikes. The workplace trade unions 
were generally constrained in adjusting labour relations. In confronting the intensive 
strikes in 2010, the authorities, both the government and the trade union, were fairly 
inexperienced, and displayed a variety of institutional responses. In addition, the 
conceptions of the authorities in Guangdong demonstrate a higher degree of 
government acknowledgement, compared with other provincial authorities, of the 
practicality of self-regulation in labour relations.  
 
It therefore would be expected that the government authority would display a variety 
of attitudes from firm to relaxed. In the cases where the authorities adopted a more 
relaxed attitude, more scope was provided for self-regulating negotiations between 
labour and capital in the resolution of strikes, and for the involvement of trade unions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Interview, Ms Y, deputy director of Nanhai District Labour Bureau, Foshan city, 10th 
November, 2011. 
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5.2 Honda Nanhai 
 
5.21 Background 
 
Auto Parts Manufacturing Ltd. (CHAM) was set up in 2007, owned by Honda Motor 
Co., Ltd (Japan). Honda (Nanhai) is located at Shishan Town in Nanhai District 
(abbreviated as SSTU), in the area of Foshan City, Guangdong Province. It supplies 
more than 80% of key auto components to four joint-venture Honda Auto Plants.  
 
Established in 2005, Shishan Town Federation of Trade Unions was a branch at the 
street administrative level. By 2010, it had 4 offices with working committees and 
more than 2,000 workplace branches, one of them was Honda Nanhai workplace trade 
union. In 2008, in the election of the Honda Nanhai union committee, the candidates 
were nominated by the company and the street union. These candidates were 
managers at middle or high level positions. The union president was the vice chief of 
the Administration and Registration Division, in a high-profile management position, 
with a salary of more than 200,000 Yuan.  
 
In Honda Nanhai, the majority of workers joined the union, because it made economic 
sense: ‘if you pay 5 Yuan per month to the union, you will get 300 Yuan worth of 
shopping vouchers in vacations.’335 Apart from distributing welfare, functions of the 
workplace union were organising sport, travel and other entertainment activities. In 
early 2010, the union organized several trips in Guangdong Province. On the day 
before the strike (16th May), there was a company sports competition organised by the 
trade union. The union also had the duty of transmitting workers’ opinions and 
demands to the company, although the feedback received from either the union or the 
company was very limited.336 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 China Newsweekly, Looking at the Honda Strike, 2nd June 2010, online, 
http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/17239453_2113993661.html (accessed 14/03/11). In 
Chinese. 
336 China Newsweekly, Looking at the Honda Strike, 2nd June 2010, online, 
http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/17239453_2113993661.html (accessed 14/03/11). In 
Chinese. 
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Within a few years of its being built, the annual output of the factory doubled to 
240,000 units in 2010. Despite the rapid expansion of production, employee numbers 
at Honda remained around 1800. A significant proportion of its workforce comprised 
intern students enrolled from technical schools in Guangdong or neighbouring 
provinces. Recruitment in Honda Nanhai was based on internship. Students in their 
final-year in school would take a ‘one-year’ internship in Honda. After graduating in 
one year, these students would be offered ‘formal employment statuses’ by the 
company.337 By the time of the strike, the intern students amounted to as much as one 
third of the whole workforce. The wage level of the newcomers, who were usually 
intern students, was around 900 Yuan per month. When they became contractual 
workers in half a year to one year, the monthly wage increased to 1300 Yuan. But 
after deducting the social insurance charge and food expenses, this monthly income 
was around 1000 Yuan, or less. It was reported the overall increased income of 
workers after five years was merely 100 Yuan. Workers had long expressed 
discontent with the low level of salary, the lack of promotion, the equal remuneration 
for all, and the poor employment conditions of the intern workers.338 
 
5.22 The Course of the Strike 
 
The strike was provoked by the reward plan proposed by the enterprise. In early May, 
the statutory minimum wage in Foshan increased from 770 Yuan to 920 Yuan per 
month, raised by nearly 20%. The company did not raise the wage, but transferred a 
certain amount of the contingent wage to the basic wage to fulfill the statutory 
requirement of a wage increase. 
 
Two workers from Hunan Province, Tan (23 years old) and Xiao (20 years old) in the 
transmission assembly division led the first strike on the morning of 17th May. 
Because of its key position in the production process, the stoppage of the transmission 
assembly division quickly spread to other departments. In a few hours, all of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Chan, C. K. C. and Hui, E. S. L. (2012), ‘The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade 
Union Reform in China: Case of the Honda Workers’ Strike’, in Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 54(5), pp. 653-668. 
338  New Century, Honda Strike over the Pay Challenges the ‘Cheap Labour’ Manufacturing 
Model, 31st May 2010, online, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20100531/01088026958.shtml (accessed 10/06/01). 
In Chinese. 
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moving lines came to a halt. Workers were requested by managers to deliver their 
opinions and demands. After the company promised a ‘satisfactory reply’ on 21st May, 
they went back to their work.  
 
In the subsequent days, bargaining meetings were organised by SSTU, attended by 
workers from five key divisions, which covered the main striking workforces. From 
each division, two front-line representatives and the squad leaders were elected to 
represent workers to negotiate with the Japanese managers. Some workplace trade 
union committee members also participated in the meeting.  
 
Worker delegates put forward 108 separate demands, among which the most 
important were that the basic wage should increase by 800 Yuan and that the yearly 
incremental rate of increase of the basic wage should be over 15%. They met other 
workers to discuss it after the bargaining commenced. When the managers refused to 
provide printed versions of the workers’ demands, Tan and Xiao headed the worker 
representatives in leaving the meeting room. Later on they were invited by the 
company to come back to the bargaining table, and each got the paper version of the 
demands.339 But those bargaining did not conclude any agreement on the wage 
increase.  
 
On 25th the company offered its own wage increase plan, which was an increase of 55 
Yuan in the workers’ living subsidy. This offer excluded the intern workers. Later, the 
company published an announcement of the dismissal of the two strike organisers, 
charging them with ‘breaking the company’s regulations’. At the time, a rumour 
spread in the factory that the company was recruiting new workers from other parts of 
Guangdong province to replace the strikers. Workers then launched a comprehensive 
strike and appealed to the company to rehire the sacked organisers. 
 
The ensuing week witnessed a severe impasse. The company revised its wage 
proposals several times. It substantially increased the overall income of intern 
students, whereby the interns’ basic wage would be much closer to that of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 China Newsweekly, Looking at the Honda Strike, 2nd June 2010, online, 
http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/17239453_2113993661.html (accessed 14/03/11). In 
Chinese. 
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standard worker. And the intern students were asked to sign a letter promising not to 
participate in any strike action. These trainees were enrolled at their final year in 
school, so they had not graduated from the schools yet. Teachers from the intern 
students’ schools were invited by the company to persuade the students. The senior 
workers posted leaflets stating ‘you are traitors to China if you submit the document!’ 
Intern students then were in a dilemma, as no one ‘want(ed) to be traitors.’340 
Nevertheless, the mainstream of intern students voluntarily participated in the alliance 
with their senior counterparts. On 27th May the two groups jointly put forward a 
formal letter responding to the company. The letter set out five demands. Firstly the 
basic wage should increase to 800 Yuan; secondly a seniority premium system should 
be introduced with a 100 Yuan increase per year of service; thirdly, the company 
should rehire the two sacked organisers, and should not undertake any vindictive act 
after the strike; fourthly, the wage lost during the strike should not be deducted; lastly, 
the workplace trade union should be restructured, and the union president and union 
committee members should be re-elected democratically.  
 
On 31st May, the company announced an official proposal of raising the basic wage 
by 24%, amounting to a 366 Yuan increase. By the time, most strikers went back to 
production, except around 50 who insisted on striking. In the afternoon, about 200 
people in yellow hats, having a ‘SSTU’ label on their clothes, besieged the strikers 
and requested them to go back to work. A physical conflict occurred between the 
workers and the ‘SSTU’ people near the factory entrance. Workers inside the factory 
were immediately informed by the strikers. The news spread among workers in their 
posts by text messages. They ran out of the workshop and gathered at the playing 
field. 
 
In the afternoon, a key figure, Zeng Qinghon, stepped in to the dispute. Zeng Qinghon 
was Deputy Director and General Manager of Guangzhou Automobile Group, but to 
the strikers, he introduced himself as a representative of the National People’s 
Congress. He asked the SSTU to apologise to the workers. On the second day, a 
‘Letter of Apology’ was publicly issued by the town union. Zeng persuaded workers 
to have another bargaining meeting with the company on 4th June and told workers if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Chan, C. K. C. (2012), ‘Class or Citizenship? Debating Workplace Conflict in China’, p. 
320, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42: 2, pp. 308-327. 
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they were not satisfied with the results, they can continue with the strike. Workers 
agreed and returned to work. Their representatives issued an open letter to the 
public,341 which was strongly rebuked by Zeng as ‘illegal’.  
 
The workers also invited an eminent labour scholar, Chang Kai, to help them. He, 
working with workers, re-organised the delegate election, revised the demands, and 
participated in the bargaining as the workers’ legal consultant. On 4th June, workers’ 
representatives and enterprise representatives participated in a bargaining meeting 
hosted by a local government official. The strike was finally ended by agreement 
based on the concession that the basic wage would be increased by 500 Yuan while 
other demands were to be discussed in further bargaining. 
 
5.23 Activities of the Actors 
 
Workers  
 
The Honda Nanhai strike manifested a relatively high level of workers’ labour 
consciousness and capability for action. They were not satisfied with the low level of 
wages and working conditions guaranteed by statutory minimum provisions. They 
compared their income with the profit gained by the company. They were more 
concerned about the fairness of the decision-making mechanism, demanding their 
own involvement in decision-making. In the strike, they neither accepted the 
managers’ unilateral decisions, nor accepted ‘closed’ negotiations between the 
government and managers.  
 
In these actions, various communication methods were employed, such as mobile 
phones, texting, instant messaging, and on-line chat-rooms. They posted the latest 
information about the strike on several internet forums and maintained close 
connections with the media to provide publicity.  They sought social help and invited 
the labour scholar to help them in the final negotiations, to compensate for their lack 
of experience and knowledge in bargaining.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 Chan, C. K. C. (2012), ‘Class or Citizenship? Debating Workplace Conflict in China’, p. 
320, in Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42: 2, pp. 308-327. 
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Two particular factors may have protected them from potentially damaging political 
risk. Firstly, Honda Nanhai workers had deliberately restricted the location of the 
strike to within the factory or their accommodation, unlike previous strikers elsewhere 
who went outside the factory to attract more public attention. In addition, they insisted 
their representatives should wear the company uniform when they were interviewed 
by the media. And they explained this that, ‘We are genuine workers. (Yet) without 
the uniform, we are “social people”.’342 It reflected an increased awareness of workers 
targeting the employers as their objective, in contrast to the sort of labour awareness 
under socialist production that largely involved the state. Secondly, the demands 
concerning the trade union had also been restricted in the sense that workers called for 
the ‘re-structuring of the trade union‘, rather than ‘establishing an independent trade 
union’. Moreover, workers also refused to be interviewed by overseas media. These 
all contributed to reduce the government’s nervousness about the possible expansion 
of the strike’s social and political influence. 
 
Government 
 
The government had been concealed behind the scenes. On the occurrence of the 
strike, a team of labour inspectors went to the factory, as a routine administrative 
investigation, to examine the implementation of labour laws and infringements of 
workers’ legal rights. They reported to the workers that there was no managers’ 
violation of the law and left. Presumably because of the increasing public attention to 
the strike, the government had until then been low key in its involvement in the strike 
except for the action against the small group of workers on 31st May, partially owing 
to the nervousness provoked by a high-profile party member ‘asking the local 
authorities to resolve the strike quickly’. It was reported that the government 
conducted a broad investigation of the issues, to be used as evidence to persuade the 
company to raise wages.  There were several government-company meetings which 
lasted several hours. 
 
In the light of the directive from the provincial Party Sectary and the involvement of 
Zeng, and after the physical conflict, the government in the ensuing resolution process 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Notes of a Journalist on Honda, June 2010, online, http://www.youth-
sparks.com/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=2746 (accessed 14/10/20). In Chinese.
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turned to a milder and more neutral attitude, until the final bargaining, where it acted 
as a third party, hosting the bargaining meeting between workers and their 
representatives and the company. As stated above, an important reason was that the 
strikers had limited the dispute to being within the economic sphere and had behaved 
in a peaceful way.  
 
“From the beginning, we defined the strike as an economic conflict between workers 
and the company. This was because the striking workers were organised from within 
the workplace, and they did not extend the strike outside the factory. Hence, it was 
easy for us to cope with it in this manner, so that we played the role of a mediator in 
the dispute.”343 
 
Management 
 
The company lost its authority in the strikes. Its tough stance worsened the situation 
which resulted in the workers’ adopting an uncooperative strategy at a later stage. The 
changing government attitude in the strike was an impetus for the company’s 
concession. More importantly, the strike itself posed tremendous stress on the 
management by arousing a huge profit loss. A week after the strike broke out, four of 
Honda’s vehicle manufacturers relying on CHAM as their supplier halted production. 
The number of workers in these factories who ceased work amounted to 100,000.344 
The daily loss of output amounted to 40 million RMB, and the total loss of all the 
Honda factories in China was near to 3 billion RMB345.  
 
Trade Unions 
 
On the occurrence of the strike, the workplace president tried to talk to workers, but 
workers did not respond and made fun of him. 346 Supervised by SSTU, the workplace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Interview, Mr P, senior officer of Nanhai District Labour Bureau, Foshan city, 10th 
November, 2011. 
344 Lin, Y. L. (2010), ‘Collective Actions Push Trade Union Reform in China’, paper for 
Conflict and Cooperation: The International Symposium of Collective Labor Dispute 
Resolution and Regulation, Beijing, 17th-18th Dec 2011. In Chinese. 
345 Beijing Morning News, The strike led to 3,000,000,000 RMB loss, Honda production plan 
faced the adjustment, 8th June 2010, online, 
http://news.bitauto.com/others/20100608/0705164696.html (accessed 14/07/07). 
346 China Newsweekly, Looking at the Honda Strike, 2nd June 2010, online 
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trade union organised several bargaining meetings, and some of the union committee 
members were present in these meetings. They helped workers to summarise their 
demands, but they kept silent during the negotiation with the managers. An important 
reason is that the guidance and assistance from SSTU was inadequate.  
 
There was a power imbalance in relations between the SSTU and the government. 
The SSTU’s subordinate position to the government was manifested by its passivity 
in the strike. The trade union was a part of the local ‘working team for emergency 
resolution’ led by the government, in which the SSTU was ‘a small potato’ 
(xiaojuese). In the overt conflict between SSTU and strikers, the SSTU was utilised as 
it was easier to intervene in the name of a trade union. Apparently the SSTU had little 
voice in this decision. After the event, its superior, the Guangdong Provincial 
Federation of Trade Union (GDPU) decided to not defend the STTU, because they 
‘had to carefully weigh its relationship with the government’, though ‘we were rather 
unhappy with such a strategy’.347 In addition, the SSTU itself had an ambiguous 
conception of the representative role of the trade union. One SSTU official stated in a 
public interview during the strike that the union did not consider itself as a central 
actor between the manager and workers in the dispute, ‘Our main duty in the dispute 
is to provide both sides with a negotiating platform, as the union should not intervene 
in a dispute between workers and the employer.’348  
 
5.24 Summary  
 
In the Honda Nanhai strike, the management largely lost its authority over workers. 
The government for the most part withheld its administrative authority in directly 
intervening in the disputes. The workers’ actions escaped from official control. Their 
own organisation was well represented and they self-disciplined themselves by acting 
in an orderly and effective way.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/17239453_2113993661.html (accessed 14/03/11). In 
Chinese. 
347 Interview, Ms S, Head of Legal Assist Department, Guangdong Provincial Trade Union 
Council, 18th November 2010. 
348 China Newsweekly, Looking at the Honda Strike, 2nd June 2010, online 
http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/17239453_2113993661.html (accessed 14/03/11). In 
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In the process of strike resolution, the trade unions were not the significant actor. 
Workers abandoned the workplace trade unions and organised the strike on their own. 
In both their relations with the government and the company, the unions at different 
levels were in disadvantageous positions. After the strike, a collective bargaining 
system was established in which the provincial and lower level trade unions were 
heavily involved.349  
 
5.3 Honda Lock 
 
5.31 Background 
 
Honda Lock (Guangdong) Co., Ltd. (short for Honda Lock) was established in 1996 
and located at Xiaolan Town, Zhongshan City, Guangdong Province. Xiaolan Town 
was a small town in what was originally an agricultural region, but later it came to be 
dominated by private manufacturing. At the time of the study, there were some 
28,000 enterprises registered, among which there were 1200 large-scale enterprises.350 
As a result of its industrialisation and social governance it has been regarded as a 
‘model’ town in the Pearl Delta Region in Guangdong. Requested by the local CCP 
committee, the labour bureaux, the Xiaolan Town Federation of Trade Unions 
(abbreviated as XLTU) and the judicial department ‘made concrete efforts in building 
up a (good) foundation for enterprise development.’351 By 2010, the town had 160,000 
local residents and 150,000 migrant residents.  
 
Honda Lock was originally a joint venture between Honda Lock Mfg. Co., Ltd. 
(established in 1962 in Japan) and a local metalwork company with a government 
background; each owned 50% of its assets. Since 2002, the Chinese stockholders 
changed to the Xiaolan Town Industry Corporation, a COE affiliated with the Xiaolan 
township government. The Chinese part-shared 35% of the stockholding and the 
Japanese enterprise owned a majority of 65%. The Honda headquarters in Japan had a 
good relationship with the Party secretary in the town.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 The discourses of post-strike reform in all cases will be developed in the final chapter. 
350 The ‘large scale enterprise’ refers to the business with an average annual revenue 
amounting to 20 million RMB from its prime operation. 
351 Interview, Ms F, member of Xiaolan Town CCP Committee, Zhongshan city, 19th 
November 2010. 
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Honda Lock manufactured lock assemblies, rear-view mirrors, door handles and key 
sets for automobiles and motorcycles for auto assembly plants across Guangdong 
Province.352 The numbers of frontline operators in Honda Lock was about 1300 by 
2010, out of a total of 1,500 workers. 60% were female workers. Only some 200 were 
local workers, the great majority were migrants. A minority of the workforce were 
‘aging workers’, in their 30s, most of whom had married. It was commonplace that 
the aging workers had worked in the company for several years, and had been 
promoted to a second or third level of the operator grade. A number of ‘aging workers’ 
were the main force in initiating the strike. 
 
The basic wage in Honda Lock was 960 Yuan per month, equaling the minimum 
wage established by local wage regulation. There was not any formal wage increase 
mechanism in the company. In 2010 the increase of the monthly wage was only 20 
Yuan. Honda Lock adopted a 3-shift production schedule, each shift worked for 8 
hours. Because there was little overtime work, the average monthly income of 
operators was as low as 1100 Yuan. Labour management at the workplace was strict. 
According to the media, ‘…(workers) are forced to stand for eight hours, with 
pregnant women allowed to sit only in their last trimester. Workers are not allowed to 
speak to one another, have to obtain passes before going to toilet, and are strictly 
monitored by management even when getting a drink of water.’353 The company did 
not provide workers with dormitories, but provided an allowance for food and 
housing of 300 Yuan a month. Despite the oppressive conditions, large scale 
recruitment had always been attractive among low skilled workers. Since early June 
of 2010, as a result of production disruption caused by the Honda Nanhai strike, 
Honda Lock company resorted to substantial overtime work to make up the lost hours, 
without overtime compensation.354  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 The four Honda partially owned automobile manufacturers were Guangzhou (Guangqi) 
Honda Automobile, Wuyang-Honda Motors, Dongfeng Honda Automobile (DHAC), and 
Honda-sundiro Motorcycle. 
353 World Socialist Web Site, China: Honda Lock strike continues, 15 June 2010, online, 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/06/chin-j15.html (accessed 14/03/21). 
354 Worker Freedom, Workers’ autonomy strikes in China – Mouvement Communiste – Part 1, 
26 July 2011, online, http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20110726084431354 
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The deputy general manager who was also the managing director took the position of 
the Honda Lock union president. He was the representative of the Chinese company 
and had a close relationship with the local government.355 The vice president was also 
a senior Chinese manager. 
 
5.32 The Course of the Strike 
 
Starting up 
 
Six workers in the Painting Division initiated the strike in the week following the end 
of the Honda Nanhai strike. Liu (34 years old) was one of the key leaders. Two days 
before the strike, they attempted to persuade a supervisor to transmit their demands 
for a pay rise to managers at higher levels, but the supervisor refused to do so as he 
believed they ‘were making trouble’. 356  
 
On the night shift on 9th June, a small-scale strike took place in the Painting Division. 
Next morning, a security guard insulted an operator in the Resin Division. Leaders 
took advantage of workers’ irritation and mobilized them to strike in these two 
divisions. Workers stopped work and rushed outside. Some were locked by the 
managers in the dressing room. Workers broke through the restraint, they tapped at 
the windows and the doors of workshops one after another, shouted ‘Stop!’ ‘All 
Chinese out!’ ‘If you want such little money, you work and be a Japanese lackey!’ In 
the end some 600 workers went out of the workshop.  
 
Impasses and two negotiations 
 
Within an hour after the incident, local government officials went to the company. 
One labour bureau official announced to the workers that the company had neither 
broken the law nor breached the labour contract. Then he persuaded workers to go 
back to work. Two managers from the Personnel Department came out and persuaded 
workers to go back to work. But workers insisted that the general manager should 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 In China it is common place in SOE and COEs that the union president is the enterprise 
party secretary, who normally takes the office of the general manager. And (s)he was the 
representative of the government.  
356 Zhu, Y. X. Interviewing Liu Shengqi, the leader of Xiaolan Honda workers’ movement, 27 
June 2010, online, http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/12/156103.html (accessed 
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come out and talk to them. At the same time, police lines had been arranged to 
separate workers and the journalists.357  
 
Some strike leaders voluntarily negotiated with the manager, at a meeting with the 
local authority, including the town labour bureau and XLTU president. Worker 
representatives put forward the workers’ demands, including an increase of the basic 
wage from 930 Yuan to 1600 Yuan, double wages for overtime compensation as 
stated in law, the reform of the workplace union, and no retaliation against strike 
participants after the strike. 
 
The manager refused to follow Honda (Nanhai), because Honda Lock was an 
independent company from Honda (Nanhai). The Japanese manager insisted they did 
not break the law, and recalled that in the 2009 economic crisis, they neither fired 
workers nor reduced wages. In addition, they had already adjusted their basic wage 
this year. The company only agreed to offer no more than an increase of 100 Yuan in 
the workers’ monthly housing allowance. The government then negotiated directly 
with the management in the headquarters in Japan. The Japanese managers of the 
China factory were then requested by the parent company to ‘respect the local 
government’. On Friday, the subsidiary provided a pay rise of 200 Yuan, made up of 
100 Yuan for the basic wage and 100 Yuan as a subsidy. 
 
Workers did not accept the offer but they underwent increasing pressure from both the 
managers and the government. The managers had a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude and 
forced the workers to sign a document of acceptance of the wage rise and make a 
commitment not to strike. They warned workers of ‘serious consequences’ if they 
continued striking, and they photographed leaders in the march. Plain-clothes 
surveillance was increasing amid the workers, and workers’ phone calls and internet 
chat rooms were monitored. Workers also received leaflets describing the strike as 
illegal and warning of jail terms of up to five years. There were patrol boats in the 
drainage channel in the front of the factory.358 At the end of the second day, the mayor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Caijing.com, The Third Stoppage in Honda Resolved, 21st June 2010, online, 
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-06-21/110464383.html (accessed 14/03/21). In Chinese. 
358 Worker Freedom, Workers’ autonomy strikes in China – Mouvement Communiste – Part 1, 
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of the town, the deputy general manager, and other company managers secretly met 
the leaders and some active strikers. The authority requested them to ‘persuade others 
to resume the work’, not contact the media, and identify other leaders. In addition, the 
key leader Liu was invited to a meal where a manager and a lawyer from another 
factory offered him a managerial position in their factory, for which his salary would 
be paid in advance. The leader was scared by the fact that ‘these people knew my 
conversations through my private cell phone’.359 He rejected all such requests and 
went into hiding with his family members in the early morning. Other leaders decided 
to not hold any negotiation because it was ‘physically dangerous for all of the 
representatives to gather in one place with management and the authorities.’360 
 
In the absence of explicit leadership, on Friday the workers held a march. They 
chanted slogans as they walked down the main road, blocking the road into the small 
industrial zone. They confronted the riot police who sealed off the road and 
surrounded the protesters for nearly two hours. The police marched off at midmorning 
and workers continued the demonstration.361  
  
Over the weekend, the company began to recruit temporary workers. For this 
recruitment, the company offered a monthly wage as high as 2,000 Yuan a month. 
The information was delivered through television and employment agents, which 
attracted ‘a flood of younger job seekers’.362 Riot police protected the recruitment tent 
outside the factory. The company also announced that both the replacement workers 
and returning employees would receive 11 per cent higher pay and a 33 per cent rise 	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in allowances for food and housing. 363 On the Sunday, a sign at the factory gate said 
that ‘from last Wednesday through to Saturday, the days when the factory was closed 
because of the strike, would be counted as paid work days.’ And double pay for hours 
worked on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday would also be paid to make up the lost 
hours in the strike.364  
 
At the same time, the second bargaining meeting took place between the union 
president and the Japanese managers on Sunday. The day before, the union had 
organised workers to collect demands and to elect representatives in each division. 
There were more than one hundred separate demands, concerning the wage increase 
mechanism, housing subsidy, conditions in the dining hall, social insurance fees, 
among other issues. Between 10 and 20 workers were then elected to participate in the 
bargaining, with the signed agreement of workers in the division. But according to 
workers, supervisors nominated many of these workers’ representatives. 
 
This bargaining meeting was more symbolic with the primary aim to get workers back 
to work. Before the bargain, they had achieved consensus among the Chinese. In the 
meeting, the China side asked for 600 Yuan, while the company gave 100 Yuan, then 
the China side indicated 300 Yuan would be acceptable. The bargaining went 
smoothly and achieved agreement in half an hour. 
 
Workers were called on to stay at the company during the bargaining process; but 
when workers re-entered the plant, they were ordered by their supervisors to change 
their working clothes and resume the work. A number of workers immediately left the 
workshop.  
 
After the agreement came out, workers turned it down and continued to stage 
demonstrations in and out of the factory. Some rushed the police outside the factory 	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gate. The police armed with shields to force back the crowd.365 Inside the factory, in 
some sections workers sat in their seats but refused to work. It was said only a few 
dozen frontline workers resumed work, and there were also managers who ‘turned on 
machines to give the impression that the factory was operating’. 
 
The third negotiation  
 
After midday on Tuesday, Zeng arrived at the factory. He met workers and introduced 
himself as the ‘representative of the National People’s Congress’. He asked workers 
to trust him, that he would negotiate with the management, and would tell the workers 
the outcome in 3 days. But during these 3 days, workers should resume their work. 
Zeng also made decisions to meet workers’ demands, first, double rates of pay for the 
three days of resumed work; second, a minimum basic pay rise of 200 Yuan; third, no 
retaliation against strike participants.366 Most strikers accepted Zeng’s suggestions and 
returned to work. And the workers elected their representatives. 
 
“Before Zeng’s arrival, no one resumed work, because the management, unlike Zeng, 
did not give us a clear answer. They always said ‘well, we have to think about it, you 
shall wait for our reply.’ While Zeng came to us, he said, ‘you will get this level of 
pay rise at least’ or ‘if your boss ate his words, I will give you the money.’ That is the 
answer (we hoped for), the clear answer.”367 
 
In the final bargaining meeting, however, the workers confronting the company were 
in a disadvantageous position. The final agreement was that wages would be 
increased to 280 Yuan, this included 200 Yuan for basic wages and 80 Yuan for 
subsidies.  
 
“We did not know how to express it. In the bargaining, a manager asked us ‘why have 
you requested such a great amount’, and ‘how high is the inflation’, we had no idea 
about how to answer. At last, when the company asked us about our opinions over its 	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offer of a mere 250 Yuan pay rise, everyone kept silent. Then a girl stood up and 
pounded the table ‘what does that mean? You did not make any concession! …you 
shall give 280 Yuan!’ Then the company offered 30 Yuan more…”368 
 
In resuming production, workers were monitored by supervisors, and by managers as 
well as the government officials at the workshops, and they were not allowed to talk 
in groups. The strike then ended. 
 
5.33 Activities of the Actors 
 
Workers 
 
Like their counterparts in Honda Nanhai, workers demanded better conditions, 
superior to statutory minima, and a sustainable mechanism for wage increases. The 
strike was originally planned for the next month. But it was felt that the workers 
‘could not wait till that day’ because the Honda Nanhai strike encouraged workers.369 
According to Honda Lock’s official announcement, 85 per cent of the plant’s 1,400 
workers had joined the action.370  
 
The strike was designed to be held firstly in the painting department as the ‘best 
leverage’ as it ‘takes time to cultivate a lacquer’.371 Protesters adopted a strategy of 
‘non-violence’. Strikers built a consensus for a peaceful strike with ‘no fighting, no 
destroying, no going out to the street’.372 Apart from a single protest march on the 
main road, when workers were confident in doing this,373 all other marches and 
demonstrations were staged inside the factory or near the factory gate. It was also a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Interview, worker 3, Honda Lock, conducted by Wang J. H., 23rd January, 2011. 
369 Zhu, Y. X., Interviewing Liu Shengqi, the leader of Xiaolan Honda workers’ movement, 27 
June 2010, online, http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/12/156103.html (accessed 
14/03/21). Also see Wang, J. H. (2011), ‘Internet: the mobilization medium for new workers’ 
collective protest’ in Open Times, (2011) 11. In Chinese. 
370 UTSanDiego Strikes put China on spot over labor unrest, 10 June 2010, online, 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2010/Jun/10/strikes-put-china-on-spot-over-labor-unrest/ 
(accessed 14/03/21). 
371 Zhu, Y. X. Interviewing Liu Shengqi, the leader of Xiaolan Honda workers’ movement, 27 
June 2010, online, http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/12/156103.html  (accessed 
14/03/21). In Chinese. 
372 Interview, worker 1, Honda Lock, conducted by Wang, J. H., 21st January, 2011. 
373 The New York Times A Labor Movement Stirs in China 10 June 2010, online, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/business/global/11strike.html?pagewanted=2 (accessed 
14/03/21). 
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sign of good organisation that they recommended that their own representatives 
should negotiate with the management. A government official recalled of the first 
negotiation meeting that, ‘the atmosphere was good. Young workers talked about 
their demands rationally and peacefully.’374 The publicity given to the workers’ 
representatives led to government suppression of the leadership. But the rest remained 
committed to the strike for another five days, despite considerable pressure from the 
authorities.  
 
Most of the workers were unskilled, having qualifications no higher than junior high 
school. By contrast, the operators in Honda Nanhai were generally trained in the 
technical colleges in subjects like mechanical engineering.375 During the strike, the 
leading group insisted on the ‘same wage level as Nanhai Honda workers’.376 
However, their high expectations served to widen the gap between groups of workers, 
because the wage increases offered were more attractive for older workers. During the 
strike, they were more distracted by their family obligations, the threats from the 
management and the government, and their difficulties in finding a new job in the 
local labour market.  
 
A certain proportion of workers, especially the older workers, went back to work after 
the recruitment campaign started. The strike then fell apart. Although the remainder 
persisted, their weakness of lacking experience in collective bargaining failed to push 
the management to make more concessions. From another perspective, the bargaining 
itself was a successful achievement of the workers in the strike, as the authorities 
made concessions.  
 
Government 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Interview, Ms F, member of CCP Committee in Xiaolan Town, 19th November 2010. 
375 The New York Times A Labor Movement Stirs in China 10 June 2010, online, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/business/global/11strike.html?pagewanted=2 (accessed 
14/03/21). 
376 Worker Freedom, Workers’ autonomy strikes in China – Mouvement Communiste – Part 1,  
26 July 2011, online, http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20110726084431354; and 
Zhu, Y. X. Interviewing Liu Shengqi, the leader of Xiaolan Honda workers’ movement, 27 
June 2010, online, http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2010/12/156103.html (both 
accessed 14/03/21). In Chinese. 
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The political atmosphere was by and large conservative. The government played a 
dominant role in leading both sides to reach agreement. It had in anticipation its well-
thought-out plan for the pay rise in the settlement. 
 
“We provided them with upper and lower limits of the pay rise between 100 Yuan to 
200 Yuan. This will resolve the problem. And we also suggested the company to give 
workers a bit more of a chance to get promoted.”377 
 
An important consideration was to avoid Honda Lock from having a demonstration 
effect for workers in other factories. And the government was afraid that the pay rise 
in Honda Lock might be a motivation for local companies to raise their wage levels, 
thereby increasing the overall local labour costs. Other reasons included the 
government’s partial ownership of the company assets and the company’s major 
contribution to the local economy.  
 
Yet it deserves mention that the authorities had the directive of not politicising the 
conflict, thus the police force avoided overt conflict with the protesters by confining 
itself to the outside of the factory.  
 
Management  
 
Poor management was the trigger of the strike. Honda Lock’s disadvantageous 
working and living conditions, compared with other enterprises nearby, made workers 
less reluctant to lose their jobs in the strike, as ‘work is everywhere, only if you do not 
want it’.378 At the beginning the Japanese managers held a hardline attitude, which 
was softened by the prolonged strike. But further concessions were opposed by the 
government. By virtue of its administrative and policing resources, the government 
worked with the company to impose pressure on workers to go back to work. 
 
Trade unions 
 
The trade unions played an invisible role in the resolution. During the strike, a 
communication channel between the workers and the authorities was lacking.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 Interview, Ms F, member of Xiaolan Town CCP Committee, Zhongshan city, 19th 
November 2010. 
378 Interview, worker 4, Honda Lock, conducted by Wang J. H., 23rd January, 2011. 
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The workplace union did not separate itself from management sufficiently owing to 
the workplace union president’s primary identity as a high-profile manager, and some 
of the mid- and high-level managers were organised by the president to resume 
production. The workplace trade union president was absent in a number of the 
government meetings with worker activitists. It was reported the union president had 
negotiated with workers on Monday, but the ‘negotiation was not successful’.  
 
This is the reason for the higher level trade union’s reluctance to play its role. The 
XLTU was a part of the government strike settlement team. The higher level trade 
union may have successfully fulfilled its established role of communicating with 
workers if it had the confidence in controlling the situation. But this was very 
unrealistic in this case because the workplace trade union cannot form a channel to 
contact workers. As the tensions between the workers and the authorities had 
increased, the pressure mounted on the local union president to adopt a cautious 
approach as the ‘lesser of two evils’, and had hidden behind the government 
throughout the whole strike resolution.  
 
“We hoped the workers would send their representatives and make clear their 
demands. Then the trade union and the labour bureau would, together with them, 
negotiate with the management. But the workplace union president thought it was 
‘improper for him to get involved in the dispute, because of his managerial 
background’, so the question became how to form a workers’ representative 
mechanism.”379  
 
Thus when workers participated in the third stage of bargaining, there did not exist 
any basis for the workers and the trade unions to trust each other. Workers did not ask 
the union to represent them in the bargaining, and the unions did not have any 
intention to do so. In the bargaining, it kept silent in the presence of workers’ frantic 
efforts.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Interview, Mr L, president of Xiaolan Town Federation of Trade Unions, 19th November 
2010. 
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5.34 Summary 
 
The resolution of the strike in the Honda Lock case was essentially through a unitary 
approach. The government dominated and restrained both the management and the 
workers from acting in their own interest. During the whole process, the government 
and management response to the strike was a one-off reaction to settle a particular 
crisis, although they confronted persistent and organised workers’ protests. 
 
The unions’ dependence upon the management and the government prevented the 
trade unions from being an effective communication channel. The local political 
atmosphere of tight control over the XLTU may reflect the greater imbalance of 
power relationships between the township trade union and the government. It may be 
presumed that, to impel agreement between the workers and management, the absence 
of any communication channel between strikers and the authorities may motivate the 
government to use the state apparatus and consequent harsh suppression. 
 
The deteriorating relationships between the authorities and the workers prevented the 
creation of any elements of an enduring pluralist institution that could take routine 
account of workers’ needs and aspirations. In addition, the harsh approach of the 
government reflected the overall political culture in Xiaolan Town, reflecting a 
dictatorial approach to the reforms of both the trade union and the management. 
These negative elements in the improvement of worker-union relations were 
demonstrated in the reforms after the strike that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
5.4 Denso  
 
5.41 Background 
 
The Denso (Guangzhou Nansha) Co., Ltd. is one of Denso’s 24 factories located in 
China. It is located at Huangge International Auto Industry Zone in Nansha 
administration district, affiliated to Guangzhou City. Established in July 2004, Nansha 
Denso supplies fuel injectors and fuel injection pumps for gasoline engines to 
Guangzhou Toyota and other Japan-based automotive manufactures across China. By 
2011, there were around 1300 employees including 200 intern students. The 26 
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Japanese managers were all positioned above the level of section chief.380 In recent 
years, its net sales increased by 12% every year. 
 
The basic wage in 2010 amounted to 1310 Yuan, increased by less than 10%; while 
the 2010 minimum wage in Nansha district rose to 920 Yuan, a 19.5% increase. On 
average, the weekly overtime was 60 hours, which was at a relatively low level 
among companies in the industrial zone, and the income of operators was around 
2000 Yuan. After deducting the insurance fee, the remained was around 1300 Yuan. 
There was a clear wage gap between the Japanese and Chinese. Salaries of the 
Japanese managers at department level were 15 times higher than the Chinese 
managers. Between the Chinese manager and workers, the monthly wage of operators 
with 60 hours overtime per week was about 1/3 of the amount a section chief earned 
before tax.381 At the end of 2009 the company issued new wage policy, which 
increased the pay gap between the operators and the middle- and higher managers.  
 
At the end of 2005, the chief personnel manager (at the time) initiated the setting up 
of a workplace trade union. To the Japanese managers, the personnel manager 
explained that the Chinese trade union and company were like ‘two wheels of the 
vehicle’ ‘to go forward together with each other’.  
 
“The trade union, though functioning to represent workers’ interest, can be beneficial 
to the development of the company. It is legally required for the company to pass its 
employment regulations with the approval of employees’ representatives or the trade 
union. Because the company had only been established for a year, it was important 
for it to normalise its operation. Hence it would be convenient for the company if 
there was a union. And so long as the union can be professional and rational, it is 
easier for the company to consult and co-operate with it.”382  
 
The personnel manager contacted the directly superior organisation of Denso trade 
union, Huangge Town trade union, and got the approval from the latter. The number 
of workers in Denso by the time amounted to 300-400, and the law regulates the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 The management hierarchy in Denso was, in order, general manager, department 
managers, section manager, subsection manager, squad chief, group chief, operator. 
381 The higher-level managers do not have the overtime wage. 
382 Interview, Mr Z, vice-president of workplace trade union, Denso, 19th May 2011. 
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workplace union should be established when workforce reaches 200. And the town 
union supported the manager’s initiation of union establishment because it helped 
them to achieve the quotas assigned to be fulfilled. 
 
A preparatory committee was then established under the supervision of the personnel 
manager. The General Affairs Department was in charge of the preparatory 
committee. The preparatory committee consisted of nine members recommended by 
the department. The majority were rank-and-file workers or low-profile managers. 
Most of the preparatory committee members, particularly the rank-and-file workers 
had little knowledge about unions. The personnel manager provided several training 
sessions to the committee members.  
 
“Some of us knew nothing about the union. In the training session, the chief personnel 
manager told us the union worked for worker’s welfare, it benefited workers’ interests. 
If we [workers] had problems, we can talk to the union. The union can affect the 
company.”383 
 
In nominating the candidates, the preparatory committee decided on a self-
appointment method. As a result, nine people put themselves forward as candidates; 
the majority of them came from the preparatory committee. The General Affairs 
Department tried to recommend one of the staff to participate in the election, it was 
rejected by the committee on the grounds that the nine self-appointed candidates had 
filled all the candidate places, and candidates should come from the rank-and-file.  
 
These candidates gave speeches at introduction meetings. Their curricula vitae were 
shown to all company members. Each worker voted for union committee members by 
selecting their preferred candidates from a list of all candidates. Votes were counted 
publicly. Seven union committee members and two union audit committee members 
were elected. In this sense, the election was a single-candidate election. The president 
and vice president were elected by the newly established committee, being required to 
muster more than half the votes. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Interview, Ms G, member of union preparatory committees and union cell group leader, 
Denso, 12th May 2011. 
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In the second union election in January 2009, Mr K, a chief manager in production, 
was elected to be the new union president. And Mr Z, the legal consultant in the 
personnel department, became the vice president. Other positions on the union 
committee were taken up by eight new faces, comprised of three subsection chiefs, 
and five foremen of a squad or a group. Members of the new union committee were 
by and large at a middle-level in the company’s management structure. The union 
administrative secretary retained her position in the second union committee. 
 
5.42 The Course of the Strike 
 
Causes of the strike  
 
There was a shifting personnel environment in the plant at the end of 2009. The old 
Japanese CEO left Denso; he was in his 60s with a moderate character. His successor 
was deployed from one of Denso’s northern plants in Yantai, Shandong Province. 
Unlike his predecessor, the new CEO was not approachable for either managers or 
workers. He was appraised to be ‘stiff’ and ‘lacked humanity and caring’. After the 
new manager was in the office, the focus of management became more inclined 
towards production and finance, while less concerned with the personnel relations of 
the plant and workers’ welfare.  
 
In April 2010, among all the 13 factories related to the Toyota companies in the area, 
the wage level in Denso ranked as 6th. In May and June, when new wage rates were 
published for Japanese companies, the wage level in Denso had fallen to the bottom. 
In addition, in the new wage plan in 2010, a work assessment test was introduced as a 
decisive factor in workers’ year-end bonus. Promotion of low and middle level 
managers was also restricted, whereas the promotion had previously been a 
significant way for workers and low level managers to increase their income. 
 
In a regular collective negotiation two months before the strike, the union put forward 
eight demands, including a 100 RMB increment of the basic monthly wage, installing 
air-conditioning at the dormitory, and providing meals for overtime workers. Apart 
from resolving the meal demand, the company did not make any concession. 
	   131	  
The mobilisation  
 
The Denso strike occurred right after Honda Nanhai workers ended their strike and 
came to an agreement with Honda, and after Foxconn encountered its twelfth suicide. 
These events inspired unrest at the workplace in Denso. The information about the 
Honda and other strikes spread across the company. On the Company toilet walls, 
workers wrote down the achievements of other strikes. In May, the monthly turnover 
rate reached 34%, equivalent to the total of the previous year. It was reported that 
there was a single day when twenty workers resigned. 384   
 
The strike was initiated in a training session provided by the company. Fourteen 
leaders attended a one-month training course. Two of them were squad chiefs, who 
were the course trainers. The rest were group chiefs. Ten of them were in production 
sections. Some of the chiefs did not know the others before the course. The course 
began at the time when the new policy was implemented and workers got their wages. 
In spare time, these leaders developed their grievance about the company wage and 
welfare policy. Then the idea of a strike came up. 
 
The leaders used their networks with their own crews and with other group leaders. 
They gathered over several dinners to discuss the details. To one of the meals, they 
invited all group leaders and some operators. But less than half of those whom they 
invited showed up, and some kept silent during the meal. The core group confirmed 
the timing, strategy and some other details of the strike. All group leaders were asked 
to pass on the strike plan to their roommates and their own crews.  
 
One day before the strike, a mass gathering was arranged to inform workers of the 
plan. It was in a commercial street near the company dormitory buildings. A ‘Letter to 
Denso Workers’ was delivered to the masses. In the letter, workers’ demands were:  
1. the wage should be increased by 800 Yuan;  
2. there should be payment during the strike;  
3. strikers shall not be dismissed;  
4. workers should be allowed to re-organise the union, and elect the president;  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Economic Observer, A 72-hour Stoppage Incident in Guangzhou Denso, 25th June 2010, 
online, http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2010/06/28/173788.shtml (assessed 13/11/21). In 
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5. the company should rewrite the labour contract with workers.  
At the end of the letter, it emphasised that, ‘All workers shall strike until the company 
accepts our demands.’ The letter asked workers to gather outside the plant after 
clocking in. It also warned those ‘crossing the picketing line’, that they ‘may suffer 
needless loss because of our aggressive behaviour brought about by our gathering.’ 
The gathering lasted for about an hour. The number of workers who participated was 
around two or three hundred. Organisers had planned that the strikers should keep 
silent for seven days, to ensure that the pressure imposed on the company was 
sufficient. At the same time, the company was immediately informed about the 
gathering. That night, it delivered about one third of the completed product it had in 
store.  
 
The strike started as scheduled in the morning. Workers stayed in the canteen. The 
organisers went to the mess and told the workers to follow them out of the plant. 
Workers began to move, operators went first, followed by the squad chiefs. After they 
had left the plant, workers gathered on the company campus. Staff workers in the 
administration and personnel department did not leave their office upstairs at the time.  
 
The Japanese manager appeared an hour after the start of the strike and made a speech 
to the workers. He agreed to raise the wage by 450 RMB, and he gave workers five 
minutes to respond. A few minutes later, when the manager asked, ‘who does not 
agree?’, no one answered him. When the company tried to get the products shipped 
out, strikers went to obstruct the entrance of the shipping port. They blocked off the 
delivery trucks and lay under the trucks. Most of the mid-level managers such as the 
squad chiefs did not get involved in the operators’ actions. But some covertly 
supported strikers, ‘do what you will do, I had the order from above (to resume the 
production), but I will not stop you.’  
 
The involvement of the trade unions 
 
After the outbreak of the strike, the company informed the local economic and trade 
commission, the latter then reported to the local government. The news of the strike 
was transmitted within the system for the maintenance of social stability (MSS). 
Several hours later, the government had a meeting to discuss the resolution of the 
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dispute. The district union president Liang was called by a high-profile government 
official to go to the meeting. The workplace union president was also called to the 
meeting to make a briefing about the situation. The president of Nansha District Trade 
Union (NSDU), Ms L went to resolve the dispute voluntarily. But normally it was the 
duty of Huangge town trade union, rather than the NSDU’s. 
 
After Ms L arrived at Denso, she asked eleven union committee members to go to the 
workers to collect their demands and elect their representatives. But the workers all 
kept silent at that time. Later in the afternoon, Ms L found the two key organisers, and 
asked them out to a teahouse. She promised to them that there would be no officials 
from the government other than trade union officials. Two district union officials and 
two Denso union presidents attended the meeting.  To ease the atmosphere, the union 
told the two strike organisers that they would not be regarded as ‘the leaders’, but 
merely ‘the advocates’. The union told the organisers that obstruction of the 
company’s delivery will break the law. And it also told the organisers that collective 
bargaining could resolve the dispute, so it wanted the squad chiefs to tell workers to 
elect their representatives for the negotiation. In addition, the union suggested that the 
organisers should ‘volunteer’ to be candidates in the representative election which 
would be held on the second day. The two organisers agreed. On the second day the 
workplace union organised a meeting to elect the workers’ representatives. But the 
squad leaders did not ‘voluntarily’ step out. They explained to the union afterwards, 
‘it was not the right time. If I dared to step out at that time, we would be eaten by 
those workers.’ 
 
Informed of the union meeting with the two organisers, the security bureau required 
the union to ‘bring the organisers to the police station’. But this was refused by Ms L, 
because ‘the union had made an effort to build up this relationship, which should not 
be destroyed’. 385  After workers blocked the company delivery department, the 
Japanese manager called the police. Ms L called the vice chairman of the district 
government saying ‘we should not let police enter.’ Then the vice chairman told the 
police chief to not send in the police without the trade union’s approval. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385 Interview, Ms L, president of NSDU, Guangzhou city, 12th August 2010. 
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The turning point of the bargaining 
 
At the same time, the union members collected workers’ demands, and persuaded 
workers to elect their bargaining representatives. All the union committee members 
went to individual workers and inquired about their demands. As suggested by the 
district union president, the union committee members told workers they were 
‘representatives of workers’ interests’. They told workers, they understood why the 
workers took such an action, but to resolve the problem, negotiation would be more 
effective than the strike. A ballot box for anonymous demands was put outside the 
union office by the union. After collecting workers’ notes, three union officials, in the 
presence of all, wrote down these demands one by one. By the end of the second day, 
the trade union had collected 623 demands from the workers. These demands were 
then summarised by the union into 5 categories, and 220 items, and the union then 
proposed a written claim, including a 800 Yuan wage increase.  
 
In the afternoon of the second day, vice union president Mr Z called on all the group 
leaders to meet him. He called them one by one. More than a dozen group leaders 
attended. The meeting lasted more than one hour. The efforts of the union had a 
growing effect on the workers, and alleviated the relations between the union and 
group leaders to some extent. 
 
“I sat with these group leaders in a circle, bringing us close to each other. Firstly, I 
told them, ‘I am not the company’s representative, if I were, I would not talk to you 
about this. I merely represent the union’. I then listened to their opinions patiently, 
and sometimes, I told them, ‘I agree with you’. After that, I said, ‘what can we do? 
We have to resolve it somehow. Now is the time to bargain as we’ve imposed enough 
pressure on the company. Firstly they did not accept my points. But I kept talking 
patiently, and I answered questions they raised, from the legal perspective or from my 
own understanding. Firstly they were irrational, but at the end some bought me 
drinks.”386  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Interview, Mr Z, vice president of workplace trade union, Denso, 10th May 2011. 
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Another key figure in the resolution was Zeng, the general manager of Guangzhou 
Auto Industry Group Co., Ltd – one of Denso’s major clients. He was also the third 
part in previous Honda cases; while in Denso, he mainly worked on the management 
side. Zeng worked closely with the union, and provided it with guidance and a variety 
of government support and resources. He went to the company with his business team, 
putting pressure on the Denso managers, and urged them to make concessions. He 
called a meeting including managers above the squad level, in which managers were 
told that bargaining representatives must be elected, ‘which was an order from the 
government’. 
 
On the third day, majority of workers came back and stayed at the production section, 
though they did not work. Each squad in the production section received an election 
form to elect the workers’ representatives. Almost all squad chiefs were 
recommended by their crews. These squad chiefs made up half of the delegation team, 
the rest were operators, group chiefs and section chiefs that were one grade higher 
than the squad chiefs. 
 
In the bargaining meeting, the union president was the chief bargaining representative. 
27 worker representatives were present in the bargaining meetings as bystanders. In 
the meeting, Zeng promised a ‘satisfactory result’ to the bargaining, which would be 
announced in three days on 25th June, but only if workers went back to work first. 
Although without any concrete agreement yet emerging, a majority of the 
representatives accepted the company’s suggestion.387  
 
Workers in the production section were called in from outside, because ‘the result has 
been revealed.’ Squad chiefs in the production section were requested by the section 
and department head to organise workers to resume production. The delivery section 
and production section I which was in charge of the union president Mr K were the 
first places which restored production. In a few days, all production on all lines was 
resumed but at a slow pace of working. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 In a union internal bulletin in Guangdong, Zeng Qinghong stated ‘getting workers sitting at 
their seats’ was imperative in ‘getting them back to production’. See GDPU Office, Work 
Bulletin of Experiences Collection of Guangzhou Trade Unions at Different Levels in Dealing 
with Workers’ Stoppage Incidents, 2nd Nov 2010. In Chinese. 
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On the third day, workers re-elected 26 of their members as their representatives. 
Union president Mr K and four delegates were the principal bargaining 
representatives. 21 workers’ representatives were bystanders sitting in the back. The 
bargaining lasted several hours. The managers were asked to leave several times, so 
that workers’ delegates could discuss their plans. Eventually, in the agreement that 
was reached, the basic wage rose by 450 RMB. The total increase including the basic 
wage, the welfare, and the bonus amounted to 800 RMB. 
 
5.43 Activities of the Actors 
 
Workers 
 
Denso workers, like their counterparts in Honda Nanhai and Honda Lock, requested 
‘a share of the company profit’. Another common feature is that they paid particular 
concern to the low income groups. The organisers had discussed the details after their 
training session. In their plan, under which the lowest grade ‘should benefit most’, the 
percentage of the wage increase would decrease with the rising grade. The pay 
increase for the operator was 40%, for the group leader was 25-30%, and for the 
squad leaders was 15%. The primary aim was to ensure the operators ‘can deposit 
several hundred RMB every month.’ But for some reason, the final demand was 
changed to a ‘800 RMB increase for all’. This was 1.5 times the increase in the 
original plan. Workers’ actions were highly disciplined by making consensus that no 
one should work, or negotiate with the company or be represented by others to 
negotiate. 
 
“When I was collecting the workers’ demands, there existed ‘another voice’, 
obstructing the union’s investigation. It was troublesome, like an ‘invisible man’, I 
don’t know who was there, but I could feel some eyes fixed on me. When I was writing 
something, I heard a voice saying, ‘why you write this?’ I looked back, but did not see 
who was saying that to me. Someone questioned my collecting of the demands; I 
thought I may have seen that guy before, but I cannot tell which section he belonged 
to and what his name is. When I was about to submit the demands to the union 
president, there came two guys asking me what I wrote, and questioning ‘can you 
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represent the mass?’ I told them I was the squad head, so I was able to represent my 
line.”388 
 
Although the strike was ignited successfully, the follow-up was inadequate. When 
workers blocked the shipping exit, the leaders consulted with their lawyer friends, and 
were told that blocking the shipping exit may violate the law. Leaders then asked 
workers to not block the private cars or trucks not in the shipping, they should only 
block the shipping trucks. Yet their request were questioned by workers ‘why do you 
stop me!?’ One organiser commented on this, ‘they got totally absorbed into the 
situation, and we were not able to bring them back.’ And the union’s consistent 
efforts to push workers into negotiation hastened the collapse of the strike alliance, 
 
“Among hundreds of people, there must be some whose mind was not very firm. You 
have got to grasp the chance to talk to them, individually and intensively. When they 
did not reject you, even if they might not agree with you, it was actually a sign of 
approval on some points.”389 
 
The gap between the leadership and the masses over the intention of continuing the 
strike increased over time. Some found the strike ‘difficult – not as interesting as we 
thought.’ And there was a growing feeling that ‘we need a result’ among workers, 
which contrasted with the original strategy of ‘strike till the company accepts all 
demands’.  
 
“Some days later, the union asked union cell group leaders to collect our demands. 
Merely complaining is useless, we have to resolve it. The strike cannot last 
forever.”390 
 
“Why were we elected the representatives? I don’t know either. There were pressures 
on us from the trade union, the manager, and Zeng. They told us it was the time to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 Interview, Mr T, squad chief and union committee member, Denso, 13th May 2011. 
389 Interview Mr Z, vice president of workplace trade union, Denso, 19th May 2011. 
390 Interview, Ms G, member of union preparatory committees and union cell group leader, 
Denso, 12th May 2011. 
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bargain. Also there had been a consensus among workers that ‘(we shall) resolve the 
problem’.”391 
 
Meanwhile, over the course of time, strike leaders had been exposed to the process of 
the strike. In the half hour after the strike started, one of the leaders was warned by 
union president Mr K that, ‘I know all of you who gathered for the (planning) dinner.’ 
At the same time, the leaders had been under pressure from their families. ‘My wife 
knew my (straight) character. And she told me to not be the leader, but to follow 
others.’ Another one confronted opposition from his family, who afterwards ‘became 
silent for the most of the time’. 
 
On the second day, a leader, when ‘about to discuss our next step with the other two 
leaders’, was told ‘you don’t know we’ve stopped? We cannot control the situation 
anymore. We’d better do what the mass do.’ After hearing this, he did not answer any 
call, and hid in a room. On the third day, most of the leaders decided to not go to the 
bargaining organised by the union. After the bargaining, those who attended told 
others ‘hold on, we have to control the situation. But we are afraid we will collapse.’ 
At the time, the strike leader made his last attempt to control the situation. When the 
workers were asked to go back to work from the campus, he went to the masses, 
 
“I stood amidst them, telling them that once they went back to work, the company will 
never ‘deliver the goods’. I think they were moved by my words, but still, they 
followed the section head. Then I left.”392 
 
Government  
 
The government did not play an important role, and one reason for this was the recent 
establishment of the district government. As in the other two cases, the MSS system 
within the government bureaucracy was switched on in the emergency perceived after 
the strike occurred. This mechanism had the substantial integration of the trade union 
into the local government apparatus. Different from the other two cases, the 
president’s personal background motivated the stepping forward of the district union 
in the government meeting, showing that the power relations seemed to be more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Interview, Ms Z, operator and union cell group leader, Denso, 12th May 2011. 
392 Interview, Mr I, strike organisor, Denso, 13th May 2011. 
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favourable for the trade union. After the involvement, the NSDU confronted the 
pressures from the government, that the deputy chairman of the district government 
publicly kept condemning the district union president as ‘not responsible’. This 
conflict was deactivated by the president of Guangzhou City Federation of Trade 
Unions (GZCU), a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress in Guangdong Province.  
 
Management 
 
Mismanagement was the key issue in the strike. The salary structure lacked reason in 
terms of income disparity, and the changed policies were increasingly unfavourable to 
the low income groups. Mismanagement was also exposed by management’s 
ignorance of the workers’ grievances, which had been reflected in the high turnover 
rate, the trade union’s proposal, and warnings appearing in the toilets. At the start of 
the strike, the general manager’s threatening speech further accelerated the conflict. 
 
Accustomed to the regular resolution of disputes in their home country, the managers 
did not welcome the involvement of the government at first. 
 
“Procedurally, we will resolve the dispute with workers on our own, because it was a 
dispute between capital and labour. But if the company cannot resolve the strike, we 
hope the government will intervene.”393 
 
The strike had a tremendous impact on the company. The stoppage at Denso had 
affected Guangzhou Toyota, Honda, Hyundai and their auto parts suppliers. During 
the strike, managers, and especially those close to the workers and in charge of 
production, were confronted by considerable pressures. 
 
“The general manager told me to deliver the goods. I cannot reject his order. So I 
told him I had to make a call to my supervisor. On the phone, my supervisor told me 
to go home right now; otherwise I must fulfill my duty. I then told the general 
manager that I had to go home. He did not insist and let me go. I left immediately.”394 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 Interview, Japanese General Manager, Denso, 19th Nov 2010. 
394 Interview, Mr T, squad chief and union committee member, Denso, 12th May 2011. 
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By contrast with the two Honda cases, there seemed to be a distance between the 
company and the government. This was attributed to the district union’s involvement 
with a worker sympathetic approach, as will be elaborated next. This not only pressed 
the company to make more concessions, but also brought the role of the trade unions 
to the fore. 
 
“In the incident, the union was central in handling the problem. It found the 
organisers and negotiated with them, but the employees did not want to talk to the 
union. Then the company talked to the workers, but it was difficult because of the 
language difference. At last, the workers, through the union, talked to the 
manager.”395 
 
More promisingly, this might enhance the workplace trade union’s status in the 
company after the strike.  
 
“The district union and company union assisted greatly in resolving the dispute, and 
the company union made great efforts in the strike. For sure the company union needs 
to be improved in many ways, including the relation between union and company, 
union and workers, and company and workers. And we will discuss these with the 
union in a further step.” 396 
 
The manager then described several reforms after the strike, ‘firstly building up a 
good relationship with the union; secondly improving communication with workers, 
especially the residents in company accommodation; thirdly, setting up the manager 
mail-box.’ And the core of reforms is the wage negotiation. The manager highlighted 
an ‘enhancement of the wage negotiation to avoid the strike’, by ‘receiving workers’ 
appeals at a day-by-day basis’, where ‘the union’s expressing and resolving workers’ 
grievance in time plays a crucial role with the co-operation with the company’. 
 
Trade unions 
 
The trade unions played a key role in the conflict resolution. The district union 
implemented its strategy through the workplace union in the resolution process. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 Interview, Japanese General Manager, Denso, 19th Nov 2010. 
396 Interview, Japanese General Manager, Denso, 19th Nov 2010. 
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order to channel the strike through formal procedures, the workplace trade union 
patiently engaged in collecting workers’ appeals and assisting workers to elect their 
bargaining representatives. This eased up the tensions in the conflict and rebuilt the 
trust between the workers and the workplace trade union.  
 
The NSDU’s stance was the key determinant in the strategy of the workplace union. 
Comparing with the Huangge town trade union, the NSDU at a higher level enjoyed 
more status within the political apparatus. Its political status provided the protection 
for the workplace trade union, against not only the management, but more important 
against the government. As the vice president stated: 
 
“In some essential issues, we went for guidance to the district union. In some key 
issues, especially, if they contain some political factors or risks, we cannot make a 
decision, but the district union can.”397 
 
Thus the general union left adequate space for the workplace union to fully engage in 
the process of rebuilding trust, by resisting the external pressures from the 
government. For the NSDU, its political shelter came from the higher union 
bureaucracy. 
 
“At that time [being rebuked by the district government], I kept silent but felt so upset. 
In the evening, I made a call to GZCU. The moment I spoke, I wept. They said to me, 
‘it is not your fault, we support you.’ I could not help but cry. On the second day, the 
GZCU president went to the deputy chairman of the district, ‘our district union 
president works for workers as she is the union president, which has offended you.’ 
Then the chairman went out and slapped my back lightly, and said, ‘That is all 
right.’”398 
 
5.44 Summary  
 
As in the other two cases, when confronted with the strike, the company’s authority 
vanished. The resources offered by NDTU and GZCU facilitated the workplace 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
397 Interview, Mr Z, vice president of workplace trade union, Denso, 19th May 2011. 
398 Interview, Ms L, president of NSDU, Guangzhou city, 12th August 2010. 
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union’s networking with workers, by overcoming the managerial resistance from the 
employers and political pressures from the government. In this sense, these trade 
unions became more autonomous from their affiliated administration.  
 
The prominent element in the Denso case in achieving the union’s relative autonomy 
was the advantageous position of the regional trade unions in their power relations 
with the government authorities. These freedoms were actually achieved through the 
trade unions’ political and administrative resources, underpinned by their political and 
legislative status. During the process, they have faced up to confrontational forces 
from the Party-government in an adverse political environment. At the same time the 
president’s rich experience was helpful in enhancing her influence in the Party-
government. The involvement of GZCU further helped the NSDU to resist the 
pressures from the government. Both the union presidents held a similar perspective 
in appealing to the union’s autonomy from the administration. The GZCU had been 
well known for the president Mr C’s enlightened views. In an internal union report 
after the strike, the GZCU appealed for an autonomous role for the trade unions in 
strike resolution. The report required the unions to ‘clearly understand the unions’ 
unique responsibilities’, and ‘[though they should] co-operate with government 
departments, pay attention to what a union could do.’399  
 
The Denso workplace trade union manifests some democratic elements in terms of 
both the process of elections and the union’s structural institutional arrangements. The 
openness of the management, the competence of the union presidents, and the worker 
activists were all favourable factors. The democratic framework of the workplace 
trade union, as elaborated earlier (section 5.41), paved the way to the smooth union 
transformation after the strike. As can be seen from the account of the reforms after 
the strikes in the next chapter, the grass-roots union committee remained the same 
while more grass-roots elements were contained in the reformed union institutions. 
The ‘bottom-up’ method developed in this case was a successful attempt at the 
institutionalisation of the workers’ participation in resolving the disputes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 GDPU Office, Work Bulletin of Experiences Collection of Guangzhou Trade Unions at 
Different Levels in Dealing with Workers’ Stoppage Incidents, 2nd Nov 2010. In Chinese. 
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Chapter Six – Case Studies in DLDZ 
 
6.1 The Context of DLDZ 
 
The most obvious fact in the three cases in DLDZ is that they come under the same 
authority at the district (development zone) level. The political as well as the labour 
relations contexts of the cases are thus of little difference from each other. The DLDZ 
context can be understood from three aspects: the general industrial relations 
development, the highlighted features of ‘paternalist’ trade unionism, and the 
changing government approaches to strike resolution with a focus on the 2005 and 
2010 strikes.  
 
6.11 The Development of Labour Relations  
 
Established in 1984, the DLDZ is located in the coastal city Dalian in Liaoning 
province. The province as a major part of the Northeast manufacturing base was 
dominated by heavy industries for decades under the socialist system. By 2010 the 
development zone constituted 2,300 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), of which 42 
are ranked among the top 500 global companies. These enterprises are engaged in a 
wide range of products such as towel products, electronics, furniture, and auto parts.  
 
In comparison with the Southern regions, the wage level in Northeastern China is 
generally lower than in the South. Taking Toshiba for instance, the wage level in 
Dalian branch, though higher than branches in other cities in Liaoning Province, is 
lower than its counterparts in cities in South China and East China.400 All the 
enterprises in the DLDZ set their basic wages equivalent to the statutory minimum 
level with minor wage increases arising from workplace negotiations. In DLDZ, the 
minimum wage remained static in the 2008 global financial crisis, while in 2009, 
Dalian City raised its minimum wage from 700 RMB to 900 RMB, nearly a 30% 
increase. Also in 2009, the green shoots of economic revival in most of enterprises led 
to the award of a general wage increase in their negotiations. For example the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Interview, Mr W, party secretary in Toshiba Dalian, DLDZ, 7th April 2011. 
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budgetary cost of the wage in Toshiba increase was 10%, a substantial rise from 3-5% 
in previous years.  
 
By 2010, workers in DLDZ had an average age of mid-20s. Because of the generally 
low requirements for recruitment in most of the companies, it was easy for workers 
with a certificate from junior high school to find a job in DLDZ. A certain proportion 
of the workers were local residents in DLDZ. More than one third of the workforce 
originated from the villages nearby. It was common for workers to have their relatives 
in factories in DLDZ. Some of them marry and stay. Dispatched workers accounted 
for 40% of the workforce in DLDZ. 
 
With regard to the employer associations, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Dalian) (abbreviated as JCCI) was established in 1983, this was a non-profit 
organisation working for all the Japanese enterprises in DLDZ. One of the JCCI’s 
major functions was to provide information about the Japanese enterprises, and it was 
reported to be able to disseminate information to all the Japanese enterprises within 
10 minutes. But it had no authority to constrain its members.  
 
6.12 ‘Paternalist’ Trade Unionism 
 
Trade unionism in DLDZ is characterised by the strong socialist tradition. The union 
institution was established in the 1980s, when the command economy remained 
dominant in the arena. Between 10% - 20% of union presidents were full-time 
officials. Most of the union presidents had the experience of working in SOEs. At 
enterprises, the socialist heritage of industrial relations rendered the grass-roots 
unions often keeping an arm’s length from the company management. Some unions 
remained to function primarily as a ‘parent for workers’ and the union presidents 
described the union-worker relation ‘which is actually a mother-child relation.’401 The 
three cases in this chapter are typical paternalist trade unions.  
 
DLDZ had developed a comprehensive pattern of networking of the local union 
organisations, which is based on a three-layer trade union structure. The highest layer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 This particular phrase of ‘parent-children relations’ was commonly heard in a meal with a 
dozen of union presidents in major enterprises on 6th April 2011. 
	   145	  
was the District Trade Union of Dalian Development Zone (abbreviated as DLDZU). 
The next layer was the Federation Trade Unions of FIEs, which was made up of ten 
workstations, each consisting of dozens of plant unions. The workplace trade unions 
at the bottom level were members of the union networks. The DLDZU president Mr 
M became the union president after he retired from the local labour bureau where he 
had worked for ten years. There were close personal relationships between the 
DLDZU president and a number of workplace union presidents in major enterprises 
such as Canon, Mabuchi Motor, Seiko, Nidec, TDK, Tostem. Union presidents 
occasionally met for meals. 
 
Wage negotiations had been introduced in DLDZ since the mid-1990s. The wage 
negotiations were carried out in a union-centered way. Union officials exercised their 
personal authority and persuasion to bargain with managers. Administrative 
assistance from above was the main resource for the workplace union in bargaining. 
As one of the union president said, ‘this (the collective bargaining) should be a top-
down process. The upper union’s role is important. Without the “word” from the 
higher level union, how could we bargain?’ From 1997, the local government was 
putting pressure on the foreign partner firms to pay acceptable wages by setting up 
guide lines. The guidelines provided these companies with high-, middle-, and low- 
levels as three reference levels of the minimum rate of wage increase. The annual 
wage increase was around 2%-3% before 2008. After 2008 owing to the enhanced 
effort on implementing the guiding line policy by the government, for many 
enterprises, the wage increase reached 10% for the first time. 
 
6.13 Institutions and Strategies of Regional Administration in the Resolution of 
Strikes 
 
DLDZ had encountered three major strike waves in its history. The first strike wave 
took place in 1994, a strike involved around 6000 workers in Mabuchi Motors, and 
then hit 14 enterprises. Ten years later in 2005, starting at the end of July, a two-
month strike wave engulfed 17 Japanese enterprises and one Korean enterprise, and 
the total number of the workers amounted to 20,000. The 2010 strikes in DLDZ 
started in the spring when Dalian Ichihiro Towel Company encountered the first 
walk-out. The surge of strikes occurred between mid-July to August, which hit 86 
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enterprises; among which 68 were Japanese-owned, the rest were Korean-owned. In 
total it involved more than 80 thousand workers. The strikes generally lasted a short 
time. The maximum length of some was 2 or 3 days while most of the strikes were 
resolved within a couple of hours. The strike in Tostem started on 19th July. Four days 
later, on 22nd July when the strike was ended in Tostem, the one in Nidec broke out 
but ended on the same day.  
 
The three major strike waves in DLDZ provide an insight into the changing political 
contexts of strikes. Recent years have witnessed a more relaxed government attitude. 
Before 1994, the government had dealt with the foreign investors by suppressing the 
strikes. According to a workplace union officer, ‘When a strike took place, the 
government called in all sorts of groups including the public security bureau, trade 
union, and the fireman. There was no collective bargaining or negotiation at all. They 
simply asked, “do you want to continue working or not? If yes, you sign (to abandon 
striking); if no, you get off here right now.” That is it!’402 
 
In the 1994 strike wave, officers from the DLDZ labour bureau and the trade union 
investigated the strike-hit plants, and later selected several workers’ representatives to 
form a bargaining group for negotiating with the enterprise. In the following meeting, 
a spirited debate occurred between union, government and employer over whether the 
strike was legitimate or not. After the meeting, the DLDZ management committee 
issued ‘Interim Provision on the Enterprise Labour Disputes in DLDZ’403 (shortened 
to DLDZ interim provision) concerning labour disputes in DLDZ. It pronounced it to 
be legal for the workers to present a written proposal for a strike to the workplace 
union and enterprise’s administration, and that the workplace union should report to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Interview, cadre of DLDZU, 3rd August 2006. 
403 Interim Provision on the Enterprise Labour Disputes in DLDZ (1994). This provision was 
terminated on the expiration of a 5-year period. But later in the year 1994, headed by the 
ACFTU, a joint notice was issued. The notice requested improvement of facilities for trade 
unions in FIEs, including unionisation, a better quality of workplace union president, and 
support and protection from the superior union for the workplace trade union. The issuing 
bodies are ACFTU, Organisation Department of the CCP Central Committee, State Economic 
and Trade Commission, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, MOL, and 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce. See Notice on Several Issues in 
Strengthening the Work of the Workplace Trade Union in the FIE (1994). 
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the local union. In an enterprise without a union, workers should present it directly to 
the local union.404 
 
Since 2005, a tripartite system for coping with strikes was formally implemented in 
DLDZ. In the proposal, the enterprise association and general trade union, under the 
leadership of the government, was required to guide workplace unions and enterprises 
respectively to negotiate with each other. But this was not practically implemented in 
the settlements. When the summer of 2005 strike took place in Toshiba (Dalian), it 
was mediated in a tripartite framework, dominated by the DLDZ management 
committee and the district union. The company raised the monthly wage by 150 Yuan. 
Several weeks later, a second strike occurred in Canon. Following the Canon incident, 
more strikes occurred in other companies. The local government of DLDZ, then 
hardened its attitude in coping with the ensuing strikes. It curbed the wage increases, 
even in some enterprises which had already reached compromises, and announced 
‘the strike is illegal’, and ‘not a penny will be raised’.405 Police were sent to enforce 
workers’ return to work. A number of strikers were fired. Broader strikes nevertheless 
were launched by workers in several other companies, including Nidec, Mitsubishi, 
Toshiba, Nissin, and Asahi. At this point the party committee at the city level stated 
that the ‘problem [of strike] resolution is the priority at the current time’. It added that 
‘a concern with social stability should overweigh economic development’. Under the 
government and the union’s instruction, the wage was raised across the board by 103 
Yuan. 
 
In the 2010 strike, the tripartite mechanism inherited from the 2005 strike was 
developed in a more formalised way. The labour bureau was in charge of providing 
the relevant policy information, and the DLDZ district union and China Enterprise 
Confederation/China Enterprise Directors Association (abbreviated as CEC-CEDA) 
were supposed to guide the workplace unions and the enterprises respectively to 
negotiate with each other.406 Under this the government had largely withdrawn their 
intervention in the dispute resolution. Officials from both the Dalian City Labour 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Article 12 of DLDZ interim provision. 
405 Phoenix Weekly, An Investigation on the Associational Strike in Japanese Invested 
Enterprises in Dalian, 2005(34). In Chinese. 
406 The CEC-CEDA however, had weaker links with the Japanese enterprises than JCCI.  
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Bureau and the directly responsible body of the DLDZ Governance Committee 
appeared to have a relaxed perspective over the strike. 
 
“When the strike took place, we knew we should not be nervous but be objective in 
viewing it. I am not saying we permitted them to do whatever they wanted, yet the 
government behaviour should be constrained.”407 
 
“[In resolving the strikes] we did not tell the trade union and the managers what they 
should do; rather relying on going into the enterprise, aiming to understand the 
workers’ appeals, and guiding both sides to continue their negotiations.”408 
 
In the resolution of 2010 strikes, the substantial mandate was given to the president of 
DLDZU to intervene into the disputes. As will be seen from the case studies, this 
district union president played a quasi-government role, of whom the strategy, though 
sympathetic to workers, took both workers and enterprise into account, 
 
“Seiko increased pay on average by 400 RMB (around 30%). It should not be this 
high, as it ignored the overall balance… The level of wage increase that I set up was 
criticised as being too low. But at that time, it was imperative to keep a balance of 
wage increases in DLDZ. Otherwise, I would go against the Party.”409 
 
6.14 Concluding Remarks 
 
The context of industrial relations in DLDZ is the hybrid of marketisation and 
traditional socialism. It inherited the ideology and methods from the past, of which 
the elements included the institutional and personal closeness among the government 
and the enterprise trade unions as well as DLDZU, the complete and robust labour 
relations institutions with socialism featuring trade unionism playing an important 
role, and the prevalent sympathy for workers among authorities in both the union and 
the labour bureaux. The trade union officials had been accustomed to methods of 
paternalism that de facto relied on their administrative status and resources. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Interview, Mr C, vice president of Dalian Labour Bureau, 7th April 2011. 
408 Interview, Mr L, deputy director of labour relations department, Management Committee 
of DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
409 Interview, Mr M, president of DLDZ Federation of Trade Unions, 6th April 2011 
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continuing characteristics of socialist labour relations however were preserved and 
reconstituted in a context of the overall marketised labour relations as a result of the 
heavy investigations of the FIEs. The local administration has adopted a number of 
marketised institutions to cope with the inherent conflicts of capitalist labour relations. 
In wage negotiations, the workplace trade unions were the key actor. 
 
And the long history of workers’ protests in DLDZ has resulted in rich experience and 
maturing methods of the local authority’s handling in the resolution of strikes. The 
adoption of the tripartite mechanism in the 2010 strike waves was indicative of the 
shifted direction of the regional administration in an attempt to balance the interests of 
labour and capital. The tripartite institutions in 2010 left a certain degree of scope for 
the trade unions to intervene into the dispute resolutions. 
 
It therefore is to be expected that the dominant mechanism in the resolution of strikes 
in DLDZ was a sluggish institution characterised by administrative domination and 
paternalist trade unions. It also implies some changes, as a result of the diminished 
administrative approach which left more scope for the trade union to perform, to bring 
the union to the fore in the DLDZ 2010 strike waves. 
 
6.2 Tostem  
 
6.21 Background 
 
The Tostem Corporation, a residential and construction building materials producer, 
originated in Tokyo in 1923. In 2001, the plant of Tostem Housing Products (Dalian) 
Co. Ltd. was established in DLDZ, producing wooden interior furnishings, mainly 
exported to Japan.  
 
The workforce in Tostem can be roughly divided into IT staff with a bachelor’s 
degree, and operators. Of the front-line workers, 80% had a diploma of no more than 
the junior high school. In 2011 the number of employees was 2800, of whom 
operators were around 1800. Because of high physical demands, the majority of the 
operators were male workers, with an average age of 24 years. Agency workers 
occupied 29% of the front-line workers. Both dispatched workers and permanent 
workers had the same basic wage of around 1000 RMB. The difference between them 
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was performance-related pay, which accounted for 22% of the monthly income of 
permanent workers (about 220 RMB), while that of the agency workers was fixed 
with a cap of 80 RMB. There was no regular channel for expressing workers’ voice in 
Tostem. The main one was the General Manager’s (Suggestion) Boxes. Workers 
could also express their opinions to their supervisors.  
 
The trade union was set up after the founding of the company, and had been 
dominated by the more senior Chinese ever since.  
 
“The trade union and the Party branch were set up right after the establishment of the 
enterprise, and were initiated by the heads of department. Because at that time, we 
did not know who was who, those who had high posts among the Chinese became the 
members of the first union committee. And the union branches were set up in the same 
way, so that the presidents were heads of sections.”410  
 
The trade union presidency was a part-time job in Tostem until 2005, when the 
workplace union played an important role in the prevention of the strike.  
 
“After the first few strikes rose [in DLDZ], I immediately informed the general 
manager about the situation in other foreign-owned firms. Union branch presidents 
who were also section leaders closely monitored the potential strikers day and night. 
When the workers on strike in the company opposite attempted to provoke our 
workers at the gate of the factory, I made a prompt suggestion to the general manager 
that everyone’s basic wage will be raised by 100 Yuan. When one worker called on 
others to sign up for striking, I cornered him and talked to him individually.”411 
 
After the strike, as suggested by the district union, the president became a full-time 
union president with the company’s endorsement for the purpose of maintaining the 
factory’s stability. 
 
The committee members were senior Chinese managers, while for the union branches 
set up at the section level, the section leaders were nominated as the branch presidents. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011.  
411 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
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When the president took the office of the presidency, he had worked as a manager in 
several major divisions. This played an important role in his authority over the 
workplace union officials. 
 
“Most of them used to be my subordinates. If I asked them to come, they would run to 
me.”412 
 
The union structure resembled the company’s managerial hierarchy, and it gave the 
union some privileges, especially in carrying out its daily work. If the union members 
wished to have a meeting during their working time, the union doesn’t need to inform 
the production supervisors in advance. And these high-profile Chinese managers were 
the employee representatives in the wage negotiations. In the bargaining process, the 
two sides of the confrontation were not workers and employers, but Chinese and 
Japanese. The bargaining representatives were managers from the budget department, 
the human resource department, etc. This beneficial composition of the workplace 
union did not appear to enhance its bargaining leverage so far as outcomes were 
concerned. The annual wage increase rate was as low as 4%. In addition, there was a 
gap between the union and the rank-and-file. Nationalism and morality were used to 
motivate the Chinese managers in wage negotiations and in the distribution of the 
cake. 
 
“We wanted to get a bigger cake, but how to allocate it? We should obey the dictates 
of our consciences… we should not be selfish with it… I asked the managers, ‘aren’t 
you Chinese? If yes, you should speak for Chinese workers.”413 
 
Workers had free access to the trade union. The channels included internal and 
external landlines, and the collection of views from the union branches. But as the 
union president admitted, these mechanisms did not function well. The union 
occasionally organised manager-workers meetings, but before the strike, ordinary 
workers had no access to normal meetings.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
413 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
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In its daily work, the workplace trade union had taken the responsibility for a range of 
workers’ welfare programmes from education to culture, from travel to sports. Some 
of these activities were originally carried out by the company, and the union acquired 
legitimacy by helping the company to implement workers’ programmes. 
 
“Without doing these works, the union will have little rights and the factory will not 
listen to you. The more work you do, the more rights you will gain.”414 
 
These resources were at the same time used to show the power of the union to 
workers. In organising these activities, the president suggested that the company 
transfer the funds to the trade union, or let the union organize them. That made the 
workers think it was the union who was in charge of them. 
 
6.22 The Course of the Strike 
 
Before the strike, the union president warned the company. The president told the 
company managers, ‘your roof is on fire!’ But the company said they needed to think 
about it. 
 
On the morning of 19th July 2010, the strike in Tostem was staged. At first there were 
a few production lines where workers stood at their positions but refused to work. 
Abandoned lines spread, one by one. Within an hour, the whole of production in the 
factory halted. Then workers moved to the factory campus. 
 
“We all worked in a big factory workshop. Seeing others stopping, we stopped. 
Seeing others going out of the building, we went. People joined in the fun.”415 
 
The trade union then had several emergency meetings with the company, at which the 
latter finally agreed to raise the wage by 300 Yuan. This was announced by the trade 
union president to the workers. It was rejected by the strikers but workers reduced the 
demands from a 800 Yuan increase to 500 Yuan. The president himself went to the 
company dormitory to enquire about workers’ demands in the evening. The trade 
union delivered survey forms for workers to write down their opinions.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
415 Interview, Mr Y, worker in Tostem, DLDZ, 10th Apr 2011. 
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At the Japanese manager’s request, the union president called about 200 leaders and 
shift leaders to go to the canteen where they might directly negotiate with the 
Japanese general manager. In the negotiation meeting, the president summarised the 
demands from the survey, and encouraged the shift leaders to tell the manager about 
the workers’ requests. The Japanese manager did not give a reply in the meeting. In 
the evening, the workplace trade union bargained with the company on its own. When 
it achieved a 400 RMB increase with the company, the president was not satisfied 
with the result. He suggested the managers should add subsidies, including an 
allowance for hot weather. 
 
The slow response from the company had provoked workers’ anger. In the morning, 
before the release of the new offer, all workers, including the IT staff from another 
building, rushed out of the plant. Strikers shouted slogans such as ‘Japanese manager 
get out’ and ‘get out general manager’. On the campus the workplace union president 
tried to appease the workers on his own. 
 
At the same time, the general union president paid a visit to the company, which led 
to the ending of bargaining between the workplace union and the company. The 
district union president asked the company to raise their wage to 1400 Yuan, which 
was an increase of 380 Yuan and a smaller pay rise than the previous agreement 
between the workplace union and the company. Despite workers refusal of the later 
offer, the workplace union president had no choice but to resume the production,  
 
“President M of the district union came and asked the company to raise wages by 380 
Yuan. This helped the Japanese to save a lot of money. I was only aware of that after I 
went back from the factory campus. What could I say then? They (Japanese) told me, 
your government, and trade union told us to raise 380 Yuan.”416 
 
The next day, the workplace union president went to the campus where workers 
gathered. He promised that working conditions would be improved. He also 
threatened to punish those who insisted on striking, and warned the leaders to get their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
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men to back to work. The president stood at the factory campus all day long to catch 
those who went out of the factory. In fear of his inability to control the situation, he 
phoned the district union president for assistance. The latter delivered five police cars, 
which stopped near the plant.  
 
“Taking the risk of losing my job as a union president, I warned the line chiefs to 
order their men to go back to work, and I swore to them that I will (ask the manager 
to) fire those who did not enter into the workshop. They were unusual measures, and I 
had to take all the responsibility.”417 
 
The IT department was first to restore production. They were requested by the 
department leaders to wait for notification to resume work; later they were told by the 
leaders that other departments had gone back to work. Following the IT department, 
the workshops resumed work under close monitoring by the managers. The whole of 
production was restarted within a few hours on the Thursday morning. 
 
The end of the Tostem strike coincided with a new strike wave in major Japanese 
companies in DLDZ, including Toshiba, Nidec, Mabuchi Motor, Toto, and Seiko. 
 
6.23 Activities of the Actors 
 
Workers 
 
From the early summer, nationwide protests in enterprises provided further 
encouragement for the incubation of the Tostem strike. In DLDZ workers had had 
close networks since the late spring of 2010. Occasional strikes had occurred from 
time to time. News about strikes in other factories, rapidly disseminated via phone or 
mobile texts through these networks, encouraged them to take action. They were 
called by others by phone about the strike situation on others’ side. Workers also 
checked the strikes on the Internet. The strike was a hot topic in spare time at that 
time. Workers were encouraged by the success of the strikes in these companies and 
by the overall favourable environment at that time. ‘A dozen factories had strikes 
from June. When there was a strike, the wage increased.’ ‘The government is on our 
side. Wenjiabao (the prime minister) said wages should rise.’ ‘The police said they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
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will “not encourage, not advocate, and not object”. This [strike] was a normal method 
to fight for our interests and rights, which was not a harmful activity.’ 
 
The workers were aware of their bargaining power. They believed the company could 
not find 2,000 people to supplant them. Even it could, the new workers could not do 
what they do. The protests took a rather peaceful form. They did not go onto the street, 
because ‘it will be different if we go out of the factory.’  
 
Strikers’ demands targeted the wage, welfare, and better working conditions. These 
demands were pitched in a less strategic way. 
 
“We said we wanted a 500 Yuan increase, or a 800 Yuan increase. It was bargaining. 
If we asked for 800, even if the company wanted to give us a half; we still got a 400 
increase.”418  
 
Workers focused on economic issues, while appearing to be less enthusiastic with 
regard to their involvement in the decision making process, in their demands, and in 
their attitude to the dispute resolution process. On the one hand, except for a few 
cases where workers demanded a fair wage increase mechanism that favoured the 
front-line workers, in Tostem and in the majority of the companies, this was not 
raised specifically by workers. And there was not an appeal for union restructuring. 
On the other hand, they appeared to be more reliant on the formal institutions to 
resolve the disputes. They avoided a head-on collision with the managers, and 
scattered and ran away when the union president walked towards them, while they 
reported their demands to the shift leaders and the section leaders who were asked by 
the trade union to inquire into workers’ opinions. 
 
“We told our demands to them. They are our cadres, who shall take sides with us. 
They did not ask our names.”419 
 
Government 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 Interview, Mr Y, worker in Tostem, DLDZ, 10th April 2011.  
419 Interview, Mr L, worker in Tostem, DLDZ, 10th April 2011. 
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The government stood aside in the strikes; its main task was to restrict workers’ 
extreme behavior and thereby maintain social order. The government had a close 
relationship with the trade union. And there was indeed a blurred boundary between 
the government and the regional trade union.  
 
The government standing aside in the strikes shifted pressures not only to the 
company but also to the workplace trade union. The workplace trade unions were not 
used to the situation and expected government intervention. 
 
“[In the 2010 strike] the government did not attempt to control the strike, or it was 
unable to control it. At the end the situation was out of control.”420 
 
Management 
 
The management in Tostem, and in Japanese companies in general, was highly 
centralized. Lower level managers and the Chinese managers had no rights in the 
wage determination procedure to make decisions.421 This may partially explain its 
slow response to the trade union’s warning before the strike. After the strike, the 
company negotiated with the workplace trade union and made concessions. When the 
district union president gave its opinion on the wage increase, the company accepted, 
not only because it was a lower rise, but also because of the government background 
of the district trade union. 
 
Trade unions 
 
Not used to the government’s withdrawal, however, the workplace trade union 
president was the main mediator between the manager and the workers in the strike 
partially owing to the local trade union’s tradition in adjusting labour relations. The 
main non-adversarial method was the high-profile Chinese managers’ presence in the 
company’s general wage negotiations. Other methods employed by the trade union 
included cooperation with and assistance to the company. The union president’s 
personal reputation and competence was the key to rendering these methods effective. 
In the strike, backed up by the threatening leverage of the strike, the president had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 Interview, Mr G, president of workplace trade union, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011. 
421 Interview, Mr Y, head of the Human Resources Department and of the General Matters 
Department, Tostem, DLDZ, 8th April 2011.  
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achieved substantial compromise in the negotiations with the company. As can be 
seen, the president had not only the capability but also the willingness to gain more 
benefit for the workers. With the mandate given by the Party-government, the 
president of DLDZU acted as a government representative, whose intervention shall 
be largely seen as a substitute for the government.  
 
6.24 Summary 
 
The withdrawal of the local government’s administrative intervention during the 
strike compelled the enterprises to bargain with the workplace trade unions. The 
workplace union took the main responsibility in resolving the strike, drawing on its 
tradition of adjusting the workplace labour relations. This tradition was a top-down 
approach whereby the leverage of the trade union in Tostem came from personal 
involvement as well as the administrative resources from the above. The role of the 
district union can be seen as acting as a representative of the government.  
 
Workers were mobilised effectively, which was the main impetus for the company to 
make much more concessions than in previous wage negotiations. But comparing 
with their counterparts in the South, they were more reliant on the authorities to 
resolve the dispute. It will be seen that this strategy, rather simply being less 
threatening to the authorities, was an indication of the less marketised labour relations 
in DLDZ, and the ensuing trade union underwent far less radical reforms by 
comparison with the Southern cases.  
 
6.3 Nidec 
 
6.31 Background 
 
Nidec (Dalian) Limited was established in 1992, a Japanese owned manufacturer 
producing DC motors for PC peripheral devices, fans, and components for precision 
motors. The workforce in Nidec used to be more than 10,000; in 2010 it was 7400, of 
which some 6000 were front-line workers.  
 
Workers’ statutory rights were reported to be severely violated. The use of overtime 
work exceeded its legal limit, rest periods had been reduced, and working hours were 
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miscalculated to the employees’ disadvantage. It made excessive use of dispatched 
workers. In 2005, workers in Nidec had staged a sympathy strike, supporting the 
strikes in Toshiba (Dalian) and Canon. Because of the strike, some infringements of 
employment rights were alleviated, and wage negotiations achieved some 
improvements. 
 
The Nidec union president had been the manager in the production department for 
four years before he was appointed as the full-time union president by the company 
and the local trade union in 2000, and got approved by the workers’ congress. At the 
time, he was also a member of the Party committee in the company. 
 
“My taking the office of union president was a result of the deadlock between the 
company and the upper trade union. When the previous president left, the company 
recommended a manager as the union presidential candidate. But the general trade 
union wanted to send its own man to be the candidate. Then the general union picked 
me up from the Party committee in the company.”422 
 
Under the union standing committee, there were 28 union committee members, in 
charge of collecting grievances and requests from the workshops or offices. There 
were 26 union branches; each contained a number of union cell groups based on a 
single production group or an administrative group. Each union cell group consisted 
of 30 to 40 workers. According to the workers, the contacts between the union 
president and the workers were few. 423 
 
In the wage negotiation of April 2010, the Nidec union conducted a survey by 
interviews and anonymous questionnaires, with a sampling group of 300 workers. It 
inquired about workers’ aspirations based on their knowledge about factors relevant 
to wage increases. The survey has encouraged workers to have a deeper 
understanding about the bargaining, but also served as a ‘force from the below’ to 
boost the union’s bargaining leverage in the negotiations.424 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 Interview, Mr Z, president of workplace trade union, Nidec, DLDZ, 9th April 2011. 
423 Interview, Ms R, squad leader and workers’ representative in 2011 wage negotiation, 
Nidec, DLDZ, 17th August 2011.  
424 Interview, Mr Z, president of workplace trade union, Nidec, DLDZ, 9th April 2011. 
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In this wage negotiation, the basic wage in Nidec rose to 1000 Yuan – a 16% increase 
of the basic wage. The result of the negotiations was not forwarded for confirmation 
to the workers’ congress. According to the survey, worker satisfaction about the wage 
increase of 16% reached 70%. The basic income of front-line workers was 1000 Yuan 
after the regular wage negotiation in April. Staff workers’ wages were on 2200 Yuan, 
120% higher than front-line workers. 
 
6.32 The Course of the Strike 
 
At the start of the 2010 strike wave, Nidec offered a wage rise of 130 Yuan to prevent 
the strike. Despite this, it still experienced a strike ten days later. On 22nd July, after 
lunch, in one of the workshops making semi-manufactured motors, a worker turned 
off the lights of the production site. It was a sign for others to launch the strike. At the 
time, there were some 3000 to 4000 front line workers. With the information 
spreading by text messages among different workshops, front-line workers stopped at 
one production line after another. Though leaders at the shift and higher levels, and 
the staff, did not participate the strike, they later relinquished their work as well. In a 
few hours, the whole production system came to a halt. 
 
When the strike occurred, the union president went to the production line that had first 
stopped work. He said to them, ‘I know your demands. The union will respond to you 
tomorrow, can you work now? If you are not satisfied with my response, you can 
strike tomorrow.’ 
 
“I attempted to stabilise the situation, if the production could be sustained at that time, 
the subsequent lines would not know about the strike.”425  
 
This however, did not have any effect. Workers either stayed on the production line, 
or went back to their dormitory. The president and the union collected workers’ 
demands written as notes. Workers presented a range of demands in the notes. The 
union president instead proposed a different plan of a pay rise of 200 Yuan.  
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“Inquiring about workers’ demands was a formality. I did not read them. They called 
for 800 Yuan, or 1000 Yuan – they talked nonsense. The increase shall be 200 Yuan, 
in accordance with the wage increase gap between Nidec and the companies 
nearby.”426 
 
The union president negotiated with the company on his own. After achieving the 
agreement of a 200 Yuan rise with the company, the trade union made joint efforts 
with the company to resume production. Decisions on the pay rise as well as notice of 
the dismissal of those who insisted on continuing striking were announced on the 
notice board. Shift leaders were on 24-hour stand-by to make calls to workers for 
resuming production. Leaders went to workers’ dormitories to tell them about the 
decisions. The production was revived in half a day. 
 
6.33 Activities of the Actors  
 
Workers 
 
In 2005, Nidec had experienced a major strike involving around 9000 workers, which 
provoked a month of strikes in DLDZ involving seventeen Japanese enterprises and 
one Korean enterprise. The 2005 strike was not the first one, Nidec had experienced 
its first strike in 1998.  
 
In DLDZ workers shared a common demand for a wage increase of 800 Yuan and the 
improvement of their welfare conditions. These in Nidec also asked for  a regular 
wage increase procedure, so that the front-line workers could benefit from wage 
adjustments. Restructuring of the trade union was not a formal demand in Nidec, nor 
in other cases in DLDZ. 
 
The form of the protests was by and large peaceful. Strikers did not go out in the 
street, which had occurred in Nidec’s 2005 strike. They clocked in and out, and had 
their meals at the canteens as usual. Workers simply abandoned their work by 
standing at their positions and doing nothing. Some went back to their dormitory. 
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Information about the progress of the strikes and the concessions being offered in 
Nidec and in other companies spread rapidly via text messages and the Internet.  
 
Government 
 
As the president in Tostem, Nidec president appeared to be unable to cope with the 
government’s silence. 
 
“At the early stage of the strike, I suggested that the superior authority should 
implement a guideline to restrict the workers. But they did not have a clear attitude 
until the strike spread to 50, or 60 enterprises. Then they pronounced that ‘workers 
should not use strikes to enforce wage increases.’”427 
 
He saw the changed strategy of the government as ‘irresponsible’.  
 
“In 2005, the strike spreading was controlled by the governments’ command to 
management to raise wages by 200 Yuan in each company. However, this time the 
government did not learn from the 2005 strike, and no one was responsible for 
addressing the disputes.”428  
 
Management 
 
Nidec was renowned for its harsh labour management in DLDZ. In the strike, the 
company had negotiated with the workplace trade union. It agreed with the latter’s 
proposal of a 200 Yuan increase. The partial reason may be that the importance of the 
agreement, apart from the district union’s intervention as an alternative to that of the 
government, was the great significance of maintaining parity of wage increases with 
other firms in the area. 
 
Trade unions  
 
The union president had attempted to employ the grass-roots force in his negotiations 
with the company, with a sense of responsibility to educate workers by improving 
their legal awareness. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Interview, Mr Z, president of workplace trade union, Nidec, DLDZ, 17th August 2011. 
428 Interview, Mr Z, president of workplace trade union, Nidec, DLDZ, 17th August 2011. 
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“I had hoped workers would strike at that time in 2005, as workers can only acquire 
their power through strikes. A strike can strengthen their labour awareness. Every 
two years, we produced a ‘Special Issue of Workers’ Legal Education’ to encourage 
their awareness. The trade union was powerless without the workers taking strike 
action. The union’s representation role does not matter, workers’ collective power 
matters.”429 
 
Ironically, he viewed the strike as the ‘awakening of workers’ awareness’; while in 
2010 he viewed the strike as ‘anarchy’ (wufawutian).430 The union had adopted quite 
distinct strategies in dealing with the strikes in 2005 and in 2010. In 2005, the strike 
lasted four days. There were full discussions between the workers, the trade union, 
and the management at that time. The president considered the cause of that strike as 
‘cruel and degrading working conditions’. By contrast, the president had seen the 
resolution in the 2010 strike as a case of crisis management, which ‘wanted a prompt 
resolution.’ In the 2010 strike, the president directly negotiated with the company 
without taking into account workers’ demands. Different strategies adopted by the 
Nidec union in 2005 and 2010 showed the change in preference between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches, when the president’s choices are susceptible to external 
factors. Though the DLDZU did not get involved in the strike in Nidec, the 200 Yuan 
increase in the strike proposed by the workplace trade union was based on the 
DLDZU’s decision.  
 
6.34 Summary 
 
The denial of government intervention led to the union’s dominant role in the strike. 
The position of the unions in Nidec and Tostem were by and large about the same. 
They were aware of their responsibility for resolving the strike. And they were 
competent in doing so. They were both reliant on administrative co-operation with 
both the management and the district trade union. The Nidec union president showed 
his relatively high competence in controlling the situation, not only through the union 
activities characterised by democratisation during the peaceful time, but also in his 
prompt resolution of the strike by adopting an authoritative approach. This showed 	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that, at the crucial point when the conflict between the workers and the management 
was sharpening, the Nidec president had prioritised the union function of maintaining 
industrial peace, by virtue of a ‘top-down’ action without workers’ participation. 
 
6.4 TDK 
 
6.41 Background 
 
The TDK Dalian Corporation was established in 1992 as a manufacturing plant 
subsidiary of Japan TDK Electronics Company. It manufactured coils, isolators, etc. 
The workforce decreased from 4200 in 2005 to around 3000 in 2011. The average age 
of the workforce in 2011 was 22.7, and 87% were female workers.  
 
The previous union president was the senior manager of the production department. In 
2000, when the workforce reached 820, according to the local regulation regarding 
the union in a company with a workforce above 500, it should have had a full time 
presidency. But the formal president refused to comply with this suggestion from the 
DLDZU because ‘there was little room for a union president to get promoted.’ As his 
successor, the DLDZU nominated Ms W to be the candidate as the TDK workplace 
union president. At the time she worked as a senior engineer in a government 
background construction company, with the part-time positions of the company’s 
union president and party secretary. Ms W was interviewed by the general manager, 
who ‘was satisfied and let her go to work immediately’. Ms W’s presidency was then 
pending to be approved by the workers’ congress. The formal union president 
released her resume to the public. She had a two-month internship in Tostem, getting 
used to contact with the workers. Her probation period as president was approved in 
the workers’ congress. 
 
“I was afraid to be not approved. If more than half of representatives did not vote for 
me, what could I do since I’d resigned from my formal company? When, in the 
workers’ congress, I got 100 votes from 111 workers’ representatives, I was 
extremely happy. I had no option but that I must do this work well. “431 
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6.42 Integrated Union-party Approach 
 
The structure 
 
The distinctive characteristic of the TDK union was its dual structure with co-
existence of the party and the union. There was a matching configuration of their 
structures, the arrangement of overlapping personnel, and co-working of the party and 
the union. The party in TDK had been established in 1994, yet the work of the party 
committee was not fully implemented. In 2000, when Ms W took the office of both 
union president and secretary of the party branch committee, there were only 11 party 
members in TDK. Ms W actively engaged in recruitment of Party members and the 
expansion of the Party. In 2003, Ms W was appointed as ‘the supervisor of Party 
building’ by the Party and Trade Union Committee of DLDZ, who had the authority 
to recruit party members across enterprises. By 2011, she had established two general 
party branches, six party branches at the company level, of which three were in TDK. 
The number of party members she enrolled amounted to one hundred and fifty-three. 
Half of them were TDK members – the rest were members in forty-three private 
enterprises in DLDZ. 
 
In most of the enterprises in DLDZ, the positions of Party secretary and union 
president were both embodied in the union president, appointed by the superior Party 
committee. Yet this particular approach of ‘integrated union-party’ was not evident in 
the cases of Nidec and Tostem, despite the fact that both union presidents were also 
the secretary of the party committee in the companies. The Nidec union president 
stated that, ‘the party committee meant nothing, only nominally it leads the union.’ In 
Tostem, where four party cell groups existed, the union president had not shown his 
commitment to the important role of the party committee in leading the union. The 
role of the party organisation in Tostem was minor. The party meeting was covert, 
which can only be held in spare time; while the trade union meeting can be held in 
working time. 
 
It was the common-place among the three cases that the grass-roots party 
organisations had low party membership among ordinary workers. In Nidec, the trade 
union membership was 100% while the party members numbered around 90, but only 
1% of the frontline workers were party members. And in Tostem, only two frontline 
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workers and one IT staff were party members. Similarly, in TDK 60% of the 
managers were party members, not frontline workers. 
 
The TDK union was structured in four layers, which were, in order, the union 
president, the union committee, the union branch and the union cell group. Ms W 
adopted the approach that ‘the Party leads the union’, which was a party-union 
integrated approach. In a similar structure with the trade union, the party organisation 
was divided into four layers. In order, they were the party secretary, the party 
committee, the party branch and the party cell group. There were eighty party 
members in TDK. Members of the party committee and union committee were 
interchangeable in a cross-exchanging of their positions. It benefited the union 
internal management. 
 
“In my first time of leading the union committee meeting, someone said ‘president, 
since you are the party member, you shall do the work and we will have no time to do 
union work.’ Then I realised (it was because) none of the committee members were 
party members. Now except two, the entire union committee members were party 
members. Will not the union work be easier to carry out?”432 
 
Union relations with management and workers 
 
The union kept a distance in the union-company relations. This was illustrated not 
only by its physical assets in the company – a large office, a union sponsored 
supermarket, an anteroom and a union-company shared activity room – but also by 
the union’s attitude in front of the company.  
 
“You should get the Japanese accustomed to the Party and the trade union, to ensure 
they pay attention to the union. We will get across the policy of the Party and 
government to the Japanese managers in the beginning of their terms of office. The 
general manager told me ‘I’ve never been in a formal wage negotiation in China.’ I 
replied ‘the wage negotiation in here has been formal for a long time, I hope you will 
get used to it’. This year, the vice general manager attended the meeting at the 
provincial level regarding the construction of harmonious labour relations. After that, 	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the provincial newspaper and television agencies came to interview us. To cooperate 
with the media, we invited the manager to attend a seminar on wage negotiation.”433 
 
The union-party approach provided top-down communication channels whereby rank-
and-file workers were seldom involved in the governance of the institution. The 
imbalance of the union-workers relations was based on, rather than a ‘legal duty’, but 
a ‘moral duty’, as was conceived by the union president, 
 
“The union should always sit with the workers, because they are a disadvantaged 
group.”434 
 
Rank-and-file workers were seldom involved in union governance, neither in union 
elections nor in its functioning. In wage negotiations, union committee members 
normally took the duty of the bargaining representatives. Some of the union 
committee members were department heads. In collecting workers’ demands, the 
trade union officers brought questionnaires to the workshops where workers could 
write down their opinions. The questionnaires were distributed at random. Workers 
did not participate in the nomination of union candidates, not even at the lowest level. 
 
“I did not know about the nomination of our union cell group leader. And I did not 
know how the union candidates were elected. We voted for several people who had 
been selected. Maybe some of them recommended themselves. If everyone was a 
candidate, things would be a mess.”435 
 
Union functions  
 
The Party organisations in DLDZ mainly engaged in activity such as ‘ideological 
work’, ‘honouring worker models’, or ‘working as the workers’ guardian’ to unite 
workers. Some union functions were merged with Party activities. Programmes such 
as welfare distribution, training, entertainment, were implemented in the joint names 
of the Party committee and the union committee. The union’s communication with 
workers was also carried out through a top-down approach that all the party members 	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should ‘actively engage in workers’ thinking by chatting with workers at every 
chance’. 
 
Given the local union customs and practice, the union had rights to veto on some 
aspects pertinent to workers’ issues such as dismissal, working hours, the reward 
system, and the penalties committee. In 2005, the enterprise released a notice of 
temporary layoff of any pregnant workers, which offended relevant laws. The trade 
union robustly argued against the company until they cancelled the notice. The union 
had also carried out a wide range of welfare distribution to workers and their 
households who were in difficulties. 
 
Besides its protection role, the ‘integrated union-party’ approach contributed to 
boosting productivity and saving labour cost by motivating workers. It engaged 
actively in implementing suggestions for rationalization. During the 2009 financial 
crisis, the union and the party committee made collaborative efforts in mobilising 
workers for flexible attendance, energy saving, productivity increase, and technical 
improvements. The economic recovery brought about a 20% increase in the 
production requirement in one production department. The trade union held meetings 
to mobilise workers in boosting productivity. Around 2000 workers worked overtime 
voluntarily and finished the production requirement on time. In March of 2011, 
affected by the earthquake and the tsunami in Japan, production in a major workshop 
of TDK halted. About 150 employees were laid off. They were given the option to 
either leave with compensation or take a move within the internal posts. For the 
former, the company would pay a considerable amount of compensation. The trade 
union then organised the union and the party members to persuade these workers to 
move their posts rather than leave the company. As a result, nearly half of the 
employees agreed to stay at the company. 
 
In wage negotiations, as well as the normal ways of collecting information as a basis 
for bargaining (such as company profits, workers’ demands, overall situation of the 
wage increases in DLDZ, and the eco-social data), the president had her own strategy 
to win a better result in the bargaining. She campaigned for all kinds of prizes for the 
company, ranging from local to provincial. The different viewpoints adopted by the 
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five Japanese managers who had taken office during the president’s tenure had 
resulted in great uncertainty about the effects of this approach on the negotiations. 
 
Sometimes, it did not work. 
 
“In one wage negotiation, I was given an award as ‘The Headline Champion of 
Economic and Social Development’ by the provincial party committee. I asked the 
committee to give my own reward to the manager to make him happy. And I helped 
the manager to finish the complex process of the negotiation. But in that wage 
negotiation, the pay rise was not increased. I felt disappointed. The company should 
have increased the pay rise by – at least – a small amount.” 436 
 
Whilst sometimes the response was positive. 
 
Last year, the president successfully helped the company to get the award of the 
‘model work unit’ (mofan danwei), which, in Dalian city, only four enterprises were 
awarded. The president and the head of the Personnel Department accompanied the 
manager to the award ceremony conference. On the way back the president said to the 
manager: 
 
You are great! 
Why? 
You are the first among the four managers who got the reward. It was a great reward, 
an honor of the company, which should be shared by the workers. How to share it? 
You should raise the workers’ pay. 
So I should raise your wage? 
I do not care, I am going to retire.  
 
The manager then spoke to the Personnel Department manager to propose a pay rise 
plan. In that wage negotiation, the wage was raised by 9.6%. 
 
6.43 The Prevention of the Strike 
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The trade union had played a significant role in resolving collective disputes. In 2009, 
after the financial crisis, the company planned a massive redundancy to cut costs. 
After the union had engaged in negotiation, an internal transfer replaced the previous 
decision to permanently end the employment of 300 workers, who had been working 
in TDK for many years. 
 
In 2010, after the occurrence of the strike wave in DLDZ, the union twice proposed a 
pay rise. The first negotiation took place during the early stage of the strike wave, 
when the company and the union came to agreement on a 200 Yuan pay rise, 100 
Yuan less than the union’s original proposal. In a couple of weeks, an increasing 
number of companies had suffered from strikes.  
 
The union systematically sought the opinions of workers. At the same time, it 
persuaded workers to abandon unrealistic expectations of the wage increase.  
 
“In the union’s inquiry into workers’ demands, they asked for an increase of 300 
Yuan, the union said ‘it is too high, the company recently had a bad economic 
performance. You should reconsider it.’ By doing so, workers agreed to decrease 
their demands.”437 
 
The president for the second time put forward their demand, including a revision of 
the newly released piecework plan and another pay rise of 300 Yuan.  
 
“I said to the manager, ‘if you did not agree to offer another 300 Yuan, it is not the 
union’s fault if workers strike.’ ‘How do you ensure that workers will not strike if pay 
rises?’ ‘If you raise the pay by 300 Yuan, I will resign if workers strike.’ ‘Do you 
mean that, if workers strike, I will have to resign as well?’ ‘Yes, both of us.’” 438 
 
The company accepted the union’s proposal. Then the union immediately informed 
the workers. Members in the four-layer mechanism of the party/union integration 
went to talk to the workers, thereby ensuring a full coverage of the party/union 
structure in transmitting information to workers. In terms of the demands for which 	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the union had not reached agreement with the company, it announced its scheme to 
resolve the dispute. In addition, workers were told ‘horrible stories’ about the 
consequence for strike leaders in previous cases. 
 
“At that time, when they saw me, they ran away. I was trying to reach them. Later 
they would like to talk with me about their difficulties and demands. I told them that I 
understood them. But I would not suggest that they go on strike. Take the bad example 
of the 1994 strike in Mabuchi Motor for example. Though the wage rose by 45% in 
1994, workers were investigated by the company after the strike as to ‘who led the 
strike’, ‘who participated’. And at the termination of their employment contracts, the 
company refused to extend the contract – which was legal. Then I told them, you can 
trust me, trust the union. We will do our utmost to strive for you.” 439 
 
Ms W retired in 2013. During her thirteen years tenure of union president in TDK, the 
company succeeded in avoiding strikes during major strike waves in the DLDZ.  
 
6.44 Summary 
 
TDK adopted a union-oriented pattern of union-party integration in FIEs. This 
approach appeared to benefit the union’s internal governance. It showed its sympathy 
for the workers, while its adverse effect on the company was limited. Faced with the 
prospect of a strike, it was successful in curbing its occurrence, thus demonstrating 
that this structure was notable in its ability to control workers, by sensitively 
monitoring their potential actions. 
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Chapter Seven – Discussion and Conclusion 
 
7.1 Discussion of Case Studies 
 
7.11 Three Types of Trade Union role in Strikes  
 
The six cases provide evidence of the concessions made by managers to the workers 
in response to workplace conflict. They describe various degrees of union 
involvement in contributing to the dispute resolution. In all of the three cases in 
DLDZ, the trade unions played dominant roles, being actively involved in the dispute 
resolution; while in the South, the unions’ participation appeared to be more diverse. 
The role of the trade unions in strike resolution can be categorized into three types.  
 
The trade unions in Nidec, Tostem and TDK in the DLDZ all negotiated with the 
company with only limited government involvement. They successfully achieved a 
resumption of production by having both sides make concessions. In the case of TDK, 
there was a complete avoidance of any strike. When it comes to the South, in the case 
of Honda Nanhai, workers themselves negotiated with the management without any 
actual involvement of either the trade union or the government. In stark contrast, in 
Honda Lock the government dominated the whole process, thereby constraining the 
behaviour of not only the workers and the trade union, but also of the company. In 
Denso, the approach was dominated jointly by both the trade union and the workers, 
and took the form of the institutionalisation of the workers’ autonomy through the 
official trade union organisation.  
 
The six cases can be seen as three types of dispute resolution, if we distinguish the 
extent to which the trade unions’ contributions caused the employers to make 
concessions to workers. They are listed below. 
 
Type 1. The Denso case and the three cases in DLDZ had similarities with the ‘union 
centered approach’, where the approach was controlled either by both the government 
and the trade union (e.g., cases of Tostem and Nidec) or the union alone (e.g., cases of 
Denso and TDK). This pattern had some characteristics of a ‘corporatist’ arrangement 
of dispute resolution regarding the conspicuous dualist functions performed by the 
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trade unions. Under the supervision of the party-government, the trade union played 
the key role of a mediator to help, encourage or urge both sides to make compromises 
and reach agreement. The party-government did not impose any direct instruction and 
intervention on the workers and managers in the dispute resolution process. In the 
case of Tostem, the government only intervened at crucial phases such as in 
prolonged strikes. The workers and the management, unavoidably linked with each 
other in the strike, came to agreement based on the trade union’s mediation. (See 
Figure 6) 
 
Figure 6.  Type 1 
 
I.e. DLDZ and Denso. 
 
Type 2. The second pattern can be described as a ‘unitary’ resolution, exemplified by 
the case of Honda Lock. The party-government dominated the resolution and left 
limited scope for both sides. In this case, despite being an integral part of the 
institutional arrangement of dispute resolution, the trade union did not play an 
independent role. The government, by virtue of its resources and authority in politics 
and administration, dominated in guiding the company and workers in achieving 
resolution of the dispute. The workers and the managers, necessarily linked, relied on 
government intervention to resolve the dispute. (See Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7.  Type 2 
 
I.e. Honda Lock. 
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Type 3. The last category is ‘pluralist’ resolution,440 the well-known Honda Nanhai 
case represented this type. The trade union, though institutionally linked with the 
other three actors, did not play any visible role. The party-government did not impose 
any direct instruction and intervention on the workers and the managers, but acted as 
a mediator to promote the resolution of the dispute. The dominant role was played by 
the workers and managers. (See Figure 8) 
 
Figure 8.  Type 3 
 
I.e. Honda Nanhai. 
 
The weakness of trade union arrangements lies in the lack of connections with the 
grass-roots workers. It was essential to ‘reconnect’ workers, thereby gaining workers’ 
compliance in the dispute resolution process. In resolving spontaneous strikes, the 
workplace trade unions, by virtue of their daily contacts with workers, benefited in 
building up an easy and smooth channel of communication with workers. 
 
In both cases of Type 2 and Type 3, the trade union lacked sufficient credibility 
among the workers. This was partially attributed to the union president’s close 
relations with the company and also to the fact that the union’s internal institutions 
had been out of touch with grass-roots members. In the absence of a ‘usable’ 
workplace trade union, effective communication between workers and the employer 
cannot be implemented. In the approach of type 1, the trade unions successfully 
channeled workers to union-led bargaining with employers. The workplace unions, 
backed up by the higher level of the trade unions, had acted as the bed-rock of 
contacting workers in the dispute resolution procedure.  
 
A closer examination of the cases within the first category revealed the different 
significance of the organisation at different levels within the union structure. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Pluralism has the connotation of laissez-faire pluralism, with emphasis on its full freedom 
for any interest group to press its interests and try to persuade others. 
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cases of Nidec, Tostem and TDK exemplified the dominant and effective role of 
strong grass-roots trade unions in resolving the disputes. Associated with the highly 
centralised union structure within the company, their approach had been characterised 
by ‘top-down measures’, in that the presidents employed their personnel influence to 
gain workers’ compliance. This method appeared to be effective in getting the 
workers to succumb to the union commands in these cases. The district union adopted 
a more dominant approach, which set up the range of the wage increase for the 
companies. This, on the one hand, constrained the workplace trade unions; on the 
other, it provided the workplace organisations with the administrative resources when 
necessary. The overall appearance of the DLDZ cases was characterised by a union 
dominant approach. This was attributed to the local tradition of socialist ‘paternalist’ 
labour relations. The district trade union had a strong government background. 
Meanwhile the workplace union presidents’ identity as full-time union presidents 
helped them to keep at an arm’s length from the managers. They also had the 
experience and legitimacy necessary for effectively dealing with the managers. A 
sense of sympathy with the workers was prevalent among the trade union officials at 
local level. 
 
The achievement of these successful solutions in the DLDZ cases nevertheless 
displays differences from their counterpart in Denso within the same category. The 
Denso unions adopted a different, bottom-up approach in resolving the strike. In this 
process, the union at the district level played a significant role in deciding the 
approach and supervising the workplace union to implement it. The district union 
president assisted the workplace trade union officials to fully engage in ascertaining 
the workers’ demands in order to gain the workers’ approval to carry out collective 
bargaining. The resources from the superior trade union were the main supports for 
the district union to insist on a bottom-up approach, and these resources arose from 
the city trade union president’s dominant administrative and political status over the 
district authority.  
 
In this approach, the Denso workplace union played an effective role in reaching 
workers, and two main factors may contribute to this achievement. Firstly, although 
the union president was a high-profile manager, it may be presumed that the 
president’s managerial position as a production department head to some extent 
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extenuated the workers’ hostility. It appeared that managers from the personnel 
department or the general affairs department, who were in direct charge of workers’ 
personnel and welfare management, were more commonly in a starkly opposed 
position towards the rank-and-file, and that caused workers to have more ‘feudal’ 
feelings of lack of trust. Secondly, in strikes, where there are serious political risks, 
the higher level organisations can provide the necessary guidance, resources, and even 
the political shelter that is essential for workplace trade unions to perform their 
representative duty. In Denso, when the district union had determined a bottom-up 
strategy in strike resolution, the workplace trade union implemented this strategy in 
an environment assured by the district union that precluded the external influence 
from the party-government pressures. In this sense, it is the rational choice of the 
workplace trade union to follow those who can protect them politically. 
 
The district union possesses adequate political resources and authority in pursuit of 
resistance from the management, the district government and relevant government 
bureaus. In addition, the resources from the superior trade union were the main 
supports for the district union to insist on the bottom-up approach, and these resources 
were arising from the city trade union president’s administrative and political status 
over the district authority. The trade union officials led both the district and city trade 
union with exceptionally prominent enlightenment in their conceptions and preference 
in adopting the bottom-up approach. 
 
7.12 Effects of the Strike in the Six Cases 
 
General welfare and communication channels improvement 
 
The average rise of the basic wage in the cases in response to the strikes was 30%-
35%. Compared with the average increase of less than 10% in previous years, the 
strikes were successful in rendering managers willing to make significant concessions. 
In 2011, the average wage rises in Denso and in Honda were both around 30%. In 
DLDZ, an average level of 15% was considered, which was higher than previous 
wage increases, but lower than those achieved in the strike. Welfare and working 
conditions were improved to different degrees in responding to workers’ demands in 
strikes. There were also general improvements in the communication channels in all 
cases, such as the monthly workers-manager meetings (‘Kentan’) which are organised 
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by the trade union, the union branches with workers, and improved feedback 
mechanisms.  
 
Collective bargaining improvement 
 
In all six, the yearly wage negotiation was re-scheduled to a fixed time. In the cases of 
Honda Nanhai and the three in the corporatist model, workers’ representatives were 
allowed to take part in union decision-making in the wage negotiation. In Honda 
Nanhai, union proposals in wage negotiation were drawn up that was based on a 
comprehensive survey of workers’ opinions. The final agreement was also approved 
by the workers’ congress. In addition, thirty workers’ representatives as observers 
attended the wage negotiation in 2011. In Denso, the union cell group leaders took 
part in the following year’s 2011 wage negotiation throughout the whole process. In 
Nidec, the workers’ congress was involved in the discussion of the draft proposal, and 
in the approval of the final agreement. In addition, four representatives of both 
workers and staff who were nominated by the workplace union president, for the first 
time, and directly participated as bargaining representatives, along with the president, 
in the wage negotiation. In Tostem, though he discussed the draft proposal with the 
workers’ congress, the union president did not thoroughly follow the procedure. In the 
interview, the president of TDK did not talk about the procedure followed. The 
unitary case of Honda Lock witnessed virtually no workers’ participation in wage 
negotiation. 
 
An interesting comparison is that the union functions, such as organising amusement 
activities, were enhanced in Honda Lock where they were previously inadequate; 
while in Denso these activities were reduced because  ‘they cost “energy and money”’. 
In other cases, no substantial changes in these functions were observed.  
 
Union re-election 
 
Union democracy was a part of the union re-structuring scheme after the strikes in 
both pluralist and unitary models. All cases in the South had union re-election as one 
of the demands in the 2010 strike while those in the North did not. In the four cases 
within the corporatist category, workplace unions all survived without union re-
organisation.  
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Despite the tight monitoring from the high-profile trade union at the provincial 
level,441 Honda Nanhai underwent a thorough transformation of the union structure, 
including the re-organisation of the union cell groups and union branches. Elections 
ranged from cell groups up to the top workplace committee. 63 leaders of union cell 
groups were directly nominated and elected from the rank-and-file. 7 presidents of 
union branches were also directly nominated and elected from the rank-and-file. 6 
members were elected by the workers’ congress to take seats in the union committee, 
among whom one became the deputy president. At the same time, the previous union 
president and 7 committee members all retained their positions.  
 
In Honda Lock, union restructuring also took place after the strike. Union cell groups 
and the union committee were re-organised. A head from the production division 
replaced the formal union president, and a full-time union officer was added to the 
committee. Differently from the reforms at Honda Nanhai, the 200 workers’ 
representatives in Honda Lock all came up from candidates nominated by the division 
heads. In this sense, although the union reform appeared to be similar with Honda 
Nanhai, it is difficult to assess the actual effects of the union reforms in Honda Lock. 
The evidence suggests apparently tougher and more restrictive constraints on labour 
in Honda Lock. 
 
The restructuring of the workplace trade union after the strike was nominally a 
‘democratic approach’. The government contended the re-election was ‘the union’s 
regular election’, rather than a ‘union restructuring’. The union presidents, the 
committee, and union member representatives were all re-elected after the strike. 38 
union cell groups were established. In the elections, different divisions recommended 
candidates and elected 200 union member representatives. Nine union committee 
members were then elected from among the union member representatives. In a 
closed election within the union committee, the manager of the production division 
took office as the president. Additionally, one member of the union committee 
worked as a full-time union officer.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Chan, C. K. C. and Hui, E. S. L. (2012), ‘The Dynamics and Dilemma of Workplace Trade 
Union Reform in China: Case of the Honda Workers’ Strike’, in Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 54(5), pp. 653-668. 
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In union activities, the restructured workplace union paid more attention to the grass-
roots workers’ welfare. Collective negotiations were held in February for wages, and 
in August for welfare. ‘Opinion boxes’ were set up for workers to express their 
opinions and demands. Every month, the union was scheduled to meet the company to 
transmit workers’ opinions, and it also published the company’s feedback on the 
bulletin board. It has also organised a number of travel and sports activities. 
 
The story in the pluralist case of Honda Nanhai does not only tell of a radical 
transformation of union re-structuring in comparison with Honda Lock. It also implies 
an attempt at institutionalisation of the workers’ autonomy that had developed during 
the strike process. The case of the Honda Lock union, which pursued a less 
democratic course, implies that the authorities will maintain the existing institutions 
of a unitary union in the long term. And in the cases of DLDZ and Denso, the absence 
of union re-structuring reform implies less perceived need for radical re-structuring of 
the currently functioning union organisation. This means that consequent 
developments of the trade unions remained to be decisively influenced by the formal 
contexts of the government and management.  
 
7.2 Conclusion 
 
7.21 Dilemma and Potential – ‘Classic Dualism’ in State Corporatism 
 
Drawing on the discussion of the case studies, it has been argued that the trade unions 
have performed their dualist functions constrained by the necessary conditions of 
which the state corporatist framework is the foremost provider. The requirement of 
being the interest representative in the transition to marketisation is more restrained 
than expedited in the current state corporatist framework. This section explores the 
potential and constraints of the dualist functioning trade unions in China’s 
contemporary labour relations system.  
 
During the decades of reform, in responding to the substantial growth of differentiated 
and diverse socio-economic actors, the state has retained its domination over Chinese 
society but in a gradually more divergent and dynamic way. Having been among the 
most restricted organisations within the state regulatory system, the trade unions 
inherited their organisational structure from state socialism and are consequently 
formed in a strictly hierarchical structure affiliated to the party. At the same time, 
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there exists increasing appreciation of the importance of the trade union in the 
deepening economic reforms being able to resolve the sharpening conflicts between 
labour and capital.  
 
The three decades of trade union development are characterised by being intricately 
intertwined with state-government bureaucracies. The decades of union development 
resulted in their weak representation of their constituencies’ interests. However it 
might not be the best that the ‘dualist functioning’ trade unions can achieve, on the 
grounds that the ‘Classic Dualism’ unions do not preclude the acknowledgement of 
associational organisations of interest, and thus have the opportunity to improve their 
capability to accommodate the different interest groups.  
 
Differences in context help explain the diversity of trade union function and conduct. 
The adaptability of the doctrine of ‘Classic Dualism’ is evident in different periods, at 
different locations, and with regard to different facets of labour relations. Firstly, 
variations are influenced by the different manifestations of incompatible functions. 
For example, since the policy of non-adversarial employment relations has prevailed 
since the mid-2000s, its influence is most significant in the way that trade unions 
function in overt conflict, such as in collective bargaining and strikes. Secondly, the 
trade union’s performance has also displayed geographical diversity. The local 
political culture is an important determinant of how dualist functioning unions operate. 
In addition, the trade union’s functions are modified by the local labour relations 
system that is shaped by the economic development status, the trade union cultural 
tradition, and the dynamic power relations among the actors. The case studies show 
how the ‘Classic Dualist’ model draws on its potential to adapt itself to represent 
workers, and they also show what the constraints are. We now move to consider the 
potential of and constraints on the trade unions. 
 
7.22 Scope and Potential of the Trade Unions 
 
The marketisation of labour relations requires the trade union to perform its worker 
protection role. Apart from the statutory requirements, the campaigns of workplace 
union organising, of collective bargaining, and many other functions set up the basis 
on which the trade unions play their protection roles. Participation of the trade union 
in strike settlement helps it to listen to the workers’ voice, brings their demands to the 
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authorities, and in some cases, encourages workers to be more involved in the process 
of dispute resolution. These all serve to achieve more favourable compromises from 
the authorities by better communication in disputes.  
 
The ‘Classic Dualism’ itself provides the trade union with scope to function. In the 
strikes, the trade unions are not only institutionally integrated into the dispute 
resolution mechanisms, but also endowed by the law with the right and responsibility 
to represent workers in the settlement. But this was only of prominence in those cases 
where the MSS became a fallback means of dispute resolution, indicating that 
government decision had shifted from administrative and legal means to a greater 
emphasis on self-regulation of working conditions, to be implemented jointly by 
capital and labour through collective bargaining. In the process, the trade unions’ 
political status was employed, using these enhanced connections to boost the 
workplace unions’ leverage in resisting both threats from the manager’s authority and 
the political risks. 
 
The regions studied in these researches have shared the common feature of being 
among the most advanced in economic and industrial development in China. This 
affects government policies by reducing the pressure to maximise economic growth. 
More weight has been allocated to social development than economic development. 
The risk of increasing social instability has moved the government in the direction of 
acting with more sympathy to workers. It also appears that, as has been deduced from 
the cases in this research, that the ownership of enterprises may affect the direction of 
governmental policy. Joint-venture enterprises and domestic private enterprises 
normally have either implicit or explicit interest connections with local government. 
This is also the case with SOEs, where the cause of disputes is made more 
complicated by the directly state-driven nature of economic transition.  
 
By contrast, the FIEs are run independently of local government, thereby removing 
direct interests and governance collusion. Local government tends to take a relatively 
impartial attitude in dealing with disputes in these enterprises. Sometimes fortuitous 
factors are useful for the trade union’s effective functioning, as when the regional 
trade union presidents in DLDZ and in Denso both had the backgrounds that were 
specialised in labour or in dispute resolution. Needless to say, competent trade union 
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officials at all levels are essential to fulfill the union’s potential. In addition, the 
management in the FIEs can help the trade union to perform better. It is often the case 
that foreign managers, affected by the ingrained culture and custom of their home 
countries, possess common sense in abiding by the law.  
 
Marketisation was the root cause in activating the redistribution of the union’s dualist 
functions, and workers’ protests made a direct contribution. Workers had become 
more willing and capable at defending their rights and interests by taking collective 
action. The generally peaceful pattern of the protests has served as another important 
factor in contributing to the government’s withdrawal from direct intervention. In 
addition, increases in conflict have enhanced the importance of the union’s protection 
roles in the eyes of the Party. The manifestation of this crisis for the ACFTU can be 
heard:  
 
“I heard this from the head of the ACFTU, ‘The sounds (“dongjing”, the social 
effects of the workers’ strikes) are louder. Without being reformed, we will find it 
difficult to survive.’”442  
 
“If it fails to address it (the strikes), the trade union is going to die, as the Party will 
say ‘stop playing, you are useless!’ This is a gamble for the union.”443 
 
7.23 Limitation and Dilemma of the Trade Unions 
 
Although the unions have demonstrated some potential for effective action, in most of 
the cases their roles were almost invisible. They stood by the authorities and did not 
identify themselves separately from the authorities at workplace and regional levels. 
More important, in cases where they showed the competence and willingness to use 
the scope they have to perform their representative functions, they relied on their 
political and legal resources to achieve their emerging roles. 
 
Classic Dualism and the legal provisions are the root cause. They, on the one hand, 
endow the union with the status of workers’ representative while, on the other hand, 
setting the philosophy of ‘non-adversarial employment relations’ as one of the basic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Interview, Mr F, chancellor of China Institute of Industrial Relations, 10th January, 2012.  
443 Interview, Mr L, chancellor of School of Guangdong Provincial Trade Union, 10th 
November 2010. 
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principles the trade unions have to abide by. This controversy is particularly acute in 
circumstances where sharper conflicts exist, as these cases have illuminated, trade 
unions in the government dominated MSS system have limited liability for dispute 
resolution. 
 
State corporatism is overwhelmingly unfavourable for workers’ protection. The more 
the trade unions are subject to the party and government, the more they are impeded 
from attempts at a more direct worker protective orientation. It was the institutional 
basis of Chinese trade unions in the 2010 strike waves, after the decades of 
development characterised by being more structurally embedded in the government 
apparatus. The higher level officials of trade unions cannot themselves separate from 
the government, while the grass-roots organisations, subject to the influence of 
management, are incapable in acting on behalf of workers. Increasingly substantial 
compensation and benefits are provided as incentives for the officials. The consequent 
vested interests in the bureaucratisation of trade unions create substantial obstacles to 
any attempts to undermine the system.444 The two district union officials of Denso and 
DLDZ had sympathetic perspectives but were largely restrained by adverse 
circumstances from the party and government, while the workplace trade unions can 
only rely on their superiors to cope with the political risks. 
 
Moreover, the extent to which workers’ protest was a challenge to the union deserves 
consideration. The current studies indicate an insufficiency of workers’ protests in 
confronting the powerful authority of the formal system. The concentration on the 
economic aspects of working life causes workers to compromise with regard to 
challenging the existing institutional and political arrangements.445 It may be a wise 
choice for strikers to accept a more satisfactory wage offer at the expense of 
diminished demands for union re-structuring, taking into consideration the political 
risk and the threat to management implied in the demands. Strikes generally reveal 
the inadequacy of the leadership of the worker activists. While the leaders were 
sometimes successful in inciting a strike, they often failed in controlling the workers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Howell, J. (2008), ‘All-China Federation of Trade Unions beyond Reform? The Slow 
March of Direct Elections’, in The China Quarterly, December 2008(196), pp. 845-863; Chen, 
W. G. (2012), Concern and Reflection: Retrospection of My 30 Years Union Work, Beijing: 
China Social Science Press. In Chinese. 
445 Chan, C. K. C. (2010), The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the changing labour 
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involved. Workers’ collective action has been severely lacking in professional 
organisation and necessary resources. Cases like the Denso and two Honda plants in 
the research, where workers directly challenge the union authority with their union re-
structuring demands, are few.  
 
7.24 Concluding Remarks  
 
This research has tried to answer the question as to what extent and to what stage the 
state-corporatist regulatory framework has developed in China, by examining the 
situation of the intermediary organisations. The Chinese trade unions are likely to 
maintain the balance of their different functions but they will have to continue their 
struggle within the strict constraints of the classic dualist framework. With strikes, 
this controversy comes to the fore in the sense that the weakness of the trade unions’ 
representative function has undermined their effectiveness as intermediaries in the 
corporatist framework. This weakness has to large extent been brought about by the 
union’s caution in choosing approaches within the framework of state corporatism. 
 
Evidence from the case studies in this research reflects the authorities’ intention of 
both curbing and absorbing the worker activists, and of formalising and developing 
existing institutions. By clearing away both the radical and the conservative elements, 
the trade union may be able to improve its functioning under Classic Dualism. On a 
broader perspective, two trends in the direction of union reforms have occurred at the 
same time. The first is the attempt of the union to strengthen its relations with 
government. The second is the attempt, in a few cases, to set the workplace union 
more free from management. The former has arguably been more effective in the 
short term in raising the union’s capacity to protect workers, with the risk of greater 
dependence on government and administrative bodies. The latter trend may provide 
more room for trade unions to achieve a better balance between their dualist functions 
by being more independent in representing the workers.  
 
This research has also illuminated some optimistic developments within ‘Classic 
Dualism’. It provides some evidence that this framework may shift to a more 
impressive corporatist model. At least some lessons can be drawn from the 
experiments. A more favourable environment for trade union development must allow 
for the workers’ increasing awareness of the power of taking action to defend their 
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interests. It must allow for increasing support for this from society. And it must allow 
also for the increased space for this that is being provided by the state. Given these 
conditions, the union may become further involved in the state corporatist framework 
by virtue of achieving a better balance between its dualist functions.  Even though the 
trade union cannot throw away ‘Classic Dualism’, it could function as a workers’ 
representative within ‘Classic Dualism’ for its own sake. There is little sign that 
unions are able to abandon the inherent contradictions of Classic Dualism, because 
they were constructed within a framework that is outside their control,446 which is 
guaranteed and reinforced by state corporatism in China. In this sense, the alternative 
possibility, of a transformation from the dualist functioning union to the 
representative union, is likely to be contingent upon a zero-sum game between 
workers and the state. 
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